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ASSET AND LIABILITY MANAGEMENT OF AN INTEREST 
FREE ISLAMIC BANK 
SUMMARY 
The last two decades or so have witnessed the emergence of a new type of financial in- 
termediaries. That is the establishment of interest free Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs). As a result the literature that deals with aspects related to these institu- 
tions has grown rapidly. Three main areas have received considerable attention from 
economists, bankers, jurists of Islamic Jurisprudence and other academics. These are 
descriptive analysis of how such a system operates, theoretical framework of such a 
system utilizing modern tools of economic analysis and empirical studies of evaluating 
certain experiments. As far as the application of quantitative tools to certain prob- 
lems of these intermediaries is concerned little progress has been made. This study is 
an addition to the work carried out in that area by discussing the Asset and Liability 
Management (ALM) problem of Islamic Banks (IBs) and then developing linear op- 
timization models that help managers to decide the structure of assets, liabilities and 
capital accounts of their intermediaries. In addition, this study also aims to examine 
thoroughly the way these institutions operate so as the managerial problems of these 
practices are identified and taken into account in the modelling process. Similarly, the 
main characteristics that distinguish these intermediaries from interest based banks 
are identified. The application of the developed models to the data of two practising 
lBs reveals that the adoption of quantitative approaches to managerial problems of 
these firms is quite encouraging. In the sense that these techniques have captured 
some policies pursued by the management of the selected institutions. Moreover, 
these methods help managers to identify, and concentrate clearly on, the problem to 
be considered. However, the main requirement which deserves particular attention in 
the implementation process of these models is to have comprehensive, detailed and 
properly recorded and prepared input data. 
X111 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The establishment of financial Institutions (FIs) based on the principles of Islamic 
Law (IL) (Shari'ah) is recent in its origin. The history of this establishment can be 
traced back to the late 1940's or the beginning of the 1950's when most of the Islamic 
countries (ICs) became independent states. The first Islamic financial institution 
(IFI) in modern time was established ill the late 1950's in a rural area in Pakistan. 
Landowners were the main backers of the institution. They were prepared to deposit 
funds without interest earnings, and the credit too was made without charging interest 
to the poor peasants for the improvements of agriculture sector of the economy. But 
this experiment came to an end in the early 1960's because of the inability of the 
intermediary to meet the requirements of depositors and the salaries of the recruited 
staff. Wilson (1983) reported that this difficulty was the result of the limited resources 
available to the institution, because of its reliance on a small administrative fixed fee 
at the time when the loan was made available as the sole source of income to cover 
operating and other expenses. As this experiment of Pakistan came to an end another 
private initiative took place in the early 1960's, in the rural area of Mit-Gliamr in 
Egypt under the name of savings bank. This trial was launched by Ahmed EL- 
1 
Naggar, who later became the general secretary of the International Association of 
Islamic Banks (IAIB). Low-income peasants and labourers were the main backers of 
the institution. Within three years, the number of depositors reached 60 thousands as 
compared to a thousand founding depositors. The partial success of this experiment 
has been the result of careful selection of the staff of the bank. Accordingly, they had 
gained the confidence of the people in the local community, because of their adherence 
to Islamic teachings in their daily practices. Despite its success the experiment was 
short-lived because of the lack of government support and the fact that the bank 
did not share in the outcome of the results generated by the borrowers. Because, 
the bank , as 
in the experiment in Pakistan, charged a small administrative fixed 
fee at the time the loan is made and did not share in the profit or loss on the funds 
loaned for investment purposes which is an essential requirement for the operation of 
a bank conducting its affairs according to Islamic principles, as we will see in later 
stages of the research. After these private initiatives no further attempt was made 
until the 1970's, when Egypt and Pakistan proposed the establishment of Islamic 
Banking during the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (01C). As a result the Islamic Development Bank(IDB), a Jeddah-based 
international institution, was established. The main purpose of this institution was 
to foster economic development among the members of the OIC countries. After that 
the idea of establishing banks and other financial institutions 
(FIs) on the bases of IL 
has flourished. Oil the domestic level it was the establishment of Dubai Islamic Bank 
(DIB), of the United Arab Emirates, the first commercial bank to start providing 
financial services on the basis of Islamic teachings. From that time the process of 
establishing Islamic financial institutions (IF[s) has grown rapidly, especially in the 
second half of the 1970's and early 1980's. Now there are more than 100 IFIs working 
2 
in Muslim as well as other communities. This new phenomenon has attracted the 
interest of economists (Muslim and non-Muslini), bankers and the jurists of Islamic 
jurisprudence. As a result several studies have been conducted in examining different 
issues concerning the work of this new type of financial institutions (FIs) and the 
implications of their establishment. The scope of these studies can be grouped into 
three main categories, Ahmed(1989). The first is descriptive, consisting mainly of 
historical discussions of the nature of the banking system based on the principles of 
Islam. The second examines rigorously the theoretical framework of such a system, 
using modern tools of economic analysis. The third, which is still in its infancy, 
focuses on evaluating the experiences of the practices of some working institutions. 
As far as the application of the concepts of the theory of finance and quantitative 
tools to IBs are concerned, no significant progress has been made apart from the work 
of Bashir (1982,1983). In that occasion Bashir discussed the portfolio management 
of IBs then he developed a mathematical model to help managers decide: 1)- the 
optimal investment proportions, and 2)- the optimal profit and loss sharing (PLS) 
ratios. It is clear that Bashir's study lies in the area of asset management (i. e. 
resource allocation). In this study , 
however, the author shares the view of other 
academics e. g. Kusy and Ziemba (1986) that both sides of the balance sheet should be 
considered in discussing the asset and liability management (ALM) problem of batiks. 
Two things justify this simultaneous considerations: 1)- basic accounting principles 
need to be satisfied; and 2)- the liquidity of assets and liabilities can be matched. 
Therefore the purpose of this study is to discuss the ALM problem of IBs and then 
develop a mathematical model that will help managers in deciding the "optimal" 
combinations of assets and liabilities that optimize (i. e. maximize or minimize) the 
targeted objective(s) over the span of a planning horizon. 
3 
Hence this current study aims to achieve the following objectives: 
1. Examine thoroughly the way Islamic Banks (IBs) conduct their business opera- 
tions in providing financial services to their customers. From this discussion the 
special features that distinguish these institutions from conventional interest- 
based banks are identified. 
2. Discuss the asset and liability management (ALM) problem, and other inan- 
agerial problems, facing the management of these intermediaries (i. e. IBs). 
3. Develop an optimization model that can capture the constraints that limit the 
freedom of action of the management in pursuing the targeted objectives. The 
main purpose of this exercise is to sec what optimization techniques can offer 
in the planning and management of the activities of lBs. 
In the light of the forementioned objectives the hypotheses of the study, therefore, 
can be stated as follows: 
Are "Islamic Batiks" batiks? If the answer is yes in what sense do they differ from 
the existing interest based commercial banks? 
What are the likely implications, on the managerial level, of these banks being "Is- 
lamic"? In other words, are there any problems that might arise for the man- 
agement of these institutions in a world where the whole environment through 
which these intermediaries operate is not "Islamic"? 
&Qe 
How well1the management of these banks cope with the encountered difficulties?, 
and finally 
What are the likely benefits and costs of adopting the proposed optimization tech- 
niques to counter some of these problems? 
4 
The author has taken the above approach in treating the ALM problem of these batiks 
on the belief that if the founders or the management of these intermediaries want to 
gain a sustainable ground in the markets they serve they should devote a great deal 
of considerations to the following factors: 
" Firstly, to adhere fully to the principles of Islamic Law (IL) whatsoever the 
difficulties faced. So that customers will have confidence that owners/managers 
of these institutions are genuine in their efforts and claims. 
" Secondly, they should be innovative and competent in the managerial aspects 
as well as the "production" of financial services. That is they should be able to 
build up good skills, experiences, benefiting from modern technology and man- 
agerial techniques which have been developed in the advanced world. Because 
as Qureshi(1983) pointed out "a poor management may turn out to be fatal 
to the new system. Under this system, the savers will put a great deal of trust 
in financial intermediaries by giving their savings without getting a guarantee 
for its return". However, this last option should not be adopted blindly regard- 
less the availability of resources for carrying out such a process and the special 
characteristics of the Muslim communities. 
The methodology pursued in achieving the aims of this study is summarized in the 
following steps: 
1. The first step is descriptive covering two main areas: 
" The working of Islamic Banks (IBs) is examined rigorously as expressed 
in the literature of Islamic Banking and as it appears in practice. More 
emphasis in this study, however, is given to the contractual arrangements 
that link these banks with surplus and deficit economic units. Undertaking 
5 
this approach allows us to determine the special features that distinguish 
these newly established intermediaries from interest based batiks as well 
as this approach allows us to identify the managerial problems attached 
to such arrangements. On the practical level two operating institutions 
have been chosen. These are Kuwait Finance I-louse (KFH) and Jordan 
Islamic Bank (. JIB). These two institutions have been selected for two basic 
reasons. The first is their cooperation and willingness at the early stages 
of the research to supply me with information. The second is the fact that 
this particular selection enables iiie to study the arrangements adopted 
by Islamic Batiks in different localities of the Muslim world, because the 
economic conditions in each locality are different. Hence on the one hand it 
can be derived how flexible Islamic Law (Shari'ah) is in serving the needs 
of each community and on the other Band to observe the impact of the 
environment on the operations adopted by each institution, especially the 
impact of the regulations of the monetary authorities. 
" Discussing in particular the Asset and Liability Management (ALM) prob- 
lem of these institutions and accordingly determine what is so special about 
the ALM problem of these intermediaries. 
2. The second step is empirical where a questionnaire was designed and forwarded 
to the management of some of these institutions. The main aim of this exercise 
was to identify the objectives targeted by the management of these banks and 
the constraints that limit the decision making process of the management. 
3. The third and last step was to build optimization models of the ALM problem of 
these banks. Single and multi-objective linear versions have been considered on 
6 
the basis of certainty for a planning period of one year. Having developed these 
two models, the results generated by them are compared with those actually 
achieved and some managerial implications of this exercise are drawn. 
The course of the above methodology is covered in the chapters that this study 
contains. In addition to this introductory chapter the study consists of nine other 
chapters. A summary of their contents is given below: 
Chapter Two. explains the general framework of how financial intermediaries con- 
duct their business of the provision of financial services. This theoretical discussion 
serves as a background that Helps its in understanding the way the newly established 
banks operate and low they differ from other FIs especially non-Islamic banks. 
Chapter Three. In this chapter the work of Islamic Banking is examined as ex- 
pressed in the literature and applied in practice. On the theoretical level the principles 
provided by IL in the finance field are discussed first. This discussion is then followed 
by a rigorous examination of the instruments used by these intermediaries to pool 
and transmit funds. On the practical level Kuwait Finance House (KFI-I) and Jordan 
Islamic Batik (JIB) are studied to see low IBs conduct their affairs in the real world. 
Chapter Four. In order to have more insight into the working of IBs, how they de- 
terinine their position in the intermediation sector and recognize that they differ from 
existing non-Islamic banks, the maturity transformation role of banking is examined. 
This step has been taken because one of the criterion used to distinguish banks from 
other FIs (i. e. Non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs)) is the fact that banks tend 
to create liquidity rather than transmit it, whereas other financial institutions tend 
to distribute rather than add to the existing liquidity created elsewhere. 
Chapter Five. Having examined the nature and the working of IBs in the previous 
chapters, this chapter focuses on the ALM problem of these institutions. Therefore, 
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the main task to be accomplished in this chapter is to study the special features of the 
ALM problem that arise from the fact that these banks are identified as "Islamic". 
Features like the limitations imposed on these intermediaries from the environment 
within which they operate, the competition from conventional interest based institu- 
tions and so forth. 
Chapter Six. The ALM problem is an area of vital importance to the management 
of commercial banks in general. It is, therefore, not surprising that a great deal of 
effort has been spent in analysing and proposing solutions of how this problem can 
be tackled. In the recent past many academics have constructed quantitative ap- 
proaches, taking the form of mathematical models, as one way of dealing with this 
problem and suggesting how it can be solved. Since the author is going to follow this 
approach, a review of the previous work is the main concern of this chapter. 
Chapter Seven. This chapter covers the second step of the research methodology. 
That is the questionnaire designed and sent to the management of some of Islamic 
Banks is analysed. The questionnaire contains 18 questions (see Appendix 7.3). Sev- 
enteen of which have been included in five parts of this questionnaire with each part 
serving a particular purpose. The eighteenth question is a general one that has been 
included to give the management of these intermediaries the opportunity to suggest, 
comment or add any thing which they think is of great assistance to the fulfilment 
of the aims of this study. In most cases percentages have been used in analysing the 
obtained responses, while in others (i. e. in cases where ranking have been asked of the 
management or some relationships between some variables were sought) the Kendall 
coefficient of concordance (W) has been used. This approach has been followed be- 
cause of the small size of the sample. 
Chapter Eight. This chapter covers the first part of the third step of the research. 
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That is the construction of a Linear Programming (LP) model for the ALM problem 
of an IB. The results of the developed model are then compared against the actual 
results achieved by the management of two practicing institutions (i. e. KFII and 
JIB). Some managerial implications of applying such a technique (i. e. LP) has been 
dealt with as a second phase of assessing the use of the model. This second phase has 
been conducted under the subject of post-optimal analysis of the results obtained by 
the LP program. The reason for doing this exercise is to introduce this mathematical 
method as a decision making tool for the decision maker, rather than as a mechanical 
approach of obtaining the optimal solution of the program. 
Chapter Nine. Covers the second part of the last step of the research. That is the 
building up of a multiobjectiveoptimization model (MOOM) for the ALM problem of 
an IB. Thus the main step taken in this phase of the research is to relax the assump- 
tion of a single objective discussed in the previous chapter. The results generated by 
this model are then compared with those actually achieved on the one hand and with 
those of the single objective on the other. This simple exercise allows us to assess 
the results obtained by this model and thereafter identifying some of the managerial 
implications of applying such a model. 
Chapter Ten. This last chapter in this study contains the general concluding re- 
marks drawn from undertaking this research and their implications for the inanage- 
ment of IBs. In addition some suggestions for further research in the the ALM area 
of IBs in particular and the area of Islamic Banking in general are included. 
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Chapter 2 
What Is a Financial Intermediary? 
2.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain the general framework of how financial 
intermediaries (FIs) operate, their links with borrowers and lenders, how they are 
classified, and the special role played by them in the economy. In doing so, the oper- 
ations of the newly established batiks (i. e. Islamic Batiks (IBs) ) can be understood 
more easily. 
2.2 General Framework of how funds can be chan- 
nelled. 
Funds between surplus economic units (ultimate lenders) and deficit economic units 
(ultimate borrowers) can be channelled through three main ways: 
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2.2.1 Direct Financing - Barter Exchange. 
In this case borrowers and lenders trade funds between themselves without the in- 
volvement of any intermediaries or markets. In a modern economy it is argued that 
this is an inefficient way, because of the problems associated with its practice. Broadly 
speaking, problems associated with this way of finance are similar to those associated 
with barter exchange. Among others, one can mention the following: 
" Fligh transaction costs in terms of time, search and the like. 
" Difficulties of matching the needs of the two parties (ultimate borrowers and 
lenders). 
" Lack of diversification. 
" High risks: liquidity, default and the variations in rates of return. 
Although this direct way of financing is inefficient in many aspects, it does take 
place in the present time, especially in the communities where financial practices 
are not widespread, because of the underdevelopment of the financial system or the 
resentment of the people to participate in it. 
2.2.2 Direct Financing - Market place case. 
In this way of financing, financial markets are being established, so that the two 
parties can meet their requirements as sellers of funds (holders of securities = secu- 
rity buyers) in the case of ultimate lenders or as buyers of funds (security issuers = 
security sellers) in the case of ultimate borrowers. Brokerage firms will play an im- 
portant role in providing information about trading opportunities against fixed fees 
or commissions. Time function of these firms is to play the `middleman' role, that is 
transmitting funds and securities between the parties without any transformation to 
the basic characteristics of the securities involved. Some of the gains that this way of 
finance can provide are listed below: 
" Easing trade between lenders and borrowers, because there is a particular place 
where both parties can meet. 
" Reducing transaction costs in terms of time and search. 
" Providing more liquidity, because of the ability of encashing securities, before 
their maturity date, more easier than the barter exchange case. 
" Narrowing the gap in mismatch requirements of the two parties (ultimate bor- 
rowers and lenders), because more information is available about trading op- 
portunities. 
Even though this way of transmitting funds has overcome some of the difficulties 
countered in the barter exchange case, there is still a third way through which these 
problems can be reduced further. This way is the establishment of firms that special- 
ize in funds trading. These firms are called financial intermediaries (FIs) and their 
functioning is treated in the next section. 
2.2.3 Indirect Financing - Financial Intermediaries case. 
Here we come to a situation where the channelling of funds is conducted through 
firms performing the "production" of financial services function as other firms, in the 
economy, that specialize in the production of goods and other services. These firms 
are literally known as financial intermediaries or institutions (FIs). Therefore, FIs 
can be defined as those institutions that stand in between surplus economic units 
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(ultimate lenders) and deficit economic units (ultimate borrowers). That is they 
stand between those economic units whose earnings exceed their expenditure at any 
moment in time and those units whose needs of financial resources exceed their own 
resources. In this case securities, in most cases, are no longer passed on without being 
transformed. That is why the contractual arrangements are broken down into two 
separate phases: 
1. Arrangements between intermediaries and their borrowers, on one hand and, 
2. The intermediaries and their lenders on the other. 
Thus FIs are combining brokerage (distribution) and transformation functions. That 
is why they are called firms, because they mix up certain `factors of production' 
as inputs to produce the final `output' in the form of financial services. Although 
what it is that these firms produce is a controversial point, but these intermediaries 
seem to satisfy the following basic needs of other firms and households, Lewis and 
Davis(1987): 
1. Payment services, which provide means of paying for and acquiring goods and 
services. 
2. Consumption transformation, which enables the purchase of goods to be rear- 
ranged over time. For example households can defer spending to later periods, 
firms can undertake investment now. 
3. Financial security, which ensures the consonance of consumption and investment 
expenditure in the face of changed economic circumstances, as may arise from 
ill health, accidents to life or property, unemployment, exchange rate variations, 
etc. 
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The above discussion of the ways of channeling funds can be summarized in Fig- 
ure 2.1. It is clear from this Figure that in direct financing case (whether it is a 
barter exchange or market place) funds are being exchanged with primary securities 
i. e. securities issued by deficit economic units no alteration has been made to the 
basic characteristics of these securities. However, in the indirect way of financing the 
operation is broken down into two separate cases: 
" Intermediaries are pooling funds from surplus units by issuing secondary secu- 
rities (with characteristics different from primary ones) against themselves. 
" Intermediaries are transmitting funds to deficit units by holding primary secu- 
rities issued by these economic units. The lower section of Figure 2.1 provides 
the following facts about FIs: 
1. In channeling funds through FIs, three players are involved: 
- Surplus economic units (ultimate lenders), - FIs, and - Deficit economic 
units (ultimate borrowers). This fact also is present in the middle section 
of the Figure, where Fis are replaced by markets. 
2. FIs obtain funds from surplus economic units by issuing securities which 
represent the claims of lenders on FIs. These securities are known as "sec- 
ondary securities". Thus secondary securities are those financial instru- 
ments issued and sold by Fis in exchange of funds from surplus economic 
units. Secondary securities, therefore, are assets for lenders and liabilities 
against FIs. 
3. Deficit economic units (ultimate borrowers) acquire funds from FIs by issu- 
ing securities which represent Fls claims. These securities are termed "pri- 
mary securities". Therefore, primary securities can be defined as financial 
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Figure 2-1 Stag Q-a sof 
I ri1 x inediat ion - 
The first phase: Barter case. 
Funds supplied by SPU 
Surplus Units Deficit Units 
(SPU) (DFU) 
Ultimate lenders Ultimate borrowers 
Securities issued by DFU 
The second phase : Establishment of markets. 
securities issued securities issued 
by DFU by DFU 
The third phase: Establishment of FIs. 
securities issued securities issued 
by FIs by DFU 
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funds supplied funds supplied 
by SPU by SPU 
funds supplied funds supplied 
by SPU by FIs 
claims, debt or equity instruments, against business concern, individuals 
and governments. Hence primary securities are assets of FIs and liabilities 
against ultimate borrowers. 
4. The securities issued by Fis differ, in many aspects such as size, safety, 
liquidity, maturity, markatability, etc, from primary securities. The most 
important of which are market value and liquidity. Liquidity is defined, 
in this case, as the investors' ability to convert assets such as checking 
accounts into cash at short notice with little or no loss in current value, 
Gup (1984). Thus financial intermediaries are assets transformers in the 
sense that changing risky primary securities (their assets (e. g. loans)) 
with unstable market value into less risky securities (their liabilities (e. g. 
chequing deposits)) with stable market value. In short, the securities are 
no longer passed on, in most cases, without any transformation to the basic 
characteristics of primary securities. 
5. Since FIs are defined as firms that belong to the service sector of the econ- 
oiny like any other firms, the management of these institutions, therefore, is 
responsible for earning income for those who have initiated their establish- 
ment. As Crosse and Hempel (1980) pointed out that "... FIs management 
should use the same basic framework for decision making as any other pri- 
vate business corporation ... the task of competent management of 
FIs is 
to perform the economic functions inherent in the intermediation business 
in such away as to maximize the return on the owners' investment over 
time without taking excessive risks". 
It appears from the above list that it is the function of asset transformation 
which gives FIs the distinctive feature in the structure of the financial system. 
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Therefore, it seems that a fundamental question arises; that is why are these 
firms able to perform this function? In other words, why are FIs able to operate 
in the way described above? The main reason advocated by academics in their 
analysis is the fact that these firms are able to exploit and benefit from the 
phenomenon of the Law of Large numbers. It is widely argued that this law 
helps FIs to achieve the following aims: 
Firstly, FIs are able to reduce risk. There are various types of risks (e. g. 
default risk, variations of rate of return risk, exchange rate risk, etc) that 
are borne from dealings in financial transactions. Two basic types of risk 
are examined here to illustrate how FIs can benefit from the law of large 
numbers in order to reduce the size of the risk involved. Default risk refers 
to the inability of the borrower to repay his obligations (i. e. the principal 
plus the amount of interest or profit, if any, realized) back when they come 
due. It is obvious in the case of direct financing that the single ultimate 
lender bears all the default risk borne from such engagement in the direct 
financial transactions. However, if that single investor places his funds 
with an intermediary which in turn on-lends this amount and other funds 
of other depositors to a large number of borrowers, the size of risk incurred 
by the single lender will be reduced in this case. To illustrate how this can 
be done let us consider the following example: suppose that an individual 
lender wants to invest 100 pounds directly, let say, to a businessman in his 
local community. Assume further that there is a probability of 5 percent 
that the businessman will default completely i. e. when the time of the 
repayment comes due the lender receives the whole of his money back or 
nothing at all. Now let us suppose that instead of direct lending to the 
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ultimate borrower the lender deposited his 100 pounds with an Fl, which 
is also faced with a5 per cent that the borrower will be unable to repay 
the money back, and the Fl has received other deposits so that its total 
deposits are 1000 pounds. The FI has used these deposits to finance the 
projects of 10 entrepreneurs, 100 pounds each. Since there is a probability 
of 5 per cent that the money lent will be considered as bad debts, the FI 
can expect a loss totaling 50 pounds on these funds. This loss in turn will 
be divided between, let say the 10 depositors, each one of them incurring 
the sum of 5 pounds. We can see from this simple example how our lender 
has exchanged a5 per cent chance that he will lose all his money if he 
lends directly to a single borrower, for a near certainty that he will lose 5 
per cent of his investment only as a result of the spreading of the loss of 
50 pounds over all depositors of the Fl. We can conclude that Fls are able 
to reduce the size of the default risk for a single lender by this pooling of 
risk mechanism. Now consider the other type of risk, i. e. the variations 
of the rate of return. The key element of reducing the size of this risk 
is through diversification. This process refers to the spreading of funds 
over a range of projects rather than putting the whole money in a single 
project or with a single borrower. Thus an individual lender is faced with 
greater risk (i. e. putting all his eggs in one basket) if he places his funds in 
a single project. Since intermediaries are dealing with a large number of 
borrowers it is expected that their portfolios are well diversified or at least 
these portfolios are more diversified than in the case of direct financing to 
the extent that the size of the variations of rates of return is reduced. 
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Secondly, FIs are able to provide liquidity. This aim is achieved by FIs 
through the maturity transformation of primary securities they hold as 
their assets. In other words at least some FIs, such as banks, are able 
to transform their illiquid risky assets (primary securities) into safe liquid 
liabilities (secondary securities). FIs are able to perform this function be- 
cause of the of the large number of customers they deal with. It is expected 
that under normal conditions not everybody wants his money at the same 
time or at least that there is a large number of depositors who can make 
almost a perfect offsetting between deposited funds and those withdrawn. 
Therefore, FIs but especially banks are in a position that allows them to 
practise the maturity transformation function. It should be noted that the 
Law of Large numbers is only one factor that explains why FIs are able 
to produce another class of securities which differ, in many aspects, with 
the securities issued by ultimate borrowers, there are other factors which 
should not be ignored (e. g. good and sustainable shares in the markets of 
both depositors and borrowers, especially that of depositors, good assess- 
ments of the credit-worthiness of borrowers, the participation in well devel- 
oped financial markets, etc). Moreover, in the case of retail banks 1 there 
is another factor that should be taken into account. That is the money 
transmission function that these intermediaries provide. This element has 
given an edge to banks over other Fis in providing liquidity to individuals 
and institutions. As early as the day of their establishment banks have 
accepted deposits from surplus economic units and issued certificates for 
these customers specifying the conditions and rights of withdrawing the 
1 Rtail banks, commercial banks, interest-based banks, non-Islamic Banks or simply banks are 
used in this research interchangably to mean the same thing. 
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deposited funds. In modern time, however, this function has developed 
and expended tremendously. Banks provide an array of deposit facilities 
ranging from demand to time deposits. In any case the accountholder of 
these deposits, particularly demand type, is supplied with cheque books 
and cards which are used for discharging debts and spending expenses 
(whether to pay for services or goods and commodities). In addition, with 
the help of developments in information technology batiks have introduced 
other means through which the function of the money transmission ser- 
vices can be carried out. These means include, among others, Visa, Access 
and other credit cards, automated teller machines, etc. 
Thirdly, FIs are able to reduce the monitoring costs of borrowers' 
projects. In recent years much emphasis has been placed on the dele- 
gated monitoring function carried out by FIs. Many models have been 
developed which illustrate the fact that FIs are delegated the task of mon- 
itoring the costly loans or projects of borrowers or entrepreneurs. FIs can 
play this role because they have a net cost advantage over the direct case 
of lending and borrowing. This is so because the environment through 
which financial transactions take place is characterized by the presence of 
information asymmetry pliettotnenon. That is, investors or entrepreneurs 
know more about the businesses they are undertaking than the ultimate 
lenders do. If lenders are inclined to monitor the investors's project they 
should be prepared to incur a monitoring cost. Therefore, they are faced 
with the following dilemma: either not to bother about the perforinauce 
of the projects financed by their funds or to incur the cost of monitoring. 
However, there is a third way that this dileinina can be overcome. That 
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is to delegate this task to some of them or to an outsider who can reduce 
the monitoring cost quite considerably through the specialization of infor- 
mation processing and collection about the businesses of the borrowers. In 
this last case FIs clearly fit the bill of performing such a task. As Dia- 
mond (1984) demonstrated "... the cots of monitoring may be very high 
[in the case of direct lending-borrowing process] if there are many lenders. 
If there are In outside security holders in a firm and it costs K>0 to 
monitor, the total cost of direct monitoring is rn*K. This will imply either 
a very large expenditure on monitoring, or a free rider problem where no 
securityholder monitors because his share of the benefits is small. The 
obvious thing to do is for some securityliolders to monitor on behalf of 
others, and we are then faced with analysing the provision of the incen- 
tives for delegated monitoring [carried out by FIs]. " It was, in fact that 
work of Diamond (1984) which initiated the large block of literature devel- 
oped in this area. Diamond (1984) argued that diversification within the 
intermediary is the key element of achieving such net cost advantage over 
direct lendi mg-borrowing of the cost of monitoring the information of the 
projects of borrowers. 
From the foregoing discussion we can summarize the following characteristics 
that FIs have, Boyd and Prescott (1986): 
1. Financial intermediaries borrow from one subset of agents in the economy 
and lend to another. 
2. Both subsets-borrowers and lenders- are typically large. Thus, to the ex- 
tent that numbers represent diversification, FIs are generally well diversi- 
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fled in both sides of their balance sheet. 
3. Financial intermediaries deal with borrowers whose information set may 
be different from theirs. In practical terms, this means that would-be 
borrowers often have better information concerning their own credit risk 
than do the intermediaries. 
4. FIs produce costly information on the attributes of would-be borrowers. 
This information is used to allocate loans and set terms. 
5. FIs issue claims that have state contingent payoffs different from claims 
issued by ultimate borrowers. 
2.3 Classification of FIs. 
In the previous section we have discussed generally how intermediaries operate 
and why they are able to perform such a distinctive role in the economy. At- 
tention in this section is given to the task of classifying FIs. There are many 
FIs operating nowadays: what differentiates one group of FIs from the other 
(or an FI from the other)? One can argue that this is a simple task, because 
if we have many business companies practicing in the same sector (let us say 
the automobile sector) and yet we can distinguish one factory from the other, 
therefore the same principle holds true for FIs. However, while this argument 
can be applied to other sectors, because of the high degree of specialization, it 
cannot be applied easily to the `finance industry', because of imperfect special- 
ization. Carter and Partington (1981) state " The `finance industry' consists 
of many different types of firms providing a wide range of services, and this 
presents difficulties in deciding how to classify them. This difficulty is partly 
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the result of imperfect specialization by financial firms, i. e. many firms perform 
different kind of functions for their costumers and the distinguishing features 
may not be very clear from mere examination of their balance sheets... ". In 
this study, however, we can argue that all Fis are similar in purpose, i. e. the 
provision of financial services to their costumers. One way of classifying FIs 
is to examine thoroughly the primary and secondary securities in which FIs 
deal. As Gup (1984) states " the principal difference among various types of 
FIs concerns the types of primary securities they hold as assets and the types 
of secondary securities they sell as liabilities", Table 2.1 is presented below to 
illustrate this point. 
Table 2.1 Examples of Securities at Selected Financial 
Intermediaries. 
Financial Intermediary Primary Security Secondary security 
Savings and loan 
associations 
Mortgages Saving shares 
Mutual funds Stocks and Bonds Mutual fund shares 
Life insurance 
companies 
Stocks, Bonds 
and Mortgages 
Life insurance policies 
or certificates 
Credit unions Consumer loans credit union shares 
Commercial banks Commercial and industrial 
loans, consumer loans 
and Mortgages 
Demand deposits 
savings accounts 
Certificates of deposits 
Pension funds Stocks and Bonds Pension funds policies 
Money market funds short-term securities shares 
Note : This Table has been reproduced from Gup(1984). 
It is clear from the above Table that FIs do have some overlapping of services, 
especially in the case of primary securities, in providing financial services to 
their customers, but they do have contrasts which distinguish one Fl from the 
other. For example, take the case of Mutual and Pension funds, both intermedi- 
aries hold stocks and bonds as their primary securities. However, the secondary 
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securities that are issued by each one are not the same. Mutual funds are 
issuing mutual fund shares, on the other Band Pension funds issue pension funds 
policies. It is, therefore, obvious that one way of dealing with the classification 
problem of FIs is to examine thoroughly the primary and secondary securities 
each FI holds. 
Another approach of classifying FIs is to consider in a broad sense the way they 
undertake their business. Carter and Partington (1981) point out that "... thus 
it may be necessary to consider ... the way 
in which they [FIs] operate their 
business 
... 
". 
A good starting point for examining the classification of Fis is the traditional 
classification of Fls; that is FIs generally can be divided into two main groups: 
Bank Financial Intermediaries (BFIs) and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries 
(NBFIs). This classification of FIs is based upon two broad approaches as 
discussed by academics (e. g Carter and Partington (1981), Bain (1981), Goacher 
(1986), and Lewis and Davis (1987)). These two approaches are: 
- Examining the liabilities of Fis and determining the precise nature and 
use of these liabilities. In the previous section we concluded our discussion 
about Fls by summing up five important facts about the operations of 
FIs. It is the last fact which is our main concern here, that is the class of 
securities created by Fis against themselves (these securities are assets for 
lenders and liabilities against FIs). It is argued by some academics that 
the liabilities of BFIs are unique in the sense that they serve the function 
of means of exchange and payment. Thus, these liabilities of BFIs are used 
as money for settling debts and payments, whereas the liabilities of NBFIs 
cannot be used in this way. In other words, the liabilities of BFIs consti- 
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tute a major part of the money supply, whereas the liabilities of NBFIs do 
not. Clearly, this distinction depends upon the definition of money, a nar- 
row definition (Mo) means all FIs are classified as NBFIs, broad definitions 
mean FIs are divided into BFIs and NBFIs. Nonetheless, even if we take 
the latter criterion (broad definition of money) much controversy remains, 
as Coacher (1986) points out " there are many ambiguities, such as what 
proportion of these liabilities should be included in the chosen money sup- 
ply measure, surrounding this particular basis of classification". Since this 
criterion of classification does not tell us a lot about the contribution of 
an individual bank to the liquidity available for the rest of the economy 
(banks and non batik agents). It is, therefore, not of much importance 
in our analysis. In Niehans and Hewson's (1976) work this criterion of 
classification is termed as gross liquidity, and it can be measured in terms 
of suitably defined monetary aggregate like MI, M2, etc. 
- The other approach is based on the criterion of whether the intermediary 
can create credit (liquidity creation), or passes on credit (liquidity distri- 
bution). If the intermediary creates liquidity (adds liquidity to the rest of 
the economy) is said to be considered as an BFI, if this is not the case the 
intermediary is classified as an NBFI. More investigations of these points 
will be carried out when the maturity transformation of IBs is examined. 
2.4 The role played by the FIs in the economy. 
To begin our discussion, we can state that the basic role played by FIs cen- 
tres around narrowing the gap between the mismatch needs of ultimate lenders 
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(savers) and ultimate borrowers (investors), as stated by Hempel and Yawitz 
(1977) " FIs operate in order to fill the diverse needs of both ultimate lenders 
and ultimate borrowers in the economy". Clearly, this is not the only role played 
by FIs. Imagine that we are in an economy where neither money nor any other 
financial asset exists, in this case, all economic units would be required to have 
balanced budgets at all times and capital formation, therefore, would be very 
low. It depends upon the distribution of current income, more consumption 
now means small amounts will be assigned for savings in the future and vice 
versa. In this economy, it is argued that external financing would be very lim- 
ited. Hence, this economy would tend to be relatively inefficient in allocating 
resources and would tend to have a low rate of economic growth. Now consider 
the other side of the coin, that is the case of an economy where a complete 
financial system (i. e. where a range of financial instruments, institutions and 
markets exist) is established. In this economy there exist money as well as va- 
riety of financial assets and the trade in funds is internalized, (as we saw in the 
second section). In this economy the specialized institutions (FIs) can perform 
the function of channeling funds either as agents (brokers) i. e. the transmitting 
of funds and assets without any modifications, or as asset transformers. It is 
this latter case which is thought to give FIs certain advantages in performing 
the intermediation role, this is not to say that brokerage function is not an im- 
portant function, but just to emphasize the "production" function performed 
by FIs. This asset transformation function assists economic growth in so many 
aspects, Hempel and Yawitz (1977), Yeager and Seitz (1989) and Henning, Pig- 
ott and Scott (1988). First, it bridges the gap of mismatching needs of ultimate 
borrowers and ultimate lenders by creating two markets, one for borrowers and 
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the other for lenders (see the second section). Second, it separates saving from 
investment decisions, so as the budget constraints of economic agents are ex- 
tended. Third, it encourages saving and investment processes by providing a 
menu of financial assets (e. g. current accounts, units of unit trust, etc) and a 
variety of arrangements (e. g. loans, drafts, etc) for transmitting the available 
funds respectively. Therefore, saving and investment processes became more 
attractive, so that the growth of capital and income is increased. Fourth, it 
(transformation) reduces risk and costs involved in the direct way of channeling 
funds, and it increases liquidity and marketability of liabilities. Fifth, possessing 
and providing information about investment opportunities, so as the selection 
of assets for portfolios is delegated and monitored by FIs. Sixth, productivity 
increases, because of specialization of activities. 
Having said that, however, it is important to note that maturity transformation 
or transmutation as some called it, i. e. liquidity creation, as one aspect of asset 
transformation is not a desired function that should be carried out all times by 
FIs as some economists have argued. Niehans (1978) pointed out "there is no 
logical or economic reason why financial intermediaries should always increase 
the money supply. Nonbank intermediaries, for example, while perhaps increas- 
ing the liquidity of the rest of the economy, typically reduce its money supply. 
This is because they hold some monetary assets as reserves, while even their 
most liquid liabilities (like savings deposits) are not monetary. There is also no 
logical or economic reason why Fls should always increase the liquidity of the 
rest of the economy. One could imagine banks that find it profitable to maintain 
balance sheets implying a reduction in the nonbank liquidity by borrowing (in 
the aggregate) long to lend (in the aggregate) short ... 
by and large, however, 
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asset transformation by banks is usually of a sort to add both to the liquidity 
and to the money supply of the rest of the economy... ". Some academics, on the 
other Band, have gone further than this by describing asset transformation func- 
tion as a mis-function of Fis and the process that leads to the presence of this 
phenomenon as mis-intermediation. This type of analysis is well explained in 
the work of McCulloch (1981). After developing his analysis McCulloch (1981) 
ended his discussion by the following statements "we have shown that mis- 
intermediation, the traditional mismatching of asset and liability maturities by 
financial intermediaries, is a potential source of macroeconomic disequilibrium. 
Rather than protecting economic participants from interest rate uncertainty, it 
actually subjects the economy to additional, unnecessary interest rate uncer- 
tainty, and to inefficiency in the intertemporal production process. Far from 
being an essential function of financial intermediaries, maturity transformation 
is actually a mis-function". 
2.5 Concluding Remarks. 
From the above discussion the following remarks can be drawn: 
FIs are firms whose main function is trading in funds. They internalize the 
operations of the provision of financial services, because of the considerable 
advantages that they can gain from; specialization, economies of scale and 
scope, the exploitation of the law of large numbers, etc. 
In performing their function FIs create another class of financial instruments 
termed secondary securities. That is why the saving and investment op- 
erations are being separated by creating two markets; one for ultimate 
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borrowers and the other for the ultimate lenders. Secondary securities 
have many different features that distinguish them from primary ones. 
The most important of which are: market value, risk, safety and liquidity. 
It is well explained in the literature of FIs and the examination of the op- 
erations of FIs that: secondary securities are having a stable market value, 
more safer, less risky and more liquid than primary securities. Of course, 
many factors have attributed to the presence of these distinguishing ele- 
ments. Among others, one can mention: the well developed money and 
capital markets, the well established inter-FIs link and the exploitation 
of the law of large numbers. This latter factor helps FIs in building well 
diversified portfolios on both sides of the balance sheet and constructing 
good models that assist in making nearly accurate expectations of some 
events (e. g. the number of people that are going to withdraw or deposit 
their funds in certain periods). 
FIs are similar in purpose; that is the provision of financial services to their 
customers. However, different FIs are working under different names. One 
of the distinguishing factor that helps us in classifying Fls is the financial 
assets in which they deal. In other words, the examination of assets that 
an Fl holds (i. e. primary securities) and the assets issued by that Fl (i. e. 
secondary securities) allows us to classify them accordingly. 
FIs play a very important role in the modern economy. They provide infor- 
mation about investment opportunities, and a menu of assets for savers as 
well as a variety of different arrangements for investors. 
29 
Chapter 3 
How Do Islamic Banks Operate? 
3.1 Introduction 
The main concern of this chapter is to study the arrangements provided by Islamic 
Banks (IBs) in conducting their business operations of the provision of financial ser- 
vices. These new institutions claim that they can provide contractual arrangements 
for their customers on the basis of profit and loss sharing (PLS) principle. That is, 
these new institutions, in contrast to conventional banks, do not go to raise or invest 
funds through the use of the debt mode of finance. By examining the way these 
institutions operate, several interesting questions can be answered. Among others, 
one can mention the following: are they (IBs) really playing a special role in the com- 
munities within which they operate, so their existence is justified, or are they playing 
the same role as the conventional institutions? That is, is the reality just a change in 
name? Instead of saying just the word batik, should it be preceded by the adjective 
"Islamic" to signify a fundamental difference? The examination of how lBs operate, 
goes as follows: principles governing their operations are stated first. Contractual 
arrangements available to them (IBs) are discussed next. Thirdly, the functioning of 
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two operating institutions are examined; namely the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) and 
Kuwait Finance I-louse (KFI-I). 
3.2 Principles Governing the Operations of Is- 
lamic Banking. 
Islam is a religion that provides general guide-lines which cover all aspects of hu- 
mau life, it is, therefore, not a religion in the limited sense of the word. It seeks 
to develop a new moral responsibility in man, and integrated social existence and 
a new socio-economic and political order. It has its own approach to economics, 
concepts, objectives, methods, laws and instruments, (Presley (1988)). Therefore, 
Islam provides a framework within which banking operations can be conducted. This 
framework is guided by the following principles, (Khau (1983), El-Naggar (1983) and 
Al-Abadi (1981). 
3.2.1 The Prohibition of "Biba" in all Transaction Forms. 
It has been stated clearly and explicitly in the Qur'an (Muslims Holy Book) and 
the Sunnah 1, the two main sources of Islamic Law Shari'ah that Allah (i. e. God) 
prohibited usury and permitted trade. But, what is meant by this word? and what 
kind of banking operations are considered as Riba 2 transactions? Literally, the word 
Riba (usury) means increase, excess, growth, rise and the like. However, with respect 
'Sunnah is the second source of Islamic Law (Shari'ah), and it refers essentially to the Prophet 
Mohammed's (PBUH) example as indicated by his practice of the Dccn (i. e. religion of Islam). The 
only way to know the Sunnah is through the collection of Ahadith (plural of Hadith). This latter 
refers to a report on the saying, deed or tacit approval of the Prophet (PBUH), Chapra(1985) with 
minor modifications. 
2The word Riba and usury are used in this study interchangeably to mean the same thing. 
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to the provision of financial services the word Riba is referred to in a specific context. 
In the pre-Islamic period the word usury was used conventionally to identify a class 
of business transactions. The general feature of these traditions was that a fixed 
amount was required over the principal. One form of dealings was that a person sold 
a product to some one on the agreement that a specified price was payable at future 
date. If at the end of the stipulated time the price was not paid by the buyer, then the 
seller would increase the amount due and extend the payment period, Klan (1985). 
Another form was that Arabs used to lend money to each other on the agreement 
that after a specified period of time the borrower would repay an excess amount over 
the principal sum due, Klan (1985). A third form was that an Arab would snake 
a loan to someone on the basis of a monthly fixed return over the principal sum 
and if at the end of the loan period the borrower was unable to repay they would 
increase the monthly fixed return, Khan (1985). Clearly, these practices demonstrate 
two ways of practicing usury. The first is that maturity of the loan or an unpaid 
due amount is being extended on the basis that the lender is getting paid for this 
extension. The second is providing or lending money on the basis of guarantied 
fixed rate of return at specific times (monthly, quarterly, yearly or any other interval 
the borrower an lender agree upon). Therefore, in financial transactions the word 
"Riba" is referred to as the `premium' that must be paid by the borrower to the 
lender with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension in its 
maturity, Chapra (1985). It is, therefore, very clear that all interest based dealings 
which dominate the financial practices nowadays fall within the range of this explicit 
definition. In Islamic jurisprudence, this kind of "Riba" is known as Riba-Al-Duyun. 3 
In fact there is another type of usury known as Riba-Al-Buyu 4 which is an extension 
'According to Ibn Rushd classification as reported by AL-Ameen (1983). 
`This type in turn covers two types of Riba. These are Riba-Al-Nassi'ah and Riba-A1-Fad!. 
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of usury to barter trade of some identical commodities. These commodities have been 
named by the Sunnah of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH). Since this kind of usury is 
not our main concern here we are not going to discuss its nature. The reader can 
consult, Chapra (1985), Al-Ameen (1983) and AL-Shabbani (1987) and others. We 
can conclude from the foregoing discussion that providing financial services according 
to the teachings of Islam cannot be conducted on the basis of receiving and paying 
interest. 
Before we end this discussion it is important to state some reasons about why Islamic 
Law (Shari'ah) is so restricted on the ban of Riba (usury) from the economy in 
general and the financial system in particular. The most advocated reason presented 
by Muslim economists is that lending on the basis of usury is regarded as an unjust 
way of making profit, "But if you return back you shall have your capital sums, 
deal not unjustly and you shall not be dealt with unjustly", (AI-Qur'an, Surrah 
(Chapter) 2, Verse 279). It is clear from this quotation that Islam considers Riba 
dealings as an unjust way of earning income. This is so, because undertaking any 
investment project has no certainty that the project will yield a positive rate of return. 
The project financier, therefore, has no reason in claiming a positive rate of return 
(i. e. pre-determined rate of interest), while his money cannot yield money without 
the collaboration of labour. The parties involved in any kind of business should, 
therefore, share the outcome of the business whether it is negative or positive. The 
other factor to be mentioned in this case is why the fortune of the lender is limited 
to this fraction of the results achieved by the entrepreneur? In highlighting this fact 
Muslim economist argue that " when a person lends money, the funds are either 
used to create a debt or an asset (i. e. through investment). In the first case, Islam 
considers that there is no justifiable reason why the lender should receive a return 
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simply through the act of lending per se. Nor is there justification, either from the 
point of view of the smooth functioning of the economy or any tenable scheme of 
social justice, for the state to attempt to enforce an unconditional promise of interest 
payment regardless of the use made of the borrowed money. If, on the other land, the 
money is used to create additional capital wealth, the question is raised as to why the 
lender should be entitled only to small fraction (represented by interest rate) of the 
exchange value of the utility created from the use made of the funds; the lender should 
be remunerated to the extent of the involvement of his financial capital in creating 
the incremental wealth", (Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987)). The other reason presented is 
the fact that the proclaimed "pure rate of interest" is just a theoretical matter that 
exists in the classrooms and academic literature. As Iqbal and Mirakhor reported 
the Muslim economists argument "... when forced into the position of identifying 
the pure rate of interest, the theorists always refer to the rates of return on "riskless 
assets" such as those paid on high quality government securities or the rate of return 
on debentures of highly successful corporations. But this is a rate of interest on debt, 
not the rate of return on capital assets. In the case of most successful companies' 
debentures, the rates of interest are determined on the basis of the long-term success 
of these businesses, and if these corporations face difficulties and their profits decline, 
the "pure rate" ceases to prevail because their debentures are no longer considered 
"riskless". Hence the pure rate of interest is only a theoretical construct that does 
not correspond to the actual return on capital assets... ". These two reasons are few 
examples only. The list, therefore, is not an exhaustive one, the interested reader 
can refer to Chapra(1985), Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987), Siddiqi (1983) and Presley 
(1988). Having listed these objections, however, we should acknowledge the reasons 
why debt or interest based mode of finance dominates the world of financial affairs 
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nowadays? I believe two main reasons can be listed. The first is the presence of the 
information asymmetries phenomena, because of the `Moral Hazard'' problem. That 
is the borrower or entrepreneur can monitor the outcome of his business costlessly or 
at least with a cost less than that of the lender if the latter carries out such a task 
(i. e. monitoring the outcome of the project undertaken by the borrower). In case the 
lender (capital provider) decides to monitor the performance of the project, financed 
through his money, lie has to incur a cost of carrying out such a task. Therefore, if 
there is a cost associated with such monitoring debt contract is argued to minimize 
this cost. This point is well illustrated and emphasized in the recent literature of the 
theory of financial intermedaitiotn, examples of these, Diamond (1984), Williamson 
(1986,1987), Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Lacker (1989,1991). Khan (1985) 6 stated 
that his work offered an explanation to the dominant role of debt mode of finance 
in the world of financial affairs "a new explanation is given for firms using debt 
to finance their capital structure. The theory based on the idea that if there are 
monitoring costs associated with financial contracts then debt minimizes these costs". 
Williamson (1986) arrived to the same conclusion by stating that "debt [contracts] 
can be derived as optimal arrangements between borrowers and lenders such contracts 
serve to economize on the monitoring cost". Second, is the fact that existing laws 
and regulations, in most if not all countries, beside the academic literature tend to 
privilege holders of debt instruments. This is very clear in the case of insurance deposit 
'In explaining this phenomenon Williamson (1987) states "if entrepreneurs in this environment 
[the environment within which his analysis is conducted] were paihogically honest (they never lie, 
even if it were in their interest to do so), then there would be no need for monitoring investment 
outcomes, and the problem would be uninteresting. However, agents are assumed to be rational 
(attentive to their own interests). Thus, without monitoring, an entrepreneur whose project was 
funded at time t and was successful would adopt the following utility maximizing strategy: report 
at t+1 that the project was unsuccessful and then consume the entire return". 
6This work originally completed in 1983 as a Ph. D dissertation at Boston University and published 
as a book in 1985. 
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schemes, collaterals and other regulations. Pres lRy(1988) pointed out "there is a 
fundamental difference between an ordinary shareholder who is one of the proprietors 
of the enterprise, liable for its debts to the extent of his investment, and a creditor who, 
as a debenture holder, lends without the risk of owning and operating capital goods _ 
and who claims interest irrespective of the profit or loss position of the enterprise. He 
runs a risk, but this risk is not of the enterprise but of the solvency of the borrower". 
Qureshi (1983) pointed out that interest based batiks are working smoothly because 
of "... a combination of the Law of Large numbers and the government intervention 
". Therefore, it is in this `proto-type' environment where it has been derived that 
debt contracts are optimal as Lacker (1991) did when he concluded his work stating 
that only collateralized debt contracts are optimal. 
3.2.2 No Gain without the Risk of Loss. 
Since Islam prohibits interest as the basis on which funds are traded, it should there- 
fore provide alternative financial instruments for the provision of financial services. 
These contractual arrangements which Islam offers are based on the profit and loss _ 
sharing (PLS) principle. Lenders (being depositors or any economic agent with ex- 
cess money assigned for lending purposes) under this arrangement are not entitled 
to receive a pre-determined positive rate of return (i. e. interest rates) at specified 
intervals regardless the outcome of the undertaken business. Instead, if those surplus 
economic units (i. e. lenders) want to have a return on their funds they have to share 
in the profit/loss. Thus, the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) working according 
to this principle are expected to provide risk-capital based on the equity-mode of 
finance. However, we should note that there are other permissible instruments which 
are not based on this principle but their use involve the presence of financial risk of 
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different nature (see next section). 
3.2.3 Financing lawful (Halal) Businesses. 
There are certain aspects of business trade and investment projects that are prohibited 
in Islam, e. g. trading in alcohol, pork meat, gambling industry etc. Therefore, these 
new institutions must not engage in financing these kind of operations or industries. 
3.3 Contractual arrangements Provided by Is- 
lamic Law (Shari'ah) for conducting financial 
intermediation. 
Since lBs only came into existence recently, those who discussed the possibility and 
problems of establishing such institutions had no examples in modern time on which 
to focus their discussion. Attention, therefore, has been oriented to examining the 
operations of conventional batiks (interest-based batiks (IBBs)). As a result of this 
examination, two kind of operations have been distinguished: First, permissible op- 
erations (i. e. banking services). This category includes all operations that do not 
involve any interest transactions. Services are being offered by institutions against 
a commission, fee or fixed charge. Examples of these are; opening current and sav- 
ing accounts, safekeeping operations and offering advice and consultancy. Second, 
non-permissible operations (i. e. usurious transactions). All operations conducted on 
the basis of guarantied pre-determined rate of interest are included in this category. 
Examples of these are, accepting deposits on the basis of pre-determined interest rate 
and offering loans for borrowers on the same basis. The spread between the interest 
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received and the interest paid represents an important, if not the main, source of 
revenue for IBBs. Those who initiated the idea of establishing Islamic Banking have 
examined the sources of Islamic law (i. e. Qur'an, the Sunnah of Prophet Mohammed 
(PBUH) and the Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh)) to derive alternative arrangements. 
These alternatives are grouped into two classes, Hamdi (1989). 
1. Instruments based on the Profit and Loss Sharing Principle(PLS). Examples of 
these are Musharakah (participation finance) and Mudarabah(capital trust). 
2. Instruments based on Sales and Rental Principle. Examples of these are Muraba- 
hah (mark-up on sale) and Ijara (leasing). 
3.3.1 Instruments based on the Profit and Loss Sharing 
Principle(PLS). 
In this case the IB (or any other Fl that choses to offer financial services on the 
bases of Islamic Law) passes on the pooled funds (i. e. the funds acquired through the 
available deposit schemes to be discussed later) to entrepreneurs on the basis that 
no positive tire-determined rate of return is guarantied. The profits achieved in this 
intermediation process depends entirely on the outcome of the financed projects. 
3.3.1.1 Musharakah (participation finance or mutual finance). 
This contract can be defined as a joint venture between two or more parties to carry 
out a certain business with defined amounts of capital provided by each party. Profits 
or losses are to be shared between them. However, profits are allocated according to 
an agreed proportion in advance, whereas losses are borne by the partners in propor- 
tion to their contribution to capital, Presley (1988). [n the Islamic banking context 
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this contract is being used to finance industry, trade, real estate, contracting and al- - 
most all legal enterprises through equity or direct participation. Through equity the 
capital needed for carrying out the businesses is divided into small amounts each of 
which represents partner's share in the required funds. Each equityholder is entitled 
to share in the realized profits (actually achieved) after deducing operating costs. 
However, the proportion assigned to each holder can be mutually agreed upon in 
advance, or it can be assigned according to the capital proportion provided by each 
partner. If losses are to be the case, the situation is clear as stated previously, these 
are borne by partners in proportion to their contribution to the capital. The other 
way of channeling funds to entrepreneurs is through direct participation. In this case 
the bank participates with other party(ies) in capital assets, technical and managerial 
expertise, working capital and the like, in varying degrees and agree (partners) to di- 
vide the profits in proportions agreed upon in advance, Haindi (1989). The way this 
contract is being implemented by IBs can be described as follows: The bank, first, 
gathers funds assigned for that type of investment (the percentage of these funds to 
the total investment funds of the bank is left to the management to decide its value). 
Having gathered funds, the bank then transmits them to the entrepreneur(s), who 
- 
will utilize them alongside with his (their) own funds. Here different cases can be 
distinguished. That is the bank can transmit depositors funds alone, mixing both 
sources (i. e. its own and those of depositors) or the bank could use its funds alone. 
If the bank uses the depositors funds alone, then the realized profits, if any, will 
be divided among capital suppliers after deducing operating costs (from which the 
bank is being paid). In case of losses, these will be divided between capital suppliers 
and those responsible for running the business will not incur any unless losses occur 
because of dishonesty, breach of the contact of the deed or negligence of taking all 
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necessary measures to make the business successful. In similar ways the other cases 
can be treated, that is when the bank mixes depositors funds with shareholders or 
shareholders funds alone. Musharakah mode of finance is well suited for financing pri- 
vate or public companies and particularly financing for, short, medium and long-term 
periods depending on the nature of the project financed (commercial or productive). 
However, we should note that in the latter two cases, i. e. medium and long-term 
operations, Musharakah has a unique feature. That is Musharakah instrument in this 
case could be permanent (i. e. on equity basis), or fixed number of years after which 
it should be repaid at one go or on decreasing basis, (Mudawi(1986)). In all cases 
projects are evaluated; if they are economically feasible and expected to be profitable, 
and if the would be partner has adequate experience, the extent of the bank's partici- 
pation is then negotiated, Presley (1988). In the Islamic banking literature as well as 
in practice there are two types of Musharakah agreement with respect to the maturity 
of the contract: 1) Musharakah agreed upon for certain projects but terminates with 
the project's completion. In this case the two parties agreed that this contract is 
initiated to complete a specific project within a specific period of time, and 2) re- 
deeniable Musharakah. This latter type of deal is similar to redeemable participation 
in conventional banking system. In the practices of Islamic banking another form of 
participation is being used. This form is known as "decreasing participation", which 
is a "self-liquidating" form of partnership used for medium and long-term operations. 
In this type of partnership the ownership of the whole project of operation would be 
transferred to the partner (customer) after all agreed period during which the bank 
would have retrieved its principal and would have shared in the profits and losses 
realized during that period, I-iaindi (1989). In summing up, Musharakah contract is 
characterized by the following features, Presley (1988). 
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1. The IB is not guarantied a fixed return on its participation. 
2. If Musharakah financing is offered for a project that has been initially financed 
by fixed interest borrowing. IBs are prepared to inject fresh money to buy out 
other batiks or creditors from the projects, and by so doing clear the balance 
sheet of any interest-bearing debts. 
3. Whether a bank steps in to finance fixed assets, working capital or both, the 
bank's benefits lies in the profit-sharing scheme between the bank and the ven- 
ture. 
4. Profits are shared pro rata with equity (total shares' rights) and are calculated 
for this purpose, after allowing for management fees and before depreciation 
and provisions, as non-cash items. 
5. The IB may extend free interest participation to alleviate liquidity shortages on 
a short-tern basis. The percentage of Musharakah financing does not constitute 
a major element of the total financing of lBs. Presley (1988), for example, 
reported that this percentage ranges from 7 to 10 per cent of the total financing 
package of lBs. 
3.3.1.2 Mudarabah (capital trust or agency participation). 
This contract can be defined as an agreement between two parties in which one 
provides capital (financier or Rab-al-Mal (capital owner)) and the other provides work 
(Mudareb or Rab-Al-Amal(work provider)) for undertaking certain business activity. 
In the Islamic banking context Mudarabah is a contract between the IB regarded as 
an investor or financier (Rab-Al-MaO who provides a second party, the entrepreneur 
(Mudareb) with financial resources to finance a particular project, Presley (1988). 
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t. 
Profits, if any, are shared between the two parties in a mutually agreed proportion in 
advance. In case no profit realized or a loss occurs (from normal business causes or 
natural disasters), the batik (capital supplier) bears all the losses and the Mudareb 
(entrepreneur) receives no reward for his efforts, as far as lie is not negligent or he has 
breached the deed of the contract. This arrangement illustrates how Islamic economics 
value human resource endeavour. The Mudarabah contract is well adopted for project 
and trade financing. However, the application of Mudarabah can be extended to cover 
all activities such as industry, agriculture, etc, Al-Ameen (1983). IBs also use it to 
finance contracting business and trade. In order to implement this contract the IB 
can use its own funds, depositors' funds or both mixed together. So, it is important 
to look at the contractual relationships that exist between the batik and depositors on 
the one land and between bank and entrepreneurs on the other. These relationships 
can be classified as follows, Presley (1988): 
1. If the bank uses its own funds, it is said to be (the batik) an investor (Rab-Al- 
Mal) and the entrepreneur is regarded as Mudareb (Rab-Al-Arnal). Profits or 
losses will be distributed between them as discussed previously. 
2. If the bank employs the depositors' funds without using any of its own, the 
bank would be acting as an agent for the depositors from the time deposits 
are accepted to the time when money is invested in a Mudarabah contract. At 
this stage the bank becomes a Mudarcb (first Mudareb). Losses, if any, are the 
liability of capital supplier(s). However, if profits are realized a portion of which 
will be assigned directly to depositors (capital suppliers), the other portion will 
be shared between the bank and the entrepreneur (second Mudareb) as they 
specified in the deed of the contract. 
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3. If the bank utilizes a mixture of both (its own and depositors' funds). The bank 
would be acting as an agent for depositors, whereas between the bank and the 
entrepreneur the former acts in its own capacity as an investor (Rab-Al-MaO. 
However, it is possible to consider the bank as the capital supplier in both cases 
(i. e. in case of his funds as well as those of depositors). In this case the rules 
explained in the previous point are applicable, (Al-Sawy (1990)). 
In order to apply Mudarabah contract the two parties should take into consideration 
the following conditions, Khan (1985): 
1. Sharing of profit/loss: The entire loss has to be borne by the principal while the 
profit has to be shared between them in some pre-specified proportions. This 
is so because in the case of loss the agent has suffered a loss of his effort and 
labour so lie cannot be asked to share any loss of capital. 
2. Agent's responsibilities: Unless specifically restricted from engaging in certain 
activities, the agent is generally free to act `as he sees fit' for the pursuit of 
profit. 
3. Duration of the business: There may or may not be a specified contractual 
period for the business, depending on the agreement between the principal and 
the agent. 
4. The Mudarabah account, in case of opening accounts on the basis of this con- 
tract in an Islamic financial institution (IFI), must be recorded properly and 
audited independently, Presley (1988). 
Before ending this part of the profit and loss sharing (PLS) mode of finance, it is 
d 
important to makefew remarks. First, under the PLS system all capital is expected 
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to be risk-capital, because funds are channeled on the PLS basis. Second, from 
theoretical point of view the new PLS system is intended to have some advantages 
which support its existence. However, new problems arise as well. The advantages 
can be listed as follows, Qureshi (1983): 
" The PLS system ensures large supply of risk-capital. 
" It provides a higher rate of return to the society since the more risky is a project, 
the higher is its expected rate of return. As the assumption of linearity between 
risk and return in the theory of finance states "the higher the risk, the higher 
the return is expected to be". In the case of 113s, this might be very clear in the 
case of depositors where they are entitled to share in the entire realized profits 
rather than taking a fraction of this profits in the case of interest based banks. 
" It leads to efficient allocation of risk in the society, since the losses will be shared 
across a broad base of ownership. 
" It promotes participation of financial institutions in the overall economic activ- 
ity which may improve the performance of the enterprise. 
Having listed some of the advantages, we turn now to account some of the problems 
that arise in adopting the PLS system, Qureshi (1983): 
" The PLS principle requires a lot more work than it is required under an interest- 
based banking system. The bank should know a great deal more about the 
investor (not only professionally, but also as a person as well). The presence 
of informational asymmetries in the intermediation process will cause great 
difficulty in the implementation of the PLS system. That is why the level of 
monitoring the activity of the entrepreneur will have to be very large and fairly 
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thorough. Monitoring will have to be very high order and sufficiently efficient for 
the successful implementation of the new system. In fact, the system will entail 
substantial monitoring costs, definitely much higher than under the interest 
based debt system. These costs are primarily in the nature of fixed costs and 
as such there will be some economies of scale if these are spread over a large 
operations. Khan (1985) pointed out that "the critical requirement for the 
working of the PLS system is the ability of the financier to monitor the real 
performance of the project". 
" Projects have to be carefully evaluated in order to assess the actual risk involved. 
This is extremely important for the proper pricing of risk. Given the existing 
methods of project evaluation, it will be necessary to introduce substantial 
changes in the methodology to achieve this end. This will obviously require a 
large expenditure. 
" The problem of efficient portfolio selection is worth mentioning, because invest- 
ment banking can be successful if the management of the bank can achieve a 
well diversified portfolio. For then the small savers can be protected from un- 
necessary exposure to risk. Therefore, the problem of portfolio selection is more 
critical for an investment bank than for a typical one. However, achieving a well 
diversified portfolio requires high quality management as it is the case in unit 
trusts (in the U. K. and Mutual funds in the U. S. A) where skilful managers are 
responsible for fulfilling this task. 
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3.3.2 Instruments Based on Sales and Rental Principles. 
The IB in this case would act as an intermediary by acquiring the commodities on 
behalf of the would be partner(s). These acquired items, in turn, will be rented or 
re-sold to the customers on a higher margin, Haindi (1989). The most important 
instruments used by IBs are discussed below. 
3.3.2.1 Murabahah (Mark-up on sale). 
This contract can be defined as the supply of goods by the seller to the buyer at a 
specified profit margin mutually agreed between thetn, Chapra (85). In the Islamic 
banking context, the IB would act as the seller and the customer is regarded as 
the buyer. This latter would approach the IB requesting that certain item(s) (be it a 
commodity, machinery or raw materials) be bought and acquired for him for a specific 
price, (Hamdi (1989)). The customer provides the batik with the specifications and 
quotations of the goods to be purchased, (Presley (1988)). When the bank and its 
customer have agreed on the terms of the deal, the former purchases the goods or 
commodities and passes the title to the customer at later date. The profit accruing to 
the batik is mutually agreed in advance as mark-up on the cost of purchase, (Presley 
(1988)) or as a fixed amount added to the purchase cost [but agreed upon in advance 
by the two parties], (collection of Booklets (KFH) (1977)). In order to implement 
A'lurabahah contract in accordance with Islamic law, the following conditions must be 
met, Presley (1988): 
1. The purchase price should be declared to the client, especially where the bank 
succeeds in obtaining a discount or rebate. Since the mark-up is calculated on 
the net purchase price, any discount or rebate obtained has to be acknowledged 
and accounted for to the benefit of the client. 
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2. The goods themselves must be classified and clearly identified according to inter- 
national or commonly accepted standards or classifications, otherwise Muraba- 
hah is void. 
3. The profit element is pre-determined, and therefore it should be known when 
the contract is being signed, (l-lauidi (1989)). 
4. The last condition relates to whether the original agreement between the IB 
and the customer is binding or not. 
As far as this last condition is concerned, the two methods are applied by lBs. For 
example, Dar-Al-Mal AL-Islami (Islamic finance house) (a Geneva based institution) 
considers the agreement as a binding one. While KFH gives the customer a non- 
binding promise to buy commodities that were purchased by KFI-I on his beihalf, 
(Presley (1988)). The repayment of the due sum by the customer is very simple. 
Once the purchase price plus the bank's margin have been agreed upon, repayment 
can be stretched over a period of 6 to 24 months and sometimes 36 months. In any 
case, repayment may be discharged by instalment or on lump sum basis, (Presley 
(1988)). However, if the customer uses his own funds to finance the Murabahah 
operation, the bank, in this case, would act as a broker charging a service fee, but 
no commission is charged for the extension of the letter of credit, Presley (1988). 
One can notice that Murabahah contract is being used as a replacement of the letter 
of credit facility provided by the Interest-based banks. Therefore, this contract is 
mainly used to finance trade operations domestically and internationally. Finally, the 
Murabahah contract is being used widely by IBs. The operations of some banks are 
dominated by Murabahah operations as noted by Ahmad (1987) "... the available 
evidence suggest that Murabahah is the most popular and dominant technique of 
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financing amongst the IBs studied". This is because of the low level of risk involved 
in Murabahah operations. 
3.3.2.2 Ijara (Lease Financing). 
Ijara (leasing) is being implemented by IBs in the same way as it is applied by conven- 
tional banks. Under this agreement, the lessee(being an individual or a businessman) 
approaches the bank requesting the purchase of a machinery or an equipment that 
can be rented to leim (i. e the client). The batik, in turn, will study the position of the 
lessee and the expected cash-flow from the operation. If the batik sees that the oper- 
ation is feasible and it can generate sufficient income it will enter into an agreement. 
The conditions of the agreement will be set afterwards. Within this global context of 
leasing, two forms are distinguished in Islamic finance. First, direct Leasing whereby 
the IB allows the customer to use capital assets owned by the bank for a limited 
period of time ranging from a few days to a few months or years depending on the 
type of the asset in question. In return the lessee pays a monthly or annual rental fee, 
(Presley(1988)). Second, lease and purchase (Hire-purchase (HP)) finance (Ijara wa 
Iktiua), whereby the IB rents the assets to the customer who promises to purchase 
the asset after a specified period. The payments to the batik, in this case, are equal 
to the batik's share in the net profit attributable to the asset plus a part of the prin- 
cipal charges. Accordingly, when these accumulated parts equal the cost of the asset, 
the ownership of the asset will be transferred to the client. The payment of rental 
allowances can be paid in different manners. One form is that the lessee will open a 
saving(or an investment) account with the batik, therefore, payments will be credited 
to this account, (Presley(1988) and Dar-AL-Mal-Al-Islami (1990)). The accumulated 
sum of funds would be invested by the batik and credited to this account. When the 
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accumulated amounts in the account equal the purchase price of the asset, the title 
of the asset will be passed to the lessee on exchange of the payment of the price. 
Dar-Al-Maal-Al-Islami (Geneva based institution) reported the use of this method in 
its operation, (Dar-Al-Maal-Islami (1981)). 
Before we end this section it is important to discuss the ways through which funds 
are being raised. The methods are listed below: 
1. Current Accounts (also known as trust deposits). Holders of this type of 
accounts are treated in the same manner as in the case of conventional banks. 
Account-holders are not subjected to any losses as well as they are not entitled 
to share in any profits. The amounts lield in these accounts are payable on 
request. Clients also are being supplied with cheques and cheque card facilities. 
2. Saving Accounts. Customers are being offered this kind of accounts free 
of charge. The bank guarantees the return of the funds on demand. There- 
fore, accountholders are not entitled to share any profit or loss. Customers 
are encouraged to hold saving accounts by providing them some services, such 
as interest-free loans, financing of small projects and sale of consumer durable 
or productive goods by instalments (deferred payments). These services are 
oriented to those who have regular savings with the bank. 
3. Investment Accounts. Holders of this type of accounts are encouraged to 
deposit their funds in these accounts on the basis of predetermined profit and 
loss sharing (PLS) ratio. That is, in contrast to the conventional banks, the 
holder of an investment account is subject to loss and is entitled to profit if 
any. Therefore, the rate of return is related to the performance of the bank, 
which, in turn, is a function of the results of the projects financed by the batik. 
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Thus, selecting profitable investments and spreading the available recourses 
on a large number of projects are important tasks involving considerable effort 
spent by the management of IBs. Investment account facilities are being offered 
to customers under two forms: First, joint investment accounts whereby the 
depositors give the bank the absolute right to invest the funds on their behalf 
in any projects selected by the bank. Second, specified investment accounts 
whereby the accountholder specifies the projects or the area of the business 
activity within which his funds can be invested. In this case, the batik would 
act as an agent transmitting money to a third party. This operation is being 
carried out by the batik against fees charged to the holders of this type of 
accounts. 
3.4 Islamic Banks in Practice. 
In this section the operations of two working institutions are examined. These are the 
. Jordan Islamic Bank (. JIB) and Kuwait Finance House (KFI-i). Before we examine 
the operations of these two institutions, it is important to give a general overview for 
each one of them. 
3.4.1 General Background. 
The KFH and the JIB were established in 1977 and 1978, respectively. A year after 
their establishment the two banks started operating (i. e. KFI-I started its operations 
in August 1978 and JIB started its operations in September 1979). KFH operates in 
one of the richest Gulf states, while JIB operates in one of the middle-income Middle 
eastern countries (according to the International Monetary Fund(IMF) classification). 
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According to the Banker magazine's classification of the top 15 Arab Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AIFIs) in November 1989 7 KFH has been classified the second after the 
Geneva based Dar-Al-Maal-Al-Islami (the Islamic House of Finance) with respect to 
total capital which amounted to 166 million dollars and first with respect to total 
assets which accounted for 4147 million dollars. The JIB came in the 9th rank after 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS) with respect to total capital factor which stood 
at the level of 21 million dollars and the bank classified fifth with respect to total 
assets which accounted for 468 million dollars. The KFH is therefore much bigger 
(about eight times) than the JIB with respect to the capital factor. 
3.4.2 How does KFH operate ? 
In the "Collection of Booklets" published by KFH in 1981 it has been stated clearly 
that the House has been established to fulfil the following: First, conducting all 
banking operations and services for its own, or for the account of third parties, without 
practising usury, whether in the form of interest or any other form. Second, carrying 
out direct investments, or purchase or finance projects or activities owned by others, 
on a non-usurious basis. In order to explain how these objectives are being achieved 
by KFH the balance sheet of the House as it appeared at 31st December 1988 is 
presented below : 
7We did not use the classification of the years that followed (i. e. 1990,1991 and 1992), because 
of the major disturbance (i. e. the Gulf crisis) which took place in the Gulf region in August 1990. 
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Table 3.1 KFH balance sheet at 31st December 1988 (items are 
expressed in percentages) 
Assets per cent Liabilities per cent 
CBB 3.00 CA 12.00 
DFI 21.00 INISA 43.00 
MAR 25.00 IDLY 0.05 
INV 0.04 IDUP 23.00 
MTMAR 11.00 DFFI 14.00 
TIP 33.00 APA 2.00 
IAC 2.00 OL 2.00 
01 0.06 PUC 2.00 
FA 2.00 SR 1.00 
CWP 2.00 GR 0.05 
Total Assets 100.00 Total liabilities 100.00 
Definition of the symbols used in the Table above: 
Assets side : 
CBB = cash and balance with banks. 
DFI = deposits with financial institutions. 
MAR = Murabahah and other accounts receivable. 
INV = inventories. 
MTMAR = Medium term Murabahah and other accounts receivable. 
TIP = trade in property. 
IAC = investment in AL-Muthana complex. 
01 = other investment. 
FA = fixed assets. 
CWP = construction work in progress. 
Liabilities side : 
CA = current accounts. 
INISA = investment and non-investment saving accounts. 
IDLP = investment deposits for limited period. 
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IDUP = investment deposits for unlimited period. 
DFFI = deposits from other financial institutions. 
APA = accounts payable and accruals. 
OL = other liabilities. 
PUC = paid-up-capital. 
SR = statutory reserve. 
CR = general reserve. 
Source : Annual Report of KFI-I 1988. 
The above Table shows that on the assets side four operations dominate the utiliza- 
tion of funds. These are : Trading investment in property (TIP), Murabahah and 
other accounts receivable (MAR), deposits with other financial institutions (DFI), 
and Medium term Murabahah and other accounts receivable (MTMAR). They ac- 
counted for 90 per cent of total assets at the end of 1988. The same fact can be 
noticed for the liability side, whereby four items dominate the sources of funds. These 
are: investment and non-investment saving accounts (INSA), investment deposits for 
unlimited period (IDUP), deposits from financial institutions (DFFI), and current 
accounts (CA). These items alone accounted for over 80 per cent of total liabilities. 
3.4.2.1 How does KFH acquire funds (sources of funds)? 
As we noticed earlier that the major source of funds are deposits. The saving accounts 
item being the chief source of these deposits. The Table below shows this has also 
been a feature of the banks operations in previous years. 
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Table 3.2 The percentage share of total deposits to total liabilities over 
the years 1979 - 1988 of KFH. 
year 'IUD/TL(%) SD/TD(%) 
1979 88 32 
1980 88 37 
1981 84 40 
1982 83 39 
1983 87 48 
1984 87 54 
1985 91 56 
1986 92 54 
1987 93 50 
1988 92 46 
Source : Annual reports of KFH 1979 - 1988. 
TD = Total deposits. 
TL = Total liabilities. 
SD = Saving deposits. 
It is clear from the above Table that the level of deposits with respect to total liabilities 
did not go below the 80 per cent level. Its lowest share being 83 per cent of the 
year 1982. The same fact can be noticed for savings deposits with regard to total 
deposits. In addition to saving accounts KFH provides other types of deposits. A 
brief explanation of which is given below: 
1. Current accounts. Deposits lield in these accounts are payable on demand. 
The customers are not entitled to any profits and they do not bear any losses. 
The House guarantees to pay the balance oll request. From the Islamic view- 
point, these deposits are regarded as interest-free loans (Qurud - Hassauna) from 
the depositors to the KFI-I, (KFII annual report (1988)). 
2. Saving accounts not committed for investment purposes. This category 
of deposits is also not entitled to share in any profits and it, does not bear any 
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losses. Funds deposited in this category can be withdrawn in whole or in portion 
at any moment, Memorandum of Agreement and Articles of Association KFH 
(1977). 
: 3. Investment deposits. Included in this category are those funds deposited 
by customers for investment purposes. These funds are used by the House 
to finance its own projects or financing projects of third parties. Investment 
deposits can take two fortes; limited or unlimited. The limited ones are those 
deposits accepted for a period of one year, on the other hand unlimited deposits 
are those obtained on the same duration but they are renewable at the end of 
each year. Both types of deposits are accepted on the profit and loss sharing 
(PLS) basis. Table 3.3 is given below to demonstrate the distribution of funds 
among different deposits over the years 1979 through 1988. 
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Table 3.3 distribution of funds among different deposits of KFH 
over the years 1979 to 1988. 
year CA/TD% INISA/TD% IDLP/TD% IDUP/TD% DFFI/TD% 
1979 24 32 5 39 - 
1980 19 : 37 5 39 - 
1981 19 40 3 38 - 
1982 15 39 2 44 - 
1983 12 48 . 06 40 - 
1984 9 54 . 006 35 2 
1985 17 56 . 001 26 1 
1986 17 54 . 01 25 4 1987 11 50 - 25 14 
1988 1: 3 46 . 06 25 15 
Source : annual reports 1979 - 1988. 
CA = current accounts 
INISA = investment and non-investment saving accounts 
IDLP = investment deposits for limited period 
IDUP = investment deposits for unlimited period 
DFFI = deposits from financial institutions 
Table 3.3 above shows that the main items through which funds are being pooled 
are : investment and non-investment saving accounts (INISA), investment de- 
posits for unlimited period (IDUP) and current accounts (CA). Their level over 
the years under investigation did not go below 80 per cent of total deposits. 
However, the evolution of deposits to each type of accounts is not the same. 
It is clear from the Table that INISA item is attracting more funds than the 
other two, especially in the IDUP item whose level has declined over the last 
five years. This change of pattern may due to the fact that KFH had channelled 
most of its funds into the Kuwaiti real estate and construction sectors and these 
two sectors were badly hit by the collapse of the market of the two sectors in 
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1984. Neither depositors nor shareholders received any return on their funds in 
1984. The depositors might, therefore, have switched to the INISA item. The 
other item which is growing steadily is DFFI, in spite of its late introduction 
in 1984 it showed quite a remarkable growth its the last two years. The main 
purpose of Bolding this type of accounts is to avoid the practice of usury from 
the dealings with other banks. As it has been pointed out in the annual report 
of the House for the year 1989 "... deposits with financial institutions [are] 
an arrangement that enables KFH to lend on Kuwaiti dinars and borrows in 
foreign currencies without the involvement of interest transactions". The other 
ways through which KFI-i raises funds are listed below: 
(a) Accounts payable and accruals. This item accounted for 2 per cent 
only of total liabilities at the end of 1988. Included in this category are the 
amounts paid in advance by customers in return of future services offered 
to them (e. g. buying goods or commodities). 
(b) Other liabilities. Included in this category are : profit attributable to 
share capital and net profit attributable to reserve accounts. 
(c) Shareholders' equity. This item consists of paid-up-capital, statutory 
and general reserves. 
3.4.2.2 How does KFH utilize funds(uses of funds)? 
At the end of the year 1988 we have noticed that the left hand-side of the bal- 
ance sheet is being dominated by four kinds of operations. These are : trading 
investment in property (TIP), with 33 per cent of total assets (TA), Murabahah 
and other accounts receivable (MAR) with 25 per cent of TA, deposits with 
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financial institutions (DFI) with 21 per cent of TA, and Medium term Muraba- 
halt and other accounts receivable (MTMAR) with 11 percent of TA. Table 3.4 
is presented below to examine the pattern of the most widely used operations 
for transmitting funds. 
Table 3.4 The percentage sharing of KFH main operations over the 
years 1979 -1988. 
year CBB/TA DFI/TA MAR/TA MTMAR/TA TIP/TA IAC/TA 
1979 17 - 33 5 43 
1980 19 :3 : 34 10 33 - 
1981 16 3 40 7 65 - 
1982 21 . 04 30 6 
40 1 
1983 15 . 06 20 9 
52 1 
1984 10 3 23 5 53 3 
1985 8 2 22 9 46 4 
1986 5 5 26 9 46 3 
1987 4 15 26 11 35 3 
1988 3 21 25 11 33 2 
Source : annual reports 1979 - 1988. 
Note: all values are expressed in percentages. 
CBB = cash and balance with banks. 
DFI = deposits with financial institutions. 
MAR = Murabahah funds and receivable accounts. 
MTMAR = Medium term Murabahah and other accounts receivable. 
TIP = Trading investments in property. 
IAG = Investments in AL-Muthana complex. 
TA = Total assets. 
It is clear from the Table above that the majority of the House's funds has been 
invested in trade and property sectors. This can be noticed from the sharing 
percentages of the MAR, MTMAR and TIP items. The lowest share of these 
items accounted for 69 per cent for the year 1988. However, it appears that TIP 
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is being the dominant factor through which funds are being channelled. But, 
after the year 1984 the share of this item has declined. This may due to the fact 
that market prices for properties collapsed in 1984. Therefore, the KFI-I was 
badly hit by this incident. The other factor that can be observed is the fact that 
current account share had declined over the last five years, especially the last 
three. This may due to the growing share of deposits with other intermediaries 
and the fact that the House is renting properties whose contribution to total 
profits stood at 17 per cent in 1988. 
3.4.3 How does the Jordan Islamic Bank(JIB) operate? 
From the "Articles governing the operations of the Bank", and "Directory of Is- 
lamic Financial institutions" edited by John Presley (1988), the following points 
are stated below : The . JIB was established 
in Amman in 1978 to conduct a full 
range of banking services within the limits permitted by Islamic Law "Shari'ah". 
The bank was particularly concerned with providing such financial intermedia- 
tion to all citizens of Jordan and adopted a policy of opening as many regional 
branches as possible. The main activity of the bank is to provide traditional 
banking services to citizens of Jordan. In addition to these banking operations, 
the bank is offering financial, investment, and collective social activities oper- 
ations on non-usurious basis. The way these operations are carried out by the 
bank is explored below : 
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3.4.3.1 How does the bank acquire funds? 
The balance sheet, as it appeared at the end of 1988, can be used as a starting 
point to explain the techniques used to acquire funds. 
Table 3.5 JIB's Balance Sheet at 31st December 1988 in percentage. 
Assets per cent Liabilities per cent 
CHB 33.6 TD 16.00 
SOC 0.1 JIA 64.00 
IFL 0.2 DOB 1.00 
IFI 55.8 SIA 8.00 
FSP 7.1 OL 6.00 
FA 2.2 PIC 3.00 
OA 1.00 SR 1.00 
GR 1.00 
TA 100 TL 100 
Source : Annual Report 1988 
Assets side: 
CHB = cash in hand and balances with other batiks. 
SOC = shares of other companies. 
IFL = interest-free loans. 
IFI = investment financing (i. e. Mudarabah, Musharakah, Murabahah and oth- 
ers) 
FSP = financing specific projects 
FA = fixed assets 
OA = other assets 
TA = total assets 
Liabilities side: 
TD = trust accounts (i. e. current and demand deposits 
JIA = joint investment accounts (i. e. saving, on notice and time deposits 
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DOB = deposits of other banks 
SIA = specified investment accounts 
OL = other liabilities 
PIC = paid-in-capital 
SR = statutory reserve 
GR = general reserve 
TL = total liabilities 
It is obvious from the Table above that the major source of funds are deposits. 
These items accounted for 80 per cent of total liabilities at the end of 1988. 
This fact is also observed during the previous years of operation, the following 
Table confirms that : 
Table 3.6 Percentage of total deposits to total liabilities over the 
years 1979 through 1988 of JIB. 
11 'I 'D/TL(%) 54 75 80 79 82 81 81 79 80 80 
11 Year 1979 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 
Source : Annual reports of 1979 - 1988. 
TD = total deposits = trust deposits + joint investment deposits. 
TA = total liabilities . 
In order to attract funds, the bank offers the following types of deposits: 
(a) Trust deposits (TD). These kind of accounts are similar to those pro- 
vided by interst-based banks (i. e. current and demand deposits). The 
bank is authorized to use these deposits at its own risk if they are invested 
in risky operations. These deposits can be withdrawn on demand and their 
holders are supplied with cheque books and cards. 
61 
(b) Joint investment accounts (JIA). Such accounts receive certain per- 
centage of the realized annual net profits and incur certain proportion of 
losses. In other words, these accounts are accepted on the basis of profit- 
and-loss-sharing (PLS) principle. Table 3.5 indicates that this type of 
deposit is very important and accounted for 64 per cent at the end of 
1988. 
(c) Specified investment accounts (SIA). The bank in this case is act- 
ing as an agent transmitting funds of depositors to specific projects rec- 
ominended by the depositors themselves. Therefore, the bank receives a 
commission fee for offering this service. 
In addition to these external sources the bank utilizes its own capital to finance 
its operations or those of third parties. But the contribution of this factor is 
insignificant, it accounted for 3 per cent only at the end of 1988. It can be 
noticed from the above discussion that the major funds of the batik are being 
channelled through deposits, attention, therefore, is given to the pattern of how 
these different deposits have grown over time. 
Table 3.7 Distribution of different types of deposits over the years 
from 1979 to 1988 of JIB. 
Year D/TL(%) TD/D(%) . JIA/D(%) SIA/D(%) 
1979 68 51 29 20 
1980 81 39 54 7 
1981 83 47 50 3 
1982 81 45 53 2 
1983 86 34 62 4 
1984 88 25 68 7 
1985 90 21 70 9 
1986 88 20 69 11 
1987 88 18 73 9 
1988 88 19 73 8 
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Deposits(D) = trust deposits + joint investment accounts + specified invest- 
merit account. 
TL = total liabilities. 
From Table 3.7 the following observations can be made: 
" Deposits constitute a major part of the batik liabilities. It started at the 
level of 68 per cent of total liabilities in 1979, reached its highest level of 
90 per cent in 1985, and stood at 88 per cent in 1988. 
" Joint investment accounts become an important way of obtaining funds. 
In 1979 they stood at 29 per cent of total deposits and reached the highest 
level, 73 per cent, in 1987 and 1988. While the share of these accounts 
is increasing the share of trust deposits is decreasing. This share of trust 
deposits stood at 51 per cent in 1979 but only accounted for 19 per cent 
in 1988. This is a natural process as the business of the batik grew up and 
customers become familiar with investment deposit scheme. 
3.4.3.2 How does the JIB employ funds? 
It is clear from Table 3.5 that the main part of the bank's funds are being 
utilized for investment operations. The share of these operations with respect 
to the total use of funds stood at 55.8 per cent in 1988. The second important 
factor is cash in hand and with other banks which stood at 33.6 per cent at the 
end of 1988. Thus both items constitute more than 80 per cent of total assets. 
Table 3.8 is presented below to trace the pattern of these two, as well as other 
items, on the left hand side of the balance sheet(i. e. assets side). 
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Table 3.8 JIB percentage share of assets items to total assets over 
the period 1979 - 1988. 
Year CHB/TA MMMF/TA SIP/TA IS/TA IFL/TA 
1979 79 10 - - . 05 
1980 43 44 5 - . 03 
1981 43 45 3 . 03 . 02 
1982 28 59 3 . 03 . 03 
1983 36 54 4 . 04 . 05 
1984 27 62 6 . 03 . 02 
1985 31 56 8 . 02 . 02 
1986 28 59 8 . 02 . 02 
1987 33 55 8 . 02 . 02 
1988 33.6 55.8 7 . 01 . 02 
Source : Annual reports of JIB 1979 - 1988. 
CHB = cash in hand and balances with other banks. 
TA = total assets. 
MMMF = Murabahah, Mudarabah and Musharakah funds. 
SIP = specified investment projects. 
IS = investments in shares. 
IFL = interest-free loans. 
As it has been noticed earlier CHB and MMMF are the two dominant ways 
through which funds are being utilized. In 1979 their level stood at 89 per 
cent of total assets and in 1988 were maintained at the slightly higher level of 
90 per cent. However, the pattern of both is not the same. While the share 
of MMMF to total assets has increased over time, the share of CIIB on the 
other land has declined. The former item started with the share of 10 per 
cent to reach its highest of 62 per cent in 1984 and it ended up in 1988 with 
a share of 55.8 per cent. The latter item started with its highest share of 79 
per cent to reach its lowest level of 27 per cent in 1984, and it stood at 33.6 
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per cent in 1988. This difference of pattern of growth may due to the fact that 
customers became more confident and familiar with the operations carried out 
by the batik as the management of the batik gained expertise and familiarity 
with these new methods of investment operations, therefore the customers have 
switched from CHB to MMMF. The other important element is the specified 
investment operations (SIP), where the batik is acting as an agent that transmits 
funds to those projects specified by creditors. However, the other items (i. e. IS 
and IFL) have an insignificant share in the portfolio operations of the batik. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that these newly established IB institutions 
have major contrasts with interest based banks in the provision of financial 
services. Foremost, among many is the replacement of the interest mechanism 
by the profit and loss sharing mechanism. That is funds are no longer accepted 
and transmitted on the basis of a pre-determined positive rate of interest or 
certainty of returns. Thus neither the bank nor depositors can guarantee the 
nominal value of their principals, it is the outcome of the financed projects 
which will determine profits or loss. In addition to this general remark, the 
following remarks should be noted: 
Deposits constitute the major part on the liabilities side through which funds 
are being generated. 
Both institutions combine payments and intermediation services. These ar- 
rangements take the forms of demand, investment, and specified deposits. 
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The assets of these newly established intermediaries, unlike conventional banks, 
are not merely financial ones. In their balance sheets appear such items 
as inventory. Moreover, these institutions also involve themselves in di- 
rect investments by setting up businesses on their own. Thus some of the 
assets held by them are less liquid than those held by their counterparts 
interest-based banks. This can explain, to a certain degree, why these 
intermediaries also hold substantial amounts of cash to meet liquidity re- 
quiretnents. As a result of these practices transformation of illiquid assets 
into liquid liabilities is partially fulfilled. 
Since the PLS system ensures large supply of risk-capital, the monitoring cost 
of projects will be much more higher than under the present interest-based 
system. It, therefore, requires from the management to know a great deal 
about the entrepreneur, not only as professionals but on a personal basis 
too. The presence of information asymmetry in the intermediation sector 
obliges the management to give considerable attention to the monitoring 
and evaluation of projects functions. 
The selection of efficient portfolios will be of great importance, because the 
success of the bank depends upon achieving a reasonable rate of return to 
depositors. The failure of achieving so may affect the future of the bank. 
Thus holding a well diversified portfolio is one of the prime concerns of the 
management of these banks. 
Given the present practices of IBs, maintaining a strong and continuous rela- 
tionship with depositors is of vital importance to their survival. Therefore, 
studying and analysing the factors that affect this relationship provides 
the management with very valuable information about the requirements 
66 
of their customers. 
Finally, the above points imply that the implementation of PLS mechanism 
requires a high quality management in the field of management as well as Islamic 
Law (Shari'ah). Under PLS system depositors have to place great trust in Fis, 
and they need to know a lot more about the management and operations of 
these intermediaries than under the present interest-based system. 
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Chapter 4 
Islamic Banks and the Maturity 
Transformation Function 
4.1 Introduction 
The basic function of financial intermediaries (FIs) is to transfer financial resources 
between surplus and deficit economic units. This function is carried out by FIs 
through the use of financial instruments. Therefore, as we described in chapter two, 
Fis transform one type of securities called "primary securities" into another type of 
assets known as " secondary securities" in a manner that appeals to both surplus and 
deficit economic units. In this chapter, however, we are going to examine one aspect 
of this transformation that is maturity transformation (transmutation). In doing so 
more insight into the position of these newly established Islamic institutions in the 
sector of financial intermediation can be gained. 
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4.2 Theoretical Framework 
It has been stated in chapter two that two broad approaches, using the traditional way 
of classifying FIs, have been suggested by academics in examining the classification 
of FIs. These are: 
" Examining the liabilities of FIs and classifying them accordingly. By 
using this criterion of classification two groups are distinguished by academics; 
namely Bank financial intermediaries (BFIs) and Nou-Bank financial interme- 
diaries (NBFIs). The first group (i. e. BFIs) consists of those institutions part 
of whose liabilities serve the function of means of exchange and payments. The 
second group includes those Fis whose liabilities do not perform these functions 
or at least the liabilities of this group of institutions have inferior qualities in 
performing this function. However, this method of classification does not help 
a great deal in achieving our aim i. e. examining the maturity transformation 
of lBs. This is so because this approach does not give us a precise quantifi- 
able treasure about the contribution of a single institution to liquidity creation. 
Therefore, attention is turned to the other approach. 
" The second approach is based on the criterion of whether the in- 
termediary can create credit (liquidity creation) or passes on credit 
(liquidity distribution). If the intermediary creates liquidity (adds liquidity 
to the rest of the economy) is said to be considered as an BFI; if the reverse is 
true the intermediary is classified as an NBFI. It is in the work of Nieltaus(1978), 
Hewson (1975) and Niehaus and HHIewson (1976) where this point has been most 
tliorouglily investigated. From this work the following criteria are derived to 
examine the maturity transformation of Islamic banks. 
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1. The notion Provided by Niehans (1978) 
Nielians(1978) states that "a bank supplies the rest of the economy (including 
other banks) with money if its monetary liabilities (e. g. checking deposits) 
exceed its monetary assets (e. g. currency reserves and demand deposits with 
other banks). In the reverse case, the bank reduces the money supply in the 
rest of the economy". 
2. The net liquidity criterion 
This criterion was elaborated by Niehaus and Ilewson (1976) in examining the 
maturity transformation of Euro-banks. This notion can be explained as follows: 
A batik accepts deposits of various maturities Do, D1 ... 
D,,, subscripts indicate 
the maturity, with Do signifying checking deposits. The bank uses these deposits 
to snake loans Lo, Lt... L7, (Lo includes central batik reserves), subscripts refer 
to the same maturity classes as for deposits. 
Net liquidity (i. e. contribution of a single batik to the liquidity available in 
the economy) (liquidity creation or maturity transformation) is given by the 
following formula: 
NL = the contribution to Net liquidity of a single batik. 
tt n 
NL = \1Di-E\1L; =ýa; (D; -Li) 
Where, E(D; - Lt) = 0, A; = liquidity coefficients (Ao =1 the case of chequing 
deposits) 
Liquidity creation requires "mismatched assets and liabilities". In the sense 
that the bank "borrows short to "lend long"; that is (D; L; for some i3). 
Under this definition three distinct cases exist: 
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Positive maturity transformation, the bank in aggregate borrows short and 
lends long. In this case the bank is adding to the liquidity of nonbauks 
(i. e. money supply is increased). 
Negative maturity transformation, the bank in aggregate borrows long and 
lends short. In this case the liquidity of nonbanks is reduced (i. e. money 
supply is reduced). 
Zero maturity transformation, assets are matched with liabilities (i. e they have 
the sause "moneyness"). 
3. The Lorenz Curve 
This curve has been initially elaborated by Lorenz (1905) to deal with the distri- 
butiou of wealth (i. e. income and assets distribution), but it has been later rec- 
ognized that this tool is very useful for economic analysis, (Hainsworth(1964)). 
This curve allows a visual comparison to be made between two distributions 
with respect to the overall arithmetic mean. In this study the curve 1 is used to 
compare bank inequality distribution (maturity transformation) between assets 
and liabilities of a bank. In order to construct this curve one should: "express 
the percentages of assets and liabilities in each maturity class as a percentage 
of aggregate assets (liabilities), cumulating these percentages for both assets 
and liabilities and then plotting these cumulated percentages, (say assets on 
the vertical axis and liabilities on the horizontal axis), allows comparison of the 
'We should note, however, that there is a basic difference between the conventional Lorenz curve 
and the one that we are going to construct which we may call "mismatch curve". This basic difference 
refers to the fact that in the Lorenz curve analysis, the distributions are ranked by size -for example, 
in the analysis of income distributions, income is ranked from the lowest to the highest class- whereas 
with the mismatch curve no ranking is undertaken. As a result, the conventional Lorenz curve is 
either concave upwards or downwards to the line of equality (depending on the labeling of the axes), 
and it can never cross the line of equality. The mismatch curve may in principle cross the line 
of equality, although empirically it may not, because of the preponderance of a particular form of 
maturity transformation, (Hewson(1975)). 
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resulting curve, which may be called the "mismatch curve", with the diagonal- 
which is the arithmetic mean relationship (perfect equality)[i. e. each asset and 
liability class has the same degree of maturity]. The larger the area between the 
mismatch curve and the diagonal, the more unequal is the distribution of claims 
(assets) relative to the distribution of liabilities", (1-lewson (1975)). Within this 
context one can end up with one of the following three cases: 
Positive maturity transformation; that is the bank on the aggregate, is bor- 
rowing short to lend long. This is to be the case where the mismatch curve 
is concave upwards to the line of equality. 
Negative maturity transformation; that is the bank on the aggregate is bor- 
rowing long to lend short. This is to be the case where the mismatch curve 
is concave downwards to the line of equality. 
The curve can be a combination of the other two cases. This could arise where 
(say) there is an excess of assets (liabilities) over liabilities (assets) at both 
short and long term maturities, in which case the mismatch curve would 
cross the equality line, (Hewson(1975)). 
These three possible cases of maturity transformation are presented diagrammatically 
in Figure 4.1. 
4.3 Examining the Maturity Transformation of 
JIB and KFH 
In this section the maturity transformation of two practicing interest free lBs is 
examined using the techniques explained in the previous section. The batiks are JIB 
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and KFH. 
Figure 4.1 Mismatch Curves for Different Types of Maturity 
Transformation 
o 100 0 % of Liabilities 
MIXED CASES 
% of Claims 
100 
0 
POSITIVE MATURITY 
TRANSFORMATION 
(Borrowing short to lend long) 
% of Claims 
100 
NEGATIVE MATURITY 
TRANSFORMATION 
(Borrowing long to lend short) 
% of Claims 
100 
100 
% of Liabilities 
100 
% of Liabilities 
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4.3.1 The application of Niehans notion 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are introduced to examine the liquidity distribution of monetary 
assets and liabilities for both institutions. 
Table 4.1 Liquidity Distribution of the most Highly Liquid Assets and 
Liabilities of JIB over the Period of 1979 to 1988 
Year Current and Call 
Accounts (CCA) 
Cash and Reserve 
with other Banks 
(CROB) 
CCA - CROB 
1979 2.525.371 5.748.075 -3.222.704 
1980 4.847.694 6.746.021 -1.898.327 
1981 12.213.100 13.471.671 -1.258.571 
1982 16.381.841 12.800.393 3.581.448 
1983 19.678.838 25.437.099 -5.758.261 
1984 21.245.370 27.555.017 -6.306.647 
1985 23.522.935 27.855.419 -15.332.484 
1986 26.418.915 45.766.084 -19.332.484 
1987 30.895.166 65.956.075 -35.060.909 
1988 35.507.682 74.764.664 -39.256.982 
Source: Annual Reports 1979 - 1988 
Note: CCA and CROB are dominated in Jordanian Dinar (JD) 
Table 4.2 Liquidity Distribution of the most Highly Liquid Assets and 
Liabilities of KFH over the Period of 1979 to 1988 
Year Current Accounts 
(CA) 
Cash and Balances 
with Banks 
(CBB) 
CA - CBB 
1979 16.138.618 12.681.411 3.457.207 
1980 29.212.498 31.241.601 -2.029.103 
1981 55.180.706 55.316.027 -135.321 
1982 70.050.502 117.353.956 -47.303.454 
198: 3 79.64 8.586 120.881.102 -41.232.516 
1984 69.130.953 74.078.540 -4.947.587 
1985 123.379.064 67.792.726 55.586.338 
1986 133.440.627 44.071.246 89.369.381 
1987 107.792.290 39.393.665 68.398.625 
1988 143.330.899 37.016.135 106.314.764 
Source: Annual Reports 1979-1988 
Note: CA and CBB are denominated in Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) 
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In the above Tables, it is clear that both institutions in the first six years tended to 
reduce rather than add liquidity to the rest of the economy. This can be noticed by the 
minus (-) sign which precedes the difference between monetary liabilities and assets, 
see the last column of each of the above Tables. This, in fact, is an expected behaviour, 
because these institutions preclude debt instruments (e. g. treasury bills) from their 
portfolio holdings. These instruments, especially government short term securities, 
are considered to be among the most important source of liquidity for interest based 
banks. This is so because of their marketability and the other characteristics that they 
acquire (e. g. very low default risk). In addition, the nature of the business carried out 
by IBs, that is their engagement in real investment projects, means that their assets 
holding are not merely financial ones as is the case of conventional banks. However, 
in the last four years covered by the Tables the situation of the two institutions is 
not the same. While the JIB followed the same pattern, i. e. the reduction of money 
supply of the rest of the economy by holding monetary assets greater than monetary 
liabilities, the KFH followed the other side of the coin. That is, it started adding 
liquidity (i. e. adding to the aggregate money supply) to the rest of the economy by 
holding liabilities greater than monetary claims. This may due to several factors. 
One of the possible explanation is the fact that KFI-l has concentrated most of its 
investments in construction sector in early years, so it may now be renting out a 
considerable amount of property that can help in generating a permanent income. 
This in fact is true as it has been reported in the annual report of the I-louse for 
the year 1983 "in order to secure continuous stable and reasonable flow of income 
KFH leases 120 buildings at reasonable rents. Rental income from these buildings 
rose by 33% during 1983... ", look, for instance at Table 4.2 the last column for the 
years 1982 and 1983 respectively. The other factor is that KFII started holding a 
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considerable amounts with other banks in the last four years (see the last column of 
Table 3.3). On the other hand, JIB is still a small size bank so that its operations are 
not that extensive even domestically. However, the batik has opened several branches 
nationwide, around 11 branches in 1986. These branches may depend heavily in 
meeting their liquidity requirements from the central branch of the batik. The above 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that the general contribution of the KFH is liquidity addition 
(i. e. adding monetary assets that can be used as money of other economic agents), 
whereas the general contribution of . JIB 
is liquidity deduction, in the form of reducing 
the amount of notes and coins in circulation in the rest of the economy. However, we 
should be very cautious in deriving such conclusions, because this notion deals only 
with one type of assets and liabilities; that is monetary ones. 
4.3.2 The application of the net liquidity definition 
In order to apply this criterion, assets and liabilities are classified as follows: 
1. Short-Tenn (ST) assets: included in this category are assets (liabilities) that 
have maturities less than one year (< lyear maturity). 
2. Medium-Term (MT) securities: this category consists of assets (liabilities) with 
maturities ranging from one year, but less than two years (1 year -<2 years of 
maturity. 
3. Long-Term (LT) assets: those assets (liabilities) with 2 years maturity and over 
(2 year-maturity- and over >). 
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Table 4.3 Maturity Structure of Assets and Liabilities of JIB at the 31st 
December 1988 
Items Assets (A) Liabilities (L) L-AL-AA/L 
Amount Percent Amount Percent Percent 
S. T 75.219.307 34 40.742.211 19 -34.477.096 -15 1.79 
M. T 140.04: 3.818 6: 3 151.318.281 71 11.274.463 8 0.89 
L. T 7.321.216 3 21.392.288 10 14.071.072 7 0.30 
Source: Annual Report 1988 
Total Assets = JD222.584.341 
Total Liabilities = . JD213.452.780 
Note: Imbalances between total assets and total liabilities due to the exclusion of 
funds denominated in foreign currencies. 
Table 4.4 Maturity Structure of Assets and Liabilities of KFH at the 31st 
December 1988 
Items Assets (A) Liabilities (L) L-AL-AA/L 
Amount 1 Percent Amount Percent Percent 
S. T 572.82: 3.860 49 306.990.923 27 -265.832.937 -22 1.81 
M. T 518.981.947 44 793.652.087 69 274.670.140 25 0.63 
L. T 81.029.873 7 47.128.801 4 -33.901.072 -3 1.75 
Source: Annual Report 1988 
Total Assets = KD1.172.835.650 
Total Liabilities = KDI. 147.771.811 
Note: Imbalances between total assets and total liabilities due to the exclusion of 
the proposed net profits to be distributed to depositors and proposed dividend of 
shareholders. 
To apply the net liquidity definition, after establishing the maturity class of assets 
and liabilities, one needs to know the liquidity coefficients related to each maturity 
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class of assets and liabilities. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate that the operations of both 
institutions are dominated by short and medium term operations. As an illustrative 
example of the net liquidity notion, the following liquidity coefficients are assigned 
arbitrary for each maturity class of assets (liabilities). 
Table 4.5 Arbitrary values of liquidity coefficients used to calculate net 
liquidity for KFH and JIB. 
Maturity class Liquidity coefficients 
S. T. <1 year . 
60 
M. T. 1 year -< 2 years . 
40 
L. T. 2 years and over . 
20 
Applying the above coefficients to the last columns of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 (the L-A 
percent column) produces the follyowing results: 
N. L(. JIB)=- 15 x 0.6 +8x0.4 +7x0.2 = -5.2 percent 
N. L(KFH)=- 22 x 0.6 + 25 x 0.4 -3x0.2 = -3.8 percent 
The above results indicate that both institutions are performing the function of liq- 
uidity destruction (i. e. they reducing the volume of money supply in circulation) 
rather than liquidity creation. This situation is observed by the minus (-) sign which 
precedes the values of N. L for each institution. The meaning of these results is that, 
for every Jordanian Dinar (. JD) (in the case of JIB) of total deposits, liquidity destruc- 
tion amounts to 5.2 pence (JD1 = 100 pence)(i. e. the money supply in circulation 
is reduced by 5.2 pence). In the case of KFH, for every Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) of to- 
tal deposits, liquidity destruction accounts for 3.8 Fils (KD1 = 100 Fils)(i. e. the 
money supply in circulation is reduced by 3.8 Fils). However, in the above example 
we assigned liquidity coefficients to different maturities arbitrary, it is, therefore, im- 
portant to test other assumptions to see low sensitive the result is to this arbitrary 
assignment. In fact using other assumptions would produce the same result i. e. the 
performance of both institutions (i. e. KFH and JIB) tend to produce a reduction in 
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the volume of the liquidity available in the economy. Table 4.6 illustrate this fact. 
Table 4.6 Values of Net Liquidity (NL) for both KFH and JIB using 
other assumptions for the values of liquidity coefficients ()j's) 
Liquidity coefficients NL(KFH) NL(JIB) 
. 80, . 40, . 20 - 
8.2 - 7.4 
. 90, . 50, . 30 - 8.2 - 7.4 
. 80, . 
70, . 50 - 1.6 - 
2.9 
. 90, . 60, . 10 - 5.1 -8 
40, . 30, . 20 - 1.9 - 
2.2 
. 30, . 20, . 10 - 1.9 -2.2 
Note: The values on the first column are applied to maturity classes as follows: short, 
medium and long respectively. 
The above results for net liquidity may be interpreted as that both institutions are 
borrowing on the aggregate medium to lend on the aggregate short and medium. This 
can be seen by referring to Tables 4.3 and 4.4 which show that 71 percent of liabilities 
are of medium term nature of *. JIB and 69 percent of total liabilities are of medium 
term nature in the case of KFH. 
4.3.3 The utilization of Lorenz "Mismatch" curve concept 
To construct the mismatch curve the cumulated percentage ratios of assets and lia- 
bilities for each maturity are plotted on the vertical and horizontal axes respectively. 
The percentage ratios are taken from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 columns 2 and 3 respectively. 
The mismatch curves for both institutions are plotted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. The 
general impression that can be gained from Figures 4.2 and 4.3 is that the maturity 
transformation of both institutions falls in the range of the second category (i. e. neg- 
ative maturity transformation). Thus, the operations of the KFH and the JIB on the 
liability side are of the medium term maturity. On the other land, the operations of 
the assets side are of short and medium term nature. This result supports the 
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findings of the previous section, where it was found that the overall contribution 
of both institutions is liquidity destruction rather than creation. Hence, we can con- 
clude that these two institutions are playing the role of distributing liquidity which 
has been created elsewhere rather than creating it. 
In order to make the above results much more clearer, a simple exercise has been car- 
ried out to examine the maturity transformation of some interest based institutions. 
The ones that have been selected are the Bank of Jordan (BJ), National Westminster 
Batik and the consolidated balance sheet of American commercial banks. The selec- 
tion has been made randomly no criteria have been used other than availability of 
information. Moreover, in this simple exercise we have used the last two criteria only 
(i. e. net liquidity and the Lorenz "Mismatch" curve), because these two tools examine 
the maturity transformation for the overall operations of assets and liabilities rather 
than dealing with one class of assets (liabilities). The results obtained from this ex- 
ercise are presented in Appendix 4.1. It is clear from these results that these interest 
based banks tend to create liquidity (add to the aggregate money supply). Although 
the batik of Jordan (B. 1) did not match the performance of the National Westminster 
Batik and American banks, it is obvious that it is playing the opposite role to that of 
the . JIB and KFII 
(i. e. these latter two are on the aggregate reducing the amount of 
notes and coins in circulation). This difference in the quantity of liquidity added by 
the Batik of . Jordan and that added by the British 
Batik (i. e. NatWest), and Anier- 
ican banks may due to the well developed and organized money markets in Britain 
and the United States. The general impression that can be gained from this simple 
exercise is that it allows us to compare visually the behaviour of interest based with 
interest free banks with respect to maturity transformation. Hence these preliminary 
results open the door for a more thorough theoretical and empirical investigations 
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into the role played by these newly established banks. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
From the above discussion of the examination of the asset maturity transformation 
aspect of two practicing lBs (KFI-I and JIB), the following observations can be made: 
The transformation function is only partially performed by IBs. The transformation 
of less liquid primary securities with unstable market value into liquid secondary 
securities with stable market value, as is the case with conventional banks, is 
performed less by IBs. The inability of IBs to perform this function may due to 
several factors. Some of which are the nature of the undertaken business (equity 
or rental and sales contracts), the underdevelopment of financial instruments 
and the lack of well organized financial assets markets. The engagement of these 
newly established banks in the real investment opportunities may affect the 
transformation function in the illiquidity aspect of real assets. The instruments 
utilized by lBs are still underdeveloped in the sense that they are not fully 
financial ones so that they can be traded in secondary markets. Nienliaus (1988) 
states "tile financial instrument for the liquidity management of Islamic Banks 
are still underdeveloped; as a consequence, the macroeconomic transformation 
function is only partially fulfilled by Islamic Banks". 
The spread between the interest paid and interest received is a major factor from 
which conventional retail banks generate their income. This factor, however, is 
replaced by the profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) principle for IBs. Thus, neither 
the bank nor the depositors (i. e. holders of investment accounts) are guaranteed 
to receive such a pre-determined positive rate of interest. This, in turn, means 
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that PLS yield is regarded as a factor depending on the outcome of the projects 
financed by the bank. Holders of investment accounts are exposed to the risk 
of nominal losses. 
The unbalanced portfolios structure, e. g. the KFH before and up to 1984 when it 
concentrated its investments in the construction sector, may affect the efficiency 
of the maturity transformation function in IBs, because diversification of the 
operations of the intermediary is very important factor for maturity transfor- 
mation. 
Both institutions have all item termed demand deposits on the liability side of their 
balance sheet. So one can conclude that both intermediaries are combining 
payment services (i. e. chequing system) with intermediation services. But, 
in contrast to conventional banks, these intermediaries are conducting the in- 
terniediation function on the PLS basis. Therefore, lBs are providing variety 
of assets for both lenders and borrowers as is the case in conventional batiks. 
However, there is a major difference between the two systems is the fact that 
interest mechanism in conventional batiks is replaced by PLS mechanism in the 
newly established banks. Presley (1988) pointed out "just as in the traditional 
system, the Islamic depository financial intermediaries transform the liabilities 
of business into a variety of obligations to suit the tastes and circumstances of 
the surplus units. One major difference between the two systems is that, owing 
to the prohibition against interest and the fact that the banks will have to rely 
primarily oll profit sharing, Islamic Banks will offer their asset portfolios of pri- 
mary securities in the form of risky, open-ended "mutual funds" type package 
for sale to investors/depositors". 
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IBs, as judged by their practice to date, act more as a liquidity distribution system 
rather than as a system which adds liquidity to the rest of the economy. 
These interest free institutions are of special nature. Therefore, the needs arise to ac- 
cominodate this special nature within the management of these institutions and 
the regulatory agencies which supervise the activities of these intermediaries. 
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Appendix 4.1 Examining the 
Maturity Transformation of Some 
Interest Based Banks. 
In this Appendix the data and the results obtained for some interest based banks 
from the application of net liquidity and the Lorenz 
"mismatch" curve criteria are 
presented. These have been organized in such a way that these two criteria can 
applied easily. The values for net liquidity are presented first and then followed by 
those of the Mismatch curve. 
1. The case of the Bank of Jordan (BJ) 
Table 4.7 The balance sheet of the BJ at the 31st December 1986. 
11 item % of total assets (A) % of total liabilities (L) L-A (%) 11 
S. T 28.4 23.4 -5 
M. T 17.7 53 35.3 
L. T 53.9 23.6 - 30.3 
Source: Bank of . Jordan Annual Report, 1986. 
Note: values are expressed as a percentage of total assets (liabilities) and S. T, 
M. T and L. T refer the same classification as defined in section 4 of this chapter. 
From the above Table the NL for BJ is given below: 
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N L, (B. J) = . 60 x (-5) + . 10 x 35.3 + . 20 x (-30.3) = 5.16 
2. The case of National Westminster Bank (NWB). 
Table 4.8 The balance sheet of the NWB at 31 December, 1988. 
11 item `Vo of total <a-, sets(A) Vo of total liabilities (L) L-A 
((7b) 11 
10 20 10 
F, \- 2 62 60 
L. _' 88 18 -70 
Source: National Westminster Bank, Report and Accounts : 31 December 1988. 
Note: Values are expressed in percentages and the same classification of assets 
(liabilities) is applied as cxplaiue"cl in Table 4.7. 
The net liquidity (NL) for National 
Westminster Bank (N%VB) is given below: 
NL(N\V B) = 10 x . 60 + 60 x . "10 + 
(-70) x . 20 = 16 
: 3. The case of American Banks. 
Table 4.9 Balance sheet of all American commercial banks (ACB) at 
December 31,1985. 
item `yo of total . essets (A) `lo of total liabilities (L) I, -A 
(%) II 
9 . 10 31 
17 : I'? 15 
L. '1' 7.1 28 -46 
Source: Financial Markets and the ECollollly, Henning, Pigott aucl Scott, 1988, 
P-50. 
'Note: Values are expressed in percentages and the, same classification of assets 
(liabilities) is applied as explained in Table "1.7. Also in all three 
Tables 4.7,4.8 
stnýl 4.9 the Values ill Table "1.5 have been used as 
liquidity coefficients. 
'I'lie net liquidity (\'I, ) value for ACI3 is given below: 
NL(ACR) = :nx . 60 + 15 x . "10 + 
(-"16) x . 20 = 15.1 
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Chapter 5 
The Special Features of the Asset 
and Liability Management 
Problem of an Islamic Bank 
5.1 Introduction 
In the guest column of the Banking and Trade magazine (1988), Prince Muhammed 
Al-Faisal states " the future of IBs depends, to a large extent on their ability to adopt 
themselves to changing business environment, and to build the necessary management 
ability to meet the challenge ... one of the most 
important challenges facing IBs 
remains management and operational expertise". He went on arguing "... they [IBs] 
are at a considerable disadvantage in facing competition from conventional banks 
as they do not have adequate access to the money markets and cannot resort to 
conventional banks when they face a difficult liquidity situation". The main concern 
of this chapter, therefore, is to discuss the difficulties surrounding the work of decision 
makers of IBs in managing their assets, liabilities and capital accounts. To carry out 
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this task the sequence of the points discussed in this chapter is as follows: First, 
the ALM problem is discussed in general. Second, the special features of the ALM 
problem of IBs are discussed. Finally concluding remarks are drawn. 
5.2 Statement of the problem 
Financial intermediaries (FIs) are defined as firms whose primary function is the pro- 
vision of financial services to their customers. They stand between two economic 
units; deficit units (whose activities require more funds than they have available from 
their own resources) and surplus units (whose activities require less funds than they 
have available). In order to carry out this function FIs hold claims on deficit units 
(ultimate borrowers) and issue claims for surplus units (ultimate lenders). The for- 
mer type of securities is literally known as " primary securities ", while the other 
type of securities is known as " secondary securities ". Thus primary and secondary 
securities represent uses and sources of funds respectively. Therefore, the main task 
confronting the management of FIs is managing the uses and sources of funds, which 
are represented by assets and liabilities, in such a way as to meet the requirements of 
equity shareholders, deficit and surplus units and regulatory agencies. 
Asset and liability management (dynamic balance sheet management or internal plan- 
ning as some academics called it) is the phrase used by academics and bankers to 
describe the above mentioned problem which can be summarized diagrammatically 
as follows: 
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Where, t=represents time, with to as the starting point of the planning horizon. 
Bt; = the position of the balance sheet at ti, i=0,1,2.... , n. 
Bto = the initial balance sheet at the starting point of the planning horizon. 
The ALM problem, therefore, can be summarized as follows: given the position of 
the bank's balance sheet Bto at to (the initial period), the internal and external 
conditions (e. g. policy, legal, economic constraints, etc) at to, the expected conditions 
that may develop at the future time tl, ti, t3, ... , t,,, what will 
be the best "optimal" 
combinations of assets, liabilities and capital accounts at ti, t2, t3, ..., t, that allows 
the batik management to meet the requirements of the owners, deficit and surplus 
units and regulatory agencies? In other words, how can the management of the bank, 
or any other Fl, structure the assets, liabilities and capital accounts of the bank 
in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of the interested groups (i. e. owners, 
surplus and deficit units, and regulatory agencies). Since the bank or any other Fl is 
providing financial services to economic agents by transforming one type of securities 
(primary securities) into another type of financial instruments (secondary securities), 
it should like any other firm aim to produce its services at the lowest possible cost and 
earn the maximum income on its investments. In dealing with the ALM problem the 
management should pay attention to the following considerations, Mishkin (1989): 
1. Make sure that the bank has enough ready cash to pay its customers (whether 
they are depositors or entrepreneurs) on demand. That is to keep cash on hand, 
short term assets [or any other arrangement that can guarantee the availability 
of cash (e. g. borrowed funds in the case of interest based institutions] that can 
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be converted into cash at the minimum cost. So, the bank should engage in 
liquidity management. 
2. Minimize risk by acquiring assets that have a low rate of default risk and di- 
versifying asset portfolio holdings. Thus, the bank should engage in asset man- 
agement. 
: 3. Acquire funds at low costs. That is the bank should engage in liability man- 
agement. 
4. Minimize the risk exposure of the bank to changes in rates of return through 
Hedging or gap management (i. e. the spread between rates of return received 
and paid). 
5. Observe regulatory requirements, especially the case of commercial banks. These 
requirements are designed to encourage safety and liquidity, as well as to pro- 
mote the accomplishment of public policy goals, (Yeager and Seitz (1989)). 
In addition IN are required to conduct their business operations within the 
framework defined by the Islamic Law (Shari'ah) (see chapter 3 section 2). 
5.3 What is special about the ALM problem of 
Islamic Banks? 
Chapter three describes how IBs conduct their business operations. Unlike the prac- 
tice of conventional interest-based banks (IBBs), these intermediaries (i. e. IBs) have 
chosen the broad lines offered by Islamic Law (Shari'ah) (IL) in the sphere of finance 
as the one that governs their operations. This law does not consider interest as a 
legitimate way through which income can be generated, because, it (IL) considers 
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money as " what money does ", so it does not treat it as a commodity which has its 
own price. Furthermore, IL regards the interest earning as inequitable as it leads to 
the concentration of funds in the hands of few people or institutions (i. e. usurers), 
and because money does not earn money without the collaboration of labour. There- 
fore, these institutions (IBs) must conduct their business within the fields permitted 
by the Islamic Law. However, the working of these institutions in a world where the 
principles of Islam are not applied to all aspects of life creates problems for their 
management. That is why the ALM of these institutions is of a special nature. This 
special nature can be seen on two levels. These two levels are discussed below: 
5.3.1 The nature of the business undertaken by these insti- 
tutions 
IBs have been established to offer banking services in accordance with the principles 
of Islamic Law. This statement is to be found in the internal regulations set out by the 
founders of these institutions. As we saw in chapter three this law excludes the prac- 
tising of "Riba " (usury) from the banking business. Instead, lBs have adopted other 
modes of finance (e. g. Mudarabah (capital trust), Murabahah (Mark-up on sale), etc). 
However, these arrangements cannot be regarded yet as purely financial assets in this 
present state of development by IBs. That is in contrast to their counterparts (IBBs), 
lBs are mainly concerned and engaged in real investment opportunities. This is not 
to say that these institutions do not conduct operations which involve financial assets 
(e. g. buying and selling stocks of other companies) but just to emphasize the insignif- 
icant contribution of these operations to the overall operations carried out by these 
institutions, see for example Tables 3.5 and 3.8 of JIB pages 60 and 64. Therefore, 
the nature of the business undertaken by these institutions raises some practical and 
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managerial problems that should be taken into considerations by those responsible for 
the management policies of these banks. Among others, the following considerations 
are felt to be of great importance: 
5.3.1.1 Liquidity problem 
Several definitions have been introduced by economists to determine what is meant 
by liquidity. For the purpose of this discussion, liquidity is defined as the ability of 
the batik to meet the short-term requirements of its customers as they come due (de- 
posit withdrawals, entrepreneurs need for working capital or any other instantaneous 
demand for cash). Clearly this definition emphasizes the fact that the bank should 
be able to provide cash to its clients so as they can meet their short term needs. The 
provision of liquidity in that sense depends upon several factors. These are the ease 
of access to money and capital markets, the holding of securities that can be sold 
on these markets with small or insignificant losses, the access to or development of 
interbank markets, the holding of cash and near-cash assets, receipt of new deposit 
accounts or fresh injection into the existing ones, and how to balance assets with 
liabilities. Clearly most of these options are not available to and cannot be used by 
IBs. The access to money and capital markets, especially money market, depends to 
a large extent on the holding of certificate of deposits (CDs), Treasury bills, bonds, 
stocks and other securities. Since debt securities cannot be included in the portfolio 
of IBs this means that a major part of the money and capital markets are not and 
cannot be utilized by these institutions. Moreover, the use of common stocks is very 
limited by IBs and these securities are more volatile than debt securities. What is 
left then is the last three options, that is, the holding of cash and near cash-items, 
receipt of new deposits and the maturity structure of assets and liabilities. In fact, 
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lBs rely heavily on the former factor, see for example Tables 4.1 and 4.2 page 74 
But this does not solve all their problems. Suppose a businessman approaches an IB 
asking for financing working capital requirements and the businessman is not in need 
of a commodity or a machiuery, etc but requires funds. The batik has two alterna- 
tives either to provide the requirements of this client on the basis of PLS principle 
or on the basis of interest free loans. The last option is not widely practised by IBs; 
(see Table 3.5 and 3.8 pages 60 and 64 respectively) and this option carries on an 
opportunity cost of not using money to generate income. The PLS choice, however, 
is very risky; it may take several mouths before the annual profit or loss is calculated 
and the account can be finally settled (Nienhaus (1986)). These problems have been 
recognized by IBs, who are therefore searching for new approaches and techniques. 
The development of good planning strategies may help in coping with these problems. 
Thus the application of methods, like OR techniques, may provide fruitful guide-lines 
that can help the management of these batiks in structuring their assets, liabilities 
and capital accounts. This is because these type of techniques, as we will see in the 
later chapters, try to capture the managerial problems in a global context rather than 
concentrating on one aspect of the problem e. g. simulation techniques. Moreover, the 
interaction between assets, liabilities and capital accounts is taken into consideration 
and sources and uses of funds can be matched in a way that expresses the policies 
desired by the management of these institutions. 
5.3.1.2 The risk involved in conducting banking business according to 
Islamic Law 
In modern finance risk analysis has received considerable attention by financial ana- 
lysts. Some analysts have gone further than that by arguing that modern investment 
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management is based on risk management e. g. Dobins and Witt (1983). This con- 
sideration has been derived from the fact that with every investment decision there 
is not only an expected return, but also a certain amount of risk associated with 
it. The investment decision, therefore, may be regarded as a trade-offs between risk 
and return; it is generally assumed that the larger the amount of risk the larger 
the anticipated return must be to compensate for that risk. But what is meant by 
risk? Generally speaking, risk may be defined as the probability of the occurrence of 
unfavorable outcomes, (Abdeen and Shook (1984)). In the banking field, there are 
several types of risk. Default or credit risk is one type, fluctuations in exchange rate is 
another, and changes in the rate of return (interest in conventional banks) is a third 
type, liquidity risk is a fourth type, etc. However, the presence of one type or the 
other depends upon the nature of the business undertaken. It is argued that default 
risk is associated with the investment and lending operations of all working FIs at 
least in the theoretical level, because the operations of Fis are conducted through the 
use of financial instruments. These securities do bear a risk of the possibility that 
the borrower or entrepreneur will not be able to repay the due amount back. The 
presence of risk relating to the variability of rates of return is expected to dominate 
the operations of those institutions that conduct their business on the equity basis, 
e. g. unit and investment trusts . 
It can be noticed from the discussion of how IBs 
conduct their operations (see chapter : 3) that the work of these institutions is domi- 
nated the presence this type of risk, hence it is expected that this risk will be much 
higher in the case of IBs than it is for conventional banks. This is simply due to the 
fact that the operations of IBs on the assets side are dominated by investments in 
real (physical) assets and the fact that the risk of these assets is higher than that of 
monetary assets, especially marketable debt instruments. However, emphasis on this 
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type of risk should not be taken as an indication of the unimportance of other type of 
risks e. g. liquidity and default risks, but only to emphasize the importance of analyz- 
ing carefully this type of risk (i. e. variations of rates of return risk). To understand 
the risk associated with the business carried out by IBs it is important to analyze 
the different methods and approaches adopted by these institutions. We concluded 
chapter three by stating that investment activities conducted by IBs are carried out 
through direct investment, Musharakah (participation), Mudarabah (capital trust), 
Murabahah (Mark-up on sale) and Ijara (Leasing). Clearly the risk associated with 
the implementation of each method is not the same. Therefore the risk involved with 
each technique is discussed below: 
5.3.1.3 Risk associated with direct investment 
The direct involvement of IBs in investment opportunities can take many forms e. g. 
trading and management of real estate properties, precious metals, import and export 
purchase and rental equipment, establishing factories, etc. The involvement of 113s ill 
direct investment in complicated projects that require special technical and manage- 
rial skills is minimal. Some IBs have restricted this involvement to certain levels e. g. 
. IIB may invest funds in various projects directly, provided that the total permanent 
investments of the Bank does not exceed seventy percent of their total paid ill) capital 
and compulsory reserve, (Abdeen and Shock (1984)). Generally, the risk faced by IBs 
under this mode of finance does not differ from the risk faced by business project 
of other companies in the real sector of the economy (e. g. the automobile industry, 
the textile industry, etc). That is the drop in the value of the selected project, the 
variation of the rate of return, and default risk are three main factors that contribute 
to the size of the incurred risk. The issue of evaluating and selecting the project is of 
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vital importance. Moreover, the profitability and feasibility of these selected projects 
are very crucial for the results realized by the batik, and conducting the business 
according to this method requires specialized staff to be assigned for that purpose. 
5.3.1.4 Musharakah (participation) Risk 
In Musharakah mode of finance the bank and its client(s) contribute to the capital 
required to finance the project. The bank has the right to participate in the man- 
agement, but it can delegate this to the client. It is important to point out that 
according to the Islamic Law(IL), the bank cannot guarantee the full repayment of 
the principal in the case of loss from his partner(s) except the case of dishonesty 
and negligence, (Mudawi (1986) and Abdeen and Shook (1984)). Thus there is a 
heavy burden on the management of the bank to take measures in order to mini- 
inize the risks attached to this mode of finance, because the presence of information 
asymmetries and `moral hazard' problems, which characterize the financial market, 
make this contractual arrangement difficult to implement. Moreover, the detection 
of dishonesty and negligence is very difficult if not impossible to prove. Therefore, 
selecting partners with good experience, reputation in the community as a whole, and 
business community in particular, is of the upmost importance, letters of reference 
may provide some protection for the interests of the bank but are not adequate sub- 
stitute for direct knowledge. Once again, a careful selection of partners with good 
and feasible projects is very important responsibility of the management of 113s. And 
it is expected that under this arrangement the monitoring cost or the involvement of 
the management in the (lay to day practices of the business, will add to the expenses 
of the bank. 
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5.3.1.5 Mudarabah (Capital trust) risk 
Mudarabah has been defined as a contract that links two parties, one provides 100 
per cent of the capital (the IB) and the other provides entrepreneurship and labour 
(the batik's client). It has been stated also that the profits, if any, are to be shared 
between the partners on a pre-determined mutually agreed proportions. However, if 
losses are to be the case, these will be incurred by the capital provider (the bank), 
except in the case where these losses are due to dishonesty and negligence of the work 
provider (the bank's client). That is why risk undertaken by the bank is assumed to 
be greater in the case of Mudarabah than in the case of Musharakah. Because under 
the latter the bank does not inject 100 per cent financing into the project, but shares 
this financing with other partners. Therefore, the loss is divided between them all. 
But in the case of Mudarabah the whole loss is incurred by the bank. For this reason, 
the ability of the bank to choose an experienced managing partner(s) who engages in 
efficient and moral practices determines the degree of risk taken, (Abdeen and Shook 
(1984)). What has been said about the two previous modes can also be said about 
the implementation of Mudarabah method: it requires the careful selection of projects 
and partners. 
5.3.1.6 Risk associated with Murabahah (Mark-up on sale) 
The risk involved in this method is different because it involves the sale on credit. The 
customer approaches the bank requesting that a particular item should be purchased 
on his behalf, with the promise that the client will purchase that item at the purchase 
cost plus the profit margin agreed upon in advance between the two parties at some 
agreed future date. According to some Islamic jurists, the customer is not obliged 
to purchase the item. Thus, if the customer refuses to buy the item the IB will seek 
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to sell that item to another client or store it in either case the IB will incur the risk 
of refusal by the customer. With respect to the risk of Musharakah and Mudarabah, 
the risk related to Murabahah is expected to be small. That may explain why this 
method is being implemented widely by IBs. 
5.3.1.7 Ijara (Leasing) risk 
The risk of leasing conies from the fact that the payment of the due amount from 
the use of the rented item depends upon the future profitability and the continuing 
generation of future cash flow. Hence, the use of this method requires careful planning 
and follow-up in order to ensure the adequacy of the rent and the preservation of 
the asset in good working condition to the end of the lease period. If the lessee 
refuses to buy the asset as stipulated by the contract (i. e. the case of Ijara wa Iktina 
(hire and purchase)), the bank will have to sell it on the market in order to recover 
its financial investment, (Abdeen and Shook (1984)). Theoretically, it seems that 
the risk attached to leasing contract is expected to be less than the risk related to 
Musharakah and Mudarabah, but lt jglier than the risk associated with Murabahah 
mode of finance. 
Having discussed the risk associated with each method of finance implemented by 
IBs, we should note that there are other types of risk. The newly developed methods 
applied by IBs and limited experience in their use is one type. That is because business 
community and other customers have not gained greater familiarity with these new 
modes of finance. Another important factor that may increase the degree of risk is 
the weak moral character of certain customers of IBs and the lack of ethical business 
practices in the community, as Khan (1985) notes " real progress of [Islamization] 
will have to come from a change of attitudes of those who are heavily engaged in the 
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present system (IBBs)". In order to minimize the risk involved in conducting their 
operations, IBs have adopted different measures. These are managerial, financial 
and legal ones (Abdeen and Shook (1984)). By managerial measures is meant the 
use of good planing and control techniques by the management of these banks, e. g. 
studying the projects that will be financed carefully by applying technical, managerial, 
financial and social conditions. The financial measures lie around the guarantees 
requested from partners when it is permissible, the application of ceilings to the 
amount specified for investment activities or investment mode of finance e. g. KFII 
states in its internal law that investment activities should not exceed 30 per cent 
of working capital or individual project financed by the house should not exceed 5 
per cent of its working capital. The third category is that of legal measures. These 
are any legal regulations imposed from the authorities in a locality within which IBs 
operate and these regulations are Helpful in minimizing the size of the expected risk 
(e. g. delay of payments from the customer). However, all these undertaken measures 
must not contradict the principles of Islamic Law (Shari'ah). 
5.3.2 The environment through which Islamic Banks oper- 
ate 
The environments in which the IBs are located and operate are not purely Islamic 
ones. That is, the regulations that govern business and other aspects of life are not 
fully in accordance with the principles of Islam. Usurious transactions are still prac- 
ticed within these communities and IBs are still working side by side with IBBs. 
Moreover, the regulations set by central batiks (CBs) and monetary authority do not 
conform with the principles of Islamic Law (Shari'ah). That is why the management 
of these newly established banks need to give considerable attention to the problems 
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which arise from conducting business within these communities. As Qureshi(1983) 
states "... it will be wrong to think that gains of investments financing under shared 
risk can be realized soon after the switch-over to the new form of financial intermedi- 
ation. A great deal of homework will have to be done before a meaningful and smooth 
change can be achieved". The problems that seem to affect the working of 113s are 
listed and discussed below: 
5.3.2.1 Competition from conventional banks (IBBs) 
Since IBs have been established in an environment within which IBBs operate, at- 
tention should be given to the nature of the services offered by IBBs. This is so, 
because both institutions are targeting the same customers (deficit and surplus eco- 
uouiic units) and it is expected that both intermediaries put considerable effort in 
attracting more customers. Generally, the major contrast between lBs and IBBs lies 
on the investment contracts applied by both institutions. The investment (time) de- 
posit accounts is one and the instruments applied to utilize funds is the other. As 
far as the former factor is concerned, IBBs offer time deposit accounts on the ba- 
sis of pre-determined rates of interest. Thus, the holders of these type of deposits 
expect to receive back the deposited principal plus the interest payment at the due 
time, at the very least they are not exposed to negative return. Moreover, the Law in 
most countries guarantees this payment through special regulations such as insurance 
deposit schemes. On the other hand, IBs offer investment accounts on the basis of 
PLS principle. The application of which entitled the account holder to share in the 
realized profits from the operations of the bank as well as sharing any losses if this is 
the case. Here, the holder of investment account with an IB is exposed to negative 
return. For this reason it is important for the management of these institutions to 
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take measures that aid the appearance of their investment accounts. With regard this 
latter aspect, it has been proposed that these institutions (IBs) can seek insurance 
deposit schemes offered by independent companies. An example of that is provided 
by Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS) which started this scheme, (Salania (1986)). 
Other suggestions include the opening of different accounts, e. g. Leasing investment 
accounts, Musharakah investment accounts and so forth. The argument behind this 
suggestion is that the investment contracts applied by IBs do not all bear the same 
degree of risk, as we discussed in the previous section, so the customer will have the 
choice between different alternatives. However, the author believes that building up a 
good portfolio (i. e. selecting good projects with the application of the saying "do not 
put all your eggs in one basket", that is, the application of diversification principle 
is necessary to generate positive rates of return. In addition, having good plans and 
applying the measures described in the previous section (i. e. managerial, financial 
and legal measures) and informing customers about the services offered are also vital. 
Moreover, lBs should launch programs and schemes aiming at increasing the awar- 
ness of the public in general and business community in particular to to understand 
the way these new intermediaries operate. These, however, are all measures that can 
be applied by these banks (IBs) to gain sustained growth in the market. Therefore, 
financial innovation and marketing strategies should be sought by the management 
of these banks, subject to being conducted within the framework of Islamic Law 
(Shari'ah). 
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5.3.2.2 The Central Bank (CB) cannot be considered as the lender of last 
resort 
One of the main functions of a central bank is to play the role of a lender of last resort 
for commercial banks in case of liquidity crisis. But in performing this function the 
CB provides liquidity to other banks in exchange for interest bearing instruments. 
The utilization of this contradicts the philosophy governing the operations of 113s. It 
has been proposed that the central banks, in the places where IBs operate, should 
look into ways and means of developing financial instruments which are interest free 
or instruments based on PLS principle, (Mudawi (1986)). On the other Band some 
economists have proposed the establishment of an International Islamic Bank (JIB) 
which could act as a clearing house for IBs, assist them in the very short term place- 
ment of surplus funds, and perform the function of lender of last resorts, (Nieshaus 
(1986)). The establishment of Dar-Al-Mal-Islam i (DMI) (The house of Islamic Fund) 
has Helped extending the activities of 113s from the national to the international level. 
DMI has many subsidiaries in many countries and work closely with many local Is- 
laniic financial institutions to provide financing on international level. AL-Baraka 
group is another Islamic financial institution that also works on the international 
level. It is important to note that the monetary authorities in the localities where 
IBs work should seek to introduce and accommodate special regulations and tech- 
niques that take into consideration the special nature of IBs. If this does not hapen 
IBs should seek to develop other ways that can help them in fulfilling their duties. 
5.3.2.3 IBs have no access to money and capital markets 
To perform its functions properly an Fl should work within a well developed and 
organized financial system. Given the circumstances under which lBs function, they 
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have found themselves to be working at a considerable disadvantage as compared 
with conventional banks. This is so because, IBs have no access to money and capital 
markets through which financial instruments can be bought and sold. This limitation 
imposed upon the operational practices of IBs is due to the dominance of interest 
bearing instruments in these markets, notably government bonds and bills. Clearly, 
a thorough and deep investigation should be devoted to the development of markets 
and instruments, especially short-term ones, to accommodate excessive surplus or 
shortages of short-term funds. Moreover, the interbank links is being used by IBs, 
in a limited sense, that is IBs are opening and holding transaction accounts with 
conventional banks. This can be observed from the present practices of IBs, see for 
example Tables : 3.3 and 3.7 pages 56 and 62 respectively of KFH and JIB 
respectively. It is obvious that the use of interbank links is still in its infancy, the 
KFH started using it in the last five years while . JIB has not mentioned its usage. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
From the above discussion the following remarks can be drawn: 
The ALM problem of lBs is special, in the sense that it needs treatment that takes 
into consideration the philosophy governing their operations. Moreover, the 
special nature of the ALM of IBs can be derived from the methods applied 
by them in conducting their business and the environment through which they 
operate, (i. e. an environment not governed by the principles of Islam). 
The degree of risk incurred from the application of each mode of finance is not the 
same. Direct investment, Musharakah and Mudarabah are considered as the 
most risky means of financing. While Murabahah (Mark-up on sale) and Ijara 
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(Leasing) are regarded as the least risky modes. 
To succeed in their practice IBs need to devote special care and consideration to their 
operating relationships and techniques, including financial, managerial and legal 
ones. In addition, they should evaluate projects carefully and select partners 
with good experience, reputation, honesty and so forth. Thus, they need to 
possess information about entrepreneurs not only as professionals but also as 
individuals too. The cost of delegated monitoring and control is expected to be 
high in comparison with their interest based counterparts. 
There is a need to develop short-term certificates, so as to absorb the excessive short 
term funds that IBs have, as well as markets through which these ilist runments 
can be traded. 
The monetary authority represented by central banks should take into consideration 
the special features that distinguish IBs from their conventional counterparts. 
It should be possible to accommodate new instruments that are based on the 
principles governing the operations of IBs if a thorough and deep investigations 
are carried out by the parties involved and practical steps are taken by the 
monetary authorities. 
The growth and continuity of IBs, with present practices, depend to a large extent 
on them having strong relations with surplus and deficit economic units. Thus 
offering services to these parties should be given more consideration by the 
management of these institutions. Therefore, it is important to inform and 
explain clearly to customers the way business is being conducted by IBs, so as 
to eliminate the lack of awareness and familiarity of the business community 
and customers with the principles and new methods applied by IBs. 
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Diversification of investments through different opportunities is a key element in 
reducing the risk involved in carrying out their operations. Thus, the selection 
of diversified portfolios is an important element for future success. 
Offering different investment accounts with different degrees of risk may help in 
attracting funds for investments e. g. offering Murabahah accounts, etc, and give 
customers a range of facilities with different degrees of risks. 
Having good management and trained staff in the fields of management, Islamic 
Law, economics and project appraisal should be given considerable attention 
by those responsible for IBs. This is so because the performance of IBs is more 
dependent on the projects financed by them than are conventional banks. In 
addition, if the customers are deceived the impact of their criticism will not be 
limited to those who cover their operations under the name of Islam but this 
latter itself will be criticized. 
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Chapter 6 
Literature Review 
6.1 Introduction 
In recent years, a great deal of effort has been devoted to the construction of ana- 
lytical approaches to solve the Asset and Liability Management (ALM) problem of 
commercial banks. Most of these models have taken the mathematical programming 
form. In this study, the author is going to pursue this approach in discussing and 
developing an ALM model for an Interest-free Islamic Bank (IB). The main concern 
of this chapter is to review and discuss the work on mathematical programming as 
applied to banks ALM problem so that this study can be placed within the context 
of this literature. 
6.2 Review of the previous work 
Because of its vital importance for the internal policy of the bank, it is not surprising 
that many models have been suggested to deal with the ALM problem of commer- 
cial banks. These models range from simple rules of thumb to the more advanced 
110 
and sophisticated techniques. Attention in this review, however, is mainly limited to 
Operations Research (OR) techniques. The history of OR can be traced back to the 
Second World War when scientists concentrated on the analysis of military opera- 
tions. After the war academics and managers realized that these tools can be applied 
to business and industrial operations and OR developed rapidly as a result. However, 
it was until the 1960s that bankers and specialists in the banking field realized the 
possibility of using this type of techniques in handling the decision problems faced by 
bankers, (Eilos and Fowkes (1972)). As far as the ALM problem is concerned, differ- 
cut models and approaches have beensuggested and discussed by academics. These 
approaches can be grouped into three main categories, Cohen, Maier and Vander 
Weide (1981), (see Figure 6.1 for a summary of the different techniques suggested by 
academics): 
6.2.1 Forecasting models. 
Sophisticated statistical models have been constructed by academics and applied by 
bankers in forecasting the level of deposits, loans, interest rates and other activities 
of the banking firm. In fact these types of models are one of the quantitative tools 
most widely used by banks. In two surveys conducted by McClure and Miller (1979) 
and LaForge and Wood (1980), in examining the use of OR techniques by large U. S. 
banks, forecasting models were utilized by 83 and 64 per cent of the examined banks 
respectively, (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
6.2.2 Simulation models. 
This type of techniques is also widely used and accepted in solving the decision 
problems faced by bankers. In the same surveys conducted by McClure and Miller 
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Figure 6.1 SuuaviaLry of 
Ari , LlV1 L tl Approacries Sugges -teci to So]. ve ALM 
problevn of Cc im inerci .1 
Barnlc 
The Main Analytical Techniques 
Forecasting Mathematical Simulation 
Methods Methods Methods 
Models based on Models based on 
portfolio theory profit maximizing 
criteria criterion 
Deterministic Stochastic 
e. g. DP, CCP 
LPUU. 
Single Objective Multiobjective 
e. g. LP. e. g. GP and MOLP. 
DP = Dynamic Programming. 
CCP = Chance-constrained Programming. 
LPUU = Linear Programming Under Uncertainty. 
LP = Linear Programming. 
GP = Goal Programming. 
MOLP = Multiobjective Linear Programming. 
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Table 6.1 Findings of McClure and Miller 1979. 
O. R. 11 Technique 1 Percent of batiks using each method 11 
Forecasting 
Other Statistical Methods 
Simulation 
Linear Programming 
Queuing Models 
Decision Theory 
Nonlinear Programming 
Inventory Models 
Integer Programming 
Probabilistic Programming 
Dynamic Programming 
PERT, CPM, and Networks 
83 
79 
79 
37 
37 
21 
19 
17 
15 
13 
12 
10 
Source: McClure and Miller 1979. 
Note: These results were based on a sample of the 100 largest, (according to assets 
size), U. S. banks. 
Table 6.2 Findings of LaForge and Wood 1980. 
O. R. Technique percent of banks using each method 
Simulation 77 
Regression/correlation 77 
Linear Programming 41 
Network Techniques 18 
Queuing Theory 15 
Integer Programming 10 
Goal Programming 8 
Nonlinear Programming 5 
Markov Analysis 5 
Inventory Techniques 5 
Source: LaForge and Wood, 1980. 
Note: These results were based on a sample of the 170 largest, (according to the 
amount of deposits), U. S. banks. 
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(1979) and LaForge and Wood (1980), 79 and 77 per cent of the examined banks 
used these techniques respectively. Moreover, Cohen, Maiser and Vander Weide 
(1981) reported that computer simulation models seem to be the most widely imple- 
mented type of management science aid in bank dynamic balance sheet management. 
6.2.3 Mathematical models. 
Although the implementation of these models is still in its infancy and they are 
quite difficult to formulate; these models have certain advantages over type (1) and 
(2) models. Foremost among these is the fact that these models help executives 
in determining the composition of assets, liabilities and capital over the planning 
horizon, while type(t) and (2) models concentrate on small parts of the ALM problem 
i. e. type (1) is merely concerned with forecasting the level of deposits, loans and 
interest rates and type (2) models concentrate on evaluating a small set of alternatives 
available to executives. Chambers and Charnes (1961) were the first to indicate how 
this type of models could be implemented by senior executives of banks. Their work 
was extended by Cohen and Hammer (1967,1972). Following the publication of this 
extended work several models and techniques have been suggested and some have been 
implemented by banks. Within this global context, two distinguished approaches have 
been stressed in recent years, Kusy and Ziemba (1986) : 
6.2.3.1 Models based on the criterion of the portfolio selection process. 
The portfolio theory developed out of the pioneering work of Harry Markowitz(1952,1959) 
and the work of William Sharpe, . Jensen and others. 
This work was largely respou- 
sible for the building up of a specific model of the relationship between risk and the 
required return, (Yeager and Seitz (1989)). Markowitz developed the mean-variance 
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criterion (MVC) for selecting portfolios. According to the theory investors desire 
high returns but they are averse to high risk which is measured by the variance of 
the portfolio. Therefore, rational investors choose to hold efficient portfolios. An 
efficient portfolio is defined as "the one that maximizes expected returns for a given 
degree of risk, or alternatively, the one that minimizes risk for a given expected re- 
turn", (Collier, Cooke and Glynn (1988)). In applying this criterion to the ALM 
problem researchers, e. g. Pyle (1971), assumed that returns are normally distributed 
and bank management utilizes risk averse utility function. Moreover, the value of all 
asset is a function of not only its return and variance, but also it depends on the 
covariance of its return with the returns of all assets included in the portfolio, (Kusy 
and Ziemba (1986)). Examples of the work that follow this line are the ones cou- 
ducted by Brodt (1976,1978,1984,1988). Brodt's work is essentially an adaptation of 
the criteria suggested by Markowitz who measures risk by the variance, while Brodt 
measures it by either semi-absolute deviation or mean-absolute deviation. In fact, 
little work has been done in pursuing this approach. This may be due to the fact that 
in a practical banking context this approach involves the formulation of sophisticated 
models and requires complex computation. Its usefulness as a managerial tool is thus 
seriously limited. In addition, some academics have criticized this approach as being 
an unrealistic description of the behaviour of the banking firne, (Santomaro (1984)). 
6.2.3.2 Models based on considering banks as firms seeking to maximize 
their expected profits. 
According to this approach banks are merely regarded as firms like any other busi- 
ness firms in the economy. They utilize some "factors of production" (e. g. labour, 
deposits) as an input to produce their output (e. g. loans). We should note that what 
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FIs do produce is a controversial point, see Lewis and Davis (1987). What really con- 
cerns us here is that banks are fulfilling the two basic functions required to consider 
any business entity as a firm. These are production and distributive functions. It 
is well discussed in the literature of the banking firth that banks exist because; they 
are asset transformers (in the sense that transforming size, maturity, risk, etc of pri- 
mary securities into secondary securities with different characteristics) and they are 
performing the brokerage function by possessing and providing information against 
commission fees. Models that have been constructed following this approach are 
either deterministic or stochastic. 
6.2.3.3 Deterministic models. 
Since the work of banks is undertaken in a world where uncertainty is associated with 
cash flows, cost of funds and rates of returns, some procedures must be provided to 
cope with this situation or assumptions must be made to simplify the real world. 
In fact, deterministic models have pursued the last option; that is assuming certain 
realization of random events. The most widely used technique in deterministic models 
is Linear Programming (LP). In two surveys cited earlier, LP ranked third, among 
the tools utilized by American banks, after Simulation and Statistical Forecasting 
methods. It is the pioneering work of Chambers and Charnes (1961) and Collen 
and Hammer (1967,1972) who developed general models for the ALM problem using 
the intertemporal LP technique. In constructing their model Cohen and Hammer 
(1967) discussed the possibility of utilizing one of the following criteria as an objective 
function: 
Maximizing the value of the shareholders' equity at the end of the final period 
of the planning horizon. 
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2. Maximizing the present value of the net income stream during the planning 
horizon. 
3. Maximizing the present value of the net income stream during the planning 
horizon plus the present value of the shareholders' equity at the end of the final 
period. 
In their formulation of the LP model Cohen and Hammer distinguish between two 
types of constraints: intra-temporal and inter-temporal constraints. The former re- 
fer to the constraints that must be met each point of time in the planning horizon 
e. g. policy, funds availability, etc. The latter type of constraints represents the links 
between the items of the balance sheet over the whole planning horizon. The most 
detailed constraint in their model is the Capital Adequacy Formula (CAF) of the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The underlying concept of that formula is that 
the function of bank capital is to protect depositors against possible loss. That is 
under crisis circumstances, equity shareholders are exposed to any losses first, for 
more details of the concept and formulation of this formula see Cohen and Hammer 
(1967) and Beazer (1975). All subsequent deterministic models developed by other 
academics are indebted to the work of Chambers and Charnes (1961) and Cohen 
and Hammer (1967,1972) especially the latter. For this reason in what follows we 
will discuss briefly some of these contributions. However, the omission of other work 
should not be considered as a negative judgement of its quality. Myer Zu Selhausen 
(1970) developed an LP model in conjunction with a leading German Bank. This 
model consists of three interrelated and nested models, planning horizons of 90 days, 
one year and five years. Each of the three models consists of a full set of balance 
sheet variables, but the variables differ in their level of aggregation the short term 
model of 90 (lays being more detailed than the other two. The objective function 
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in the models is the maximization of the contribution to bank profit from raising 
and investing funds, subject to a block set of constraints (some of which have been 
regarded as sub-objectives e. g. limitation of risk). A slightly different approach has 
been suggested by Balbirer and Shaw (1981). A version of their model, in fact, has 
been implemented by the Central Carolina Bank and Trust Company. The authors 
constructed a single period LP model with the objective function of maximizing prof- 
its. In dealing with the multiobjective nature of the banking firm, three approaches 
have been suggested. The first is Goal Programming (GP). This technique recog- 
nizes the existence of multiple and possibly conflicting goals. Forston and Dince 
(1977) constructed an intertemporal GP model consisting of four quarters comprising 
a planning horizon of one year. A version of this model was implemented, as reported 
by the authors, in a small National Bank located in North Geogia. Gioakas and 
Vassiloglou (1991) developed a Goal Programming model for the commercial bank 
of Greece (CBG). In their construction of the model the authors have considered six 
goals. These include: the maximization of gross revenues resulting from the difference 
between the interest received and the interest paid, the target of this goal was set 
up to be equal to zero ensuring that income would be greater than or equal to ex- 
penses, the minimization of solvency risk which has been measured by the ratio of the 
bank's equity capital to its total weighted assets and the target of this ratio has been 
specified at the level of 8 per cent or more, the minimization of liquidity risk which 
has been defined as the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities, the standard level 
determined by the management of the selected Greek bank was to maintain a level of 
this ratio at approximately 60 per cent, the achievement of a target level of deposits 
2: 3 per cent higher than the level of the previous year, and finally the achievement 
of a target level of loans of 21 per cent above the previous year's level. In addition, 
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institutional, financial, legal and policy considerations that reflect the environmental 
constraints of the bank, have been included in the model. The second approach is 
Multiobjective Linear Programming (MOLP). This technique attempts to optimize 
all objectives simultaneously subject to the specified constraints. This method has 
been proposed by Eatman and Sealey (1979). Their model includes three specific 
objectives; maximizing net after tax profit, minimization of capital adequacy ratio 
(the ratio of required to actual capital) and minimization of risk assets to capital. 
The authors solve the MOLP problem by using an algorithm developed by Milan 
Zeleny (1974). According to this algorithm a set of solutions can be obtained called 
non-dominant. A nondoniinated solution is the one where no objective value can be 
improved without harming one or more of other objective values. A nondomiuated 
solution is, therefore, equivalent to all efficient solution in portfolio analysis theory, 
(Eatman and Sealey (1979)). In order to arrive at a final solution, bank managers are 
presented with the set of possible solutions and then use their subjective preferences, 
experience and judgement to select the solution that is most favourable overall. The 
third technique is Polynominal Goal Programming (POP). This method has been 
suggested by Tayi and Leonard (1988). However, their exercise was for expository 
purposes and it was based on the numerical example provided by Eatman and Sealey 
(1979). The POP is similar to OP in the sense that it (PCP) tries to locate a sin- 
gle best compromise solution. In order to utilize this method the decision maker 
is requested to provide preference information concerning various trade-offs between 
the multiple objectives, which is then used to set up a single objective problem. At 
each interaction with the decision maker, a new single objective problem is solved 
so that the current solution is `close enough' to the best compromise solution, Tayi 
and Leonard (1988). It should be noted that the multiobjective methods and their 
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solution techniques are grouped into three main categories, depending on when and 
how the preference information from the decision maker is used, see chapter 9 (pages) 
for these groupings. Before we end this part it is important to note the fact that the 
omission of uncertainty is a serious drawback of deterministic models. However, they 
have gained an enormous acceptance on the practical level. This is so because they 
are computationally tractable and they can be understood easily by decision makers. 
Kusy and Ziemba (1986) state that "the banking industry has accepted these models 
as a useful normative tools". 
6.2.3.4 Stochastic models. 
This type of model , as 
its name indicate, has tried to cope with the uncertainty 
inherent in the banking environment. This uncertainty includes uncertainty of cash 
flows, rates of return and costs of funds. Proponents of these models have argued 
that since probability distributions can be obtained for random events, the uncer- 
tainty should be incorporated in formulating the ALM problem. In their forniula- 
tions academics have used mainly four mathematical techniques. These are Cltance- 
constrained programming (CCP), Dynamic programming (DP), Multistage stochastic 
progratntning (MSP) (also known as Linear programming under uncertainty (LPUU)) 
and Sequential decision tree approach. CCP was suggested more than two decades 
ago by Charnes and Tlhore (1966) and Cliarnes and Littlecliild (1968). But since that 
time no more work has been conducted using this approach. This is mainly due to its 
computational difficulty. As Cohen, Maiser and Vander Weide (1981) reported "... 
there have not been more recent papers of which we are aware of describing applica- 
tions of this technique to bank dynamic balance sheet". 
The application of DP to the ALM problem attributed to the work of Eppen and 
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Fama (1968,1969,1971) who modeled two and three assets problems. Their work was 
extended by Daellenbach and Archer (1969). A slightly different approach within the 
context of DP has been developed by Chen (1970). In this occasion Chen discusses 
the uncertainties surrounding the work of bankers. He considered three type of un- 
certainties as the most important ones : 1) - uncertainty of future prices on assets, 2) 
- uncertainty of returns of asset; these two type of uncertainties have been referred to 
as portfolio risk and; 3) - uncertainty of deposits levels, which the author regarded as 
liquidity risk. To take these kinds of risks into consideration Chen suggested that the 
management should study the prevailing conditions of the market within which assets 
can be bought/sold and then derive the probability distributions of future prices of 
assets. Chen defines the liquidity risk as the correlation between the future returns 
of assets and the magnitude of bank's liquidity need to meet deposits withdrawals. 
For a single period model the author suggested the use of quadratic programming. 
While in the multiperiod case lie suggested the application of stochastic dynamic 
programming. 
MSP is the third quantitative technique that has been suggested in dealing with 
the ALM problem under uncertainty. Cohen and Thore (1970) proposed the use of 
two-stage programming under uncertainty (which is a special case of the generalized 
MSP). This work was extended by Booth (1972). Booth reported that the extension 
dealt with the following aspects: 1) - in the Cohen-Thore model uncertainty was lini- 
ited to the level of deposits only, while Booth's model incorporated the uncertainty 
of rates of interest, loan demands and non-deposit liability levels, 2) - Cohen and 
Thore's model is a single period model, whereas Booth's model is a two period model 
type; and 3) - the author claims that the data required as an input for his model can 
be obtained by bankers in a mariner easier than that of Cohen and Thore model. 
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Agliili, Cramer and Thompson (1975) constructed a MSP model, which has been 
implemented by a small Midwestern batik. The aim of this exercise was to test the 
ability of two-stage programming in solving the ALM problem for senior executives. 
For that reason, they compared the results obtained by the model with the actual 
results of the small Midwestern bank for 1972. The authors cited the advantages of 
using MSP: 1) - it allows the batik to recover from a bad to another decision stage 
(that is why it is important in decision making to separate time decisions into stages), 
2) - the formulated model is of the same size as LP models, so it can be easily solved 
by the LP algoritlitn; and 3) - in formulating a decision problem it is necessary to 
characterize future economic events with a finite set i. e. expressing uncertainty in the 
form of economic scenarios. 
In the model developed by Aghiliet al (1975) policy constraints were found to be the 
cornerstone of the model. When the model was applied to the data of the Midwestern 
batik, the authors found that the model produces results very similar to the actual 
ones, when the policy constraints were included. But when these constraints were 
omitted the model produces entirely unrealistic results. Therefore, they conclude 
that policy constraints are very important in modelling the ALM problem. More- 
over, their work led them to claim that MSP is the technique that bridges the gap 
between theory and practice "... indeed it is our opinion that it [MSP] does bridge 
the gap between the theoretically desirable and practically reasonable, and above all 
can lead to better batik management". 
Kusy and Ziemba (1986) have developed a multi-period LPUU model, taking into 
considerations uncertainties of cash flows, cost of funds and rates of return on in- 
vestments. In their opinion batik management should pay considerable attention to 
the trade-off between risk, return and liquidity. A version of the model developed 
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has been applied by a Canadian bank as reported by the authors, (Vancouver City 
Savings Credit Union) for five years. 
The fourth technique is sequential decision tree developed by Bradley and Crane 
(1972,1973,1976). The Bradley-Crane model depends upon the developments of eco- 
nomic scenarios that are intended to include the set of all possible outcomes. The 
scenarios may be viewed as a tree diagram for which each element (economic scenario) 
in each path has a set of cash flow and interest rates, (Kusy and Ziemba (1986)). 
From the above discussion we can conclude that stochastic models are theoretically 
superior to deterministic ones. However, they have achieved little success in prac- 
tice. Because of the computational difficulties associated with them, unfamiliarity of 
bankers with their mathematical requirements, the considerable information that they 
require and the undesirable features that they contain, (e. g. arbitrary constraints), 
(Kusy and Ziemba (1986)). 
6.3 Assessment of the Previous Work and Av- 
enues to be explored. 
Having reviewed, in some details, the different approaches that have been taken by 
academics, attention is given to the assessment of that work. The purpose of this 
is to place the work carried out in this study within the context of the literature 
reviewed. It can be noticed that all Operational Research (OR) techniques, which 
have been suggested by academics to solve the ALM problem, share the same prin- 
ciple of optimizing an objective(s) subject to certain mix of portfolio constraints. 
Therefore, one of the distinguishing factors between different models is : what is 
it that is optimized?, and under what conditions?. All single objective detertnin- 
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istic models, and some stochastic models, have used Expected Net Present Value 
(ENPV) or contribution to profits from raising and investing funds as an objective 
criterion to be maximized. Of course, different arguments have been put forwarded 
for selecting one criterion or the other. Cohen and Hammer (1967,1972) have sum- 
marized these arguments. Those who used ENPV have put the following reasons 
for their selection : 1) not all earnings opportunities are explicitly incorporated as 
decision variables in the Linear Programming (LP) model, 2) increasing degrees of 
uncertainty are implicitly attached to more distant forecasts, and 3) it is felt that 
shifts in time pattern of the net income stream will affect the market 's valuation 
of bank's stock. However, difficulty exists when it comes to the matter of select- 
ing an appropriate discount rate. That is why proponents of contribution to profit 
maximization have favoured its use, because it avoids the necessity for determining 
a discount rate. Multiobjective models, on the other band, have used some other 
objectives such as providing sufficient liquidity, minimizing risk and maintaining ad- 
equate capital as well as profit maximization criterion which has been used widely 
in constructing single objective models, see Forston and Dince(1977), Eatmau and 
Sealey(1979), Zaloom et al (1986) and others for more details. As far as the other 
part (i. e. constraints) is concerned, most if not all, academics have used the capital 
adequacy formula (CAF) developed by the examiners of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve system as the most important constraint. Because it is a very 
detailed and comprehensive formula and it involves many assets, some liabilities and 
capital items, (Cohen and Hammer(1967,1972) and Beazer(1975)). However, some 
other academics e. g. Zu Selhausen(1977) have regarded liquidity maintenance as the 
core of the model constraints. Clearly, emphasizing one constraint or the other de- 
pends upon the nature of the business undertaken by the institution, the environment 
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through which it operates and the regulations which govern its operations. The next 
step in assessing the reviewed work is to consider what is theoretically desirable and 
practically feasible. So far, it seems that the gap between the two is far from being 
narrowed. What is theoretically desirable is presented in stochastic models which 
incorporate uncertainty in the modelling process. While what is practically feasible 
has been presented in deterministic models (i. e. linear models). Many writers have 
noticed and reported this fact. For example, Eatman and Sealey(1979) have stated 
that "... the linear model, in one form or another, has proven to be the most use- 
ful in practical applications". Cohen and Thore(1970) have pointed out the same 
fact for American banks "the most successful technique that has actually been de- 
veloped and implemented in any American bank ... 
is a large-scale intertewporal 
LP model". While other academics have stated the reasons why banking industry 
has not yet accepted stochastic models for example, Kusy and Ziemba(1986) state 
that "... stochastic models ... 
have achieved little success. This failure due to the 
inherent computational difficulties, the oversimplifications needed to achieve com- 
putational tractability and practioners' unfamiliarity with these models' potential". 
In their discussion of constructing a Goal Programming model Zaloom et al (1986) 
pointed out the same fact "techniques other than LP such as quadratic programming 
... dynamic programming models have not been adapted for practical balance sheet 
management by the commercial banks since the specifications of these models are gen- 
erally difficult and their mathematical solutions are costly to obtain and to interpret". 
Moreover, the worthiness of utilizing stochastic models depends upon having more 
information about the probability distributions of random variables. As Beazer(1975) 
noticed "... their [stochastic models] worth depends upon having more information 
about probability distribution than just expected value". Within the global con- 
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text of linear models two approaches have been suggested; single-and multi-objective 
models. Linear programiiiing(LP) is the most formidable normative tool which has 
been implemented and accepted in the banking industry. However, this technique 
is still being criticized for its narrowness in limiting the utility function of the batik 
to a single criterion function to be optimized when the nature of the banking firm 
indicates the usefulness of considering the conflicting requirements of shareholders, 
depositors, borrowers and regulatory agencies. Coal programming(GP), multiohjec- 
five linear programining(MOLP) and Polynominal Coal Programming (PCP) are the 
three tools that have been proposed to deal with the multicriteria nature of the bank- 
ing firm. Our discussion, however, will be limited to the first two techniques, because 
the latter requires an interaction between the decision maker and the analyst at each 
iteration stage in order to determine his preferences with respect to the objectives to 
be optimized. GP has been developed and used for practical purposes in at least one 
small national batik located in north Georgia, (Forston and Dince(1977)). Although 
GIP recognizes the presence and importance of multiple and perhaps conflicting goals, 
the way used it tries to overcome this problem makes it a controversial technique. It 
first asks the management to set some targets for each goal and to put priorities on 
them - that is to rank them in order of importance, when this information is sup- 
plied GP tries to minimize the deviations from the targets set, (Levin, Rubin and 
Stinson(1986)). This procedure makes it rather a mechanical tool as Zeleny(1982) 
states "it [GP] still a rather mechanical technique plagued by insufficient theoretical 
elaboration, mediocre interpretations, and fast applications". Therefore, interpreting 
the results is a very difficult task "the interpretation of the criterion value ... can 
be very difficult. Since the goals are usually stated in different units, the criterion 
value is likely to be a mixture of "apples and oranges", (Forston and Dince(1977)). 
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MOLP, on the other hand, has not been developed for practical purposes yet. It 
has been proposed by Eatman and Scalcy(1979), but their model was for expository 
purposes "the purpose of the model is to demonstrate the formulation of a MOLP 
and to present the results obtained from the procedure. As a result, the model is for 
expository purposes", (Eatman and Sealey(1979)). However, MOLP has some desir- 
able features such as presenting the whole set of the non-dominated solutions which 
qualifies it to be regarded as a managerial rather than a mechanical tool. Eatmal] 
and Sealey(1979) pointed out that "MOLP appears to have a number of advantages 
over more traditional programming techniques. First, MOLP allows the introduction, 
in a feasible manner, of all the information required to achieve a utility maximization 
solution. Second, it avoids the appearance of being a purely mechanical decision- 
making technique because decision makers are allowed to choose explicitly the final 
course of action ... third, in order to implement the procedure, no major changes are 
required in most existing linear models of batik management". 
On the basis of the above discussion, the author is going to develop linear models in 
the form of single and multiobjective processes. The techniques that are going to be 
used are LP and MOLP for solving the ALM problem of an interest-free Islamic bank. 
LP has been chosen, because of its simplicity and its acceptance by the banking in- 
dustry on the practical level. While MOLP has been chosen for its desirable features 
and the fact that it has not been developed for practical use yet. Therefore, this 
study will allow the author to assess the usefulness of these techniques with respect 
to the actual portfolios achieved by the selected. institutions, in one hand, and the 
improvements that can be gained from using MOLP with respect to the LP technique 
on the other hand. To end this section we can say that the author has given the fol- 
lowing factors more considerations than others in developing an ALM model for an 
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interest-free Islamic bank : 
1. Simplicity, so that the results can be understood easily by the senior executives; 
despite their unfamiliarity with these type of techniques. 
2. Simultaneous considerations of assets and liabilities to satisfy basic accounting 
principles and match the liquidity of assets and liabilities. 
: 3. Legal and policy constraints appropriate to the bank's operating environment. 
The last two factors have been taken from the work of Kusy and Ziemba(1986) 
in their discussion of what an ideal operational model should contain. 
6.4 Concluding Remarks. 
From the above discussion the following remarks can be drawn: 
Two different approaches have been stressed in recent years in dealing with the 
ALM problem; one based on the portfolio criteria (mean-variance) developed 
by Markowitz and others, and the other which regards banks as firms striving 
to maximize an objective function subject to one or more constraints reflecting 
the nature of banking as business activity. Clearly, these two views indicate 
the fact that a general model that expresses how banks behave have not been 
developed by academics yet. 
Deterministic vs Stochastic models. We ended our previous discussion by stating 
that each one of these approaches has its merits as well as its demerits. De- 
terministic models are found to be superior on the practical level, but they 
suffer from the lack of treatment of uncertainty. Stochastic models, on the 
other hand, are theoretically superior in coping with the uncertainty problem. 
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However, they have failed to achieve the progress made by their counterparts. 
Beazer (1975) states "optimization is a way of organizing knowledge. It is not 
a means of reducing uncertainty or of making outcomes more predictable. For 
some one who has not reflected upon this, techniques like Chance-constrained 
programming, Two-stage programming under uncertainty and Bayesian sequen- 
tial decision theory probably hold considerably more magic than ordinary Linear 
Programming 
... their 
[stochastic models] worth depends upon having more in- 
formation about probability distributions than just an expected value". Beazer 
argued further that "this should by no means be interpreted as disparaging to 
programming models that explicitly treat uncertainty. They can be extremely 
valuable. But unless one has the data that they require they are no more fruitful 
than simpler models". 
Single vs Multi-objective models. In discussing the ALM problem few academics 
have dealt with the multiojective nature of the banking firm. Since the banking 
firm is an intermediary enterprise that tries to satisfy the requirements of dif- 
ferent groups (i. e. stockholders, depositors, creditors and regulatory agencies), 
it is important for the management of the bank to incorporate the objectives 
of the interested groups. Zaloom et al (1986) state that "the conflict of interest 
among these groups makes the management of bank funds a complex task to 
deal with. It is not realistic to apply mathematical models that optimizes a 
single decision criterion". 
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Chapter 7 
Survey Analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
As a part of the research a questionnaire was designed and sent to 17 operating 
interest-free IBs. The main aim of this questionnaire was to obtain information about 
certain aspects of the asset and liability management (ALM) of these institutions. 
Questions like: what are the main objectives of these banks? which agencies control 
the operations of these intermediaries? In addition, some other issues are covered; 
such as the nature of regulations imposed by regulatory agencies, investment policies, 
etc. The questionnaire was divided into five parts, each of which serve a particular 
purpose. The structure of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix 7.3. In addition to 
the questions asked in the structured sections a general question was added to give a 
chance for the management to suggest, add or comment on anything which they felt 
might be helpful to the research project. Adding this question to those in the other 
five parts, the total number of questions summed to 18. 
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7.2 Type of Responses Received and the Difficul- 
ties Faced 
The questionnaire was sent on the 3rd September, 1990 and it was planned that by 
15th October of the same year the responses would have been received. Unfortu- 
nately, only two questionnaires were received during the planned period. Therefore, a 
reminder was sent to those institutions which did not respond. As a result the num- 
ber of replies increased to seven, but only after a long time, May 1991. This delay 
may have been due to the reluctant nature of the management of these institutions 
and the nature of the trail questionnaire. Surveys conducted by other researchers 
indicate this fact. For example, Ahmad' (1987) has reported that lie has approached 
about 30 Islamic Banks (IBs) through the 4th and 5th annual meeting of directors of 
operations of these institutions and through snail as well. However, he only received S 
responses, which constitute 26 per cent of the sample size. Given these considerations 
and the nature of snail surveys which suffer from low response rates, it seems that 
7 replies, which constitute 41 per cent of the sample size, is a reasonable rate. As 
Emory (1985) pointed out " mail surveys with a return of 30 per cent or so are con- 
sidered satisfactory... ". However, if the return rate is very low such findings are lard 
to be generalized. As Kerlinger(1986) states " as a result of low return in mail ques- 
tionnaire, valid generalizations cannot be made". Nevertheless, these results when 
combined with other material, such as annual reports of these institutions and the 
findings of Ahmad(1987), will give an overview of what we are trying to obtain. As 
far as type of responses is concerned, 2 institutions have answered all questions, 2 
On the subject of "Development and problems of Islamic Banks". Moreover, lie was (and still) 
working at the Jeddah based institution (i. e. Islamic Development Bank (IDB)). 
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answered 17 and 3 have answered 16 questions. Therefore, it has been decided that 
these returned questionnaires should be analysed and concluding remarks should be 
drawn. The list of the banks which responded is given below: 
1. Islamic Bank of Bahrain (IBB), established in 1979. 
2. Habib Bank Limited (HBL) (Pakistan), established in 1941, but commenced 
non-interest operations in 1985. 
3. Tadamon Islamic Bank (TIB) (Sudan), established in 1983. 
4. Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB), established in 1983. 
5. Albaraka Islamic Investment Bank (AIIB) (Balirain), 1984. 
6. United Bank Limited (UBL) (Pakistan), 1959, but commenced Interest-free 
operations in 1985. 
7. Islamic Bank International Denmark (IBID), 1983. 
7.3 Analysis of the Obtained Results 
Since the number of replies is very low, in most cases percentages have been used for 
analytical purposes. For questions which have been constructed in a ranking manner 
to test some specified hypotheses the Kendall coefficient of concordance (W) has been 
used. The reason for using this statistical test is that these questions have been de- 
signed on an ordinal scale basis and the sample size is very small. These two factors 
give the nonparametric 2 statistical tests, the category in which W falls, the advan- 
21n statistics there are two types of statistical tests; parametric (e. g. t and F tests) and nonpara- 
metric (e. g. W and Spearman rank correlation coefficient r, (rho)). The former group refers to the 
procedures used when certain assumptions, about the population from which the sample(s) is (are) 
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tage over their parametric counterparts. Siegel (1956) states "many of these tests 
[nonparametric] are identified as "ranking tests" and this title suggests their ... prin- 
cipal merit: nonparametric techniques may be used with scores which are not exact 
in any numerical sense; but which in effect are simply ranks ... 
[Another] advantage 
of the nonparametric tests is their usefulness with small samples ... If sample sizes as 
small as N=6 [nonparametric tests] are used, there is no alternative to using a non- 
parametric statistical tests unless the nature of the population distribution is known 
exactly". Emory (1985) emphasizes the former factor stating that nouparanietric 
tests "... are the only technically correct tests to use with ordinal data, although 
parametric tests are sometimes employed in this case". The analysis of the obtained 
results is presented part by part as follows: 
7.3.1 The main objectives of Islamic Banks 
In this first section of the questionnaire two questions were put. The main purpose 
was to identify the objectives targeted by Islamic Banks (IBs) and to indicate their 
degree of importance. Responses to question one 3 reveal that maximizing return to 
depositors (7 out of 7 have considered this objective as an important one) , minimizing 
risk of losses (scores 6 out of 7), maximizing profits (scoring 5 out of 7) and maximizing 
return to owners (with a score of 3 out of 7) are the main targeted objectives. In 
the space left for the management to name any other objectives six more objectives 
have been mentioned. Two of these objectives were indicated by two banks; these are 
developing and spreading the idea of Islamic Banking and providing banking facilities 
drawn, are met. Assumptions like : 1) the observations must be drawn from normally distributed 
populations, 2) the variables involved must have been measured in at least an interval scale, so 
that it is possible to use the operations of arithmetic (i. e. adding, dividing, finding means, etc), 
(Siegel(1956)). Whereas, the latter category of procedures depends on no assumption as to the form 
of the sample population parameters, see Siegel(1956) and Kerlinger(1986) for more details. 3Summery of the obtained results is displayed at Appendix 7.1 at the end of the chapter. 
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to as large a number of customers as they could, while the rest were each named by 
one bank only. These answers illustrate the diversity of objectives being sought by 
these institutions. That may explain the low value of W of the result obtained from 
the answers to the second question to give a clear evidence of an agreed upon order 
of the listed objectives. Because W stood at 0.25 and testing the significance of W at 
the significance level of 5% rejects the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis '. This 
finding indicate the multiobjective nature of these institutions and the importance of 
featuring the interest of depositors within the utility function of the bank because of 
the participatory nature of the business undertaken. 
7.3.2 The restrictions imposed upon IBs by regulatory agen- 
cies 
In this part, three questions were asked of the management of these intermediaries. 
The main information sought was that of identifying the type of regulations being 
imposed. The replies indicate that the central batik comes out top of the regulatory 
bodies and minimum cash holding is the main requirement imposed. All responding 
banks regarded the central bank as the principal regulatory agency; while 6 out 7 
banks considered minimum cash holding as the main restriction imposed upon them. 
Moreover, replies to question five did support this latter finding. W stood at 0.56 and 
the null hypothesis, which states that the regulations imposed by regulatory agencies 
do not affect the portfolio holding of IBs, is rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. 
In fact an examination of the structure of assets of IBs indicates that cash holding 
'See Appendix 7.2 for undersigning how to test the significance of W. We should be very careful 
with this type of results and conclusions, because we might commit type II error (i. e. accepting the 
null hypothesis when in fact it is false). The main reason for this caution is that the probability 
of commiting this type of errors as well as type I can be reduced if the sample size is increased. A 
measure which we have tried to adopt, but we could not achieve it because of the low response rate. 
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constitutes a major element in which funds are placed. Alimad (1987) has discussed 
the problems of IBs and he found that "six [out of the 8 batiks which replied to his 
questionnaire] reported that they had a problem of excess liquidity". In the sense that 
these institutions are holding much of their funds in the form of cash and reserves 
(i. e. statutory, general and sometimes provision for investment risk). This situation 
may due to several factors, as Ahtnad pointed out, "excess of deposits, shortage of 
investment avenues, absence of long term investment opportunities, policy of central 
batik (i. e. asking for high reserve ratios, as high as 25 percent in some cases), and 
absence of very short term financial investment, etc ... 
". Therefore, the policy of the 
central bank is one of the factors that contributes to the presence of excess liquidity 
in IBs. In addition to central bank control, three batiks also reported that their 
operations were being inspected by the religious supervisory committee. The main 
function of such committees is to make sure that the operations of the batiks are 
fully conducted in accordance with the principles of Islamic Law (S7zari'ah). This 
last feature represents the distinctive nature of these newly established institutions 
in comparison with interest-based batiks. 
7.3.3 The measures taken to protect the benefit of deposi- 
tors and to minimize the risk of losses 
The main concern of this part was to get some information about the measures taken 
by IBs to minimize the risk of losses and to protect the interest of depositors. For 
that reason three questions were asked of management. From the answers given the 
following factors were indicated by the management of IBs: 
All responding banks regarded careful selection of partners and the asking for col- 
laterals as the two main measures taken to minimize the risk of losses. 4 out 
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of 7 banks also reported the use of ceilings, (i. e. the amount to be invested 
in a particular operation should not exceed an upper limit), for certain risky 
investment operations (e. g. direct investment). 
All responding banks indicated the fact that they sought collaterals from their cus- 
tourers to minimize the risk of losses. 
6 out of 7 of the responding banks reported that investing in safe and quick return 
projects as the main measure taken to protect the benefit of the depositors. In 
fact the available data about IBs reveals that most funds of these institutions 
are being placed in trade, real estate and construction, the so-called soft areas of 
credit. Aliinad (1987) pointed out "in some banks trade financing constitutes 
up to 90 percent of total financing". In some banks about 98 per cent of 
the available funds are held in short term, quickly realizable projects, of the 
maturity extending up to one year, the Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain (FIBB), 
(FIBB annual reports(1988,1989)). Only three out of the 7 banks reported 
the practice of assigning special reserves for risky investment operations. The 
other factor mentioned by two of the responding banks was the undertaking of 
feasibility studies before taking on a new project. 
7.3.4 Investment policy 
This is the most important part of the questionnaire. Hence, it contains seven ques- 
tions about the investment policy of these institutions. Most of the questions have 
been constructed in a form that allows us to test some specified hypotheses. Un- 
fortunately, the results are not that encouraging, in the sense that these specified 
hypotheses are not supported empirically. The hypothesized relationships were as 
136 
follows: 
1. It was hypothesized that Long-Term (LT) investment operations were affected 
by the following factors: 
" funds in long term investment accounts (FLIA) 
" liquidity requirement (LR) 
" Rate of return of the investment (RR) 
" the investment risk (IR) 
" social need of the investment (SN) 
Therefore it was supposed that the above factors will affect the long term in- 
vestment. However, W stood at 0.237 a result which support the invalidity of 
this supposed claim in the statistical sense. But, we should be careful with this 
type of results and conclusions for the reasons spelled out in footnote 4 of this 
chapter. 
2. what has been said above applies also to questions 9 and 10 in which the fol- 
lowing two relationships were hypothesized: 
- It was hypothesized that the demand for cash holding (CII) was affected by 
the following factors: 
" volume of funds in current accounts (CA) 
" volume of funds in saving accounts (SA) 
" liquidity requirement (LR) 
" banking services (BS) 
But the calculated W stood at 0.41, which is a low value. 
137 
3. It was hypothesized as well that providing banking services (BS) was afrected 
by the factors given below: 
" Return from banking services (RBS) 
" Social need for these services (SN) 
" Volume of funds in current and saving accounts (FCS) 
" Total funds (TF) 
In this case as well the value of W, which stood at 0.087, failed to support the 
supposed hypothesis. 
From the answers given to questions 11 and 12, it is revealed that the operations 
of IBs are dominated by three techniques. These are Musharakah (Partnership), 
Murabahah (Mark-up on sale) and cash holdings and accounts with other banks. 6 
out of 7 of the responded banks have reported the use of Mudarabah (capital trust) 
and Musharakah in providing working capital to entrepreneurs. 'I'lse annual reports 
of these banks do not give clear cut details of the significance contribution of each 
operation (i. e. Mudarabah and Musharakah). However, from the study conducted by 
Alimad (1987) it has been found that "all the eight responding banks have reported 
to use Musharakah ... 
Mudharabah 
... 
[has] been reported to be used by 7 banks". 
Therefore, it seems that Musharakah is one of the popular techniques employed by 
IBs. In the case of Mudarabah 3 out of 7 have reported its use for providing working 
capital to entrepreneurs and 3 out of 7 as well have reported its use for guaranteeing 
the necessary liquidity. In order to know the frequency of use of these different 
techniques, question 13 was included. Responses reveal that the most widely used 
techniques are Murabahah, Musharakah and Mudarabah. Although the value of W 
is insignificant, W stood at . 
29, we can state that Murabahah is the most popular 
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technique. This can be confirmed from the earlier finding and the findings of Ahmad 
(1987). In which he states "... the available evidence suggests that Murabahah is the 
most popular and most dominant technique of financing amongst the Islamic Batiks 
studied". In addition to the methods discussed so far some batiks reported the use of 
other instruments. The answers given by the management were reported in question 
14 in which the management of the banks was requested to name any newly developed 
method(s) of channeling funds. The replies of these institutions were as follows: 
" Tadarnon Islamic Bank of Sudan has reported the use of Muzarah and istisnaa 
for financing agriculture and industry operations respectively. 
" Qatar Islamic Bank has reported the use of Musawania technique. But it did 
not specify for which sector of the economy is being used. 
Islamic Batik of Balirain has reported the development of general and specific 
portfolios. 
7.3.5 Relations with other institutions 
In the last part of the questionnaire three questions were asked of the management 
of IBs regarding their links with other banks. As was expected, all the responding 
banks have reported that they do have relations with commercial banks in the form 
of transaction accounts. Only one bank (i. e. United Bank Limited) has reported 
the opening of deposit accounts with commercial batiks. Five of the responding 
batiks reported that they do have relations with other lBs in the form of current and 
investment accounts. These responses clearly indicate the importance of expanding 
the network of IBs nationally and internationally. Otherwise leaving this network as 
it is will limit the investment avenues of these institutions and their ability to diversify 
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risk as diversity of geographical location may bring new investment opportunities. 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
From the above discussion the following remarks can be drawn: 
Islamic Banks, like other financial intermediaries, should be looked at as multiobjec- 
tive utility maximizing firms rather than limiting this utility to a single objective 
matter. Moreover, in this utility function the interest of depositors must be fea- 
tured and should be given its importance because of the participatory nature 
of these institutions. 
The central bank still is the main regulatory agency for IBs and apply almost the 
same regulations as those applied to interest-based banks. This practice in- 
dicates the fact that the special nature of these institutions has not yet beeil 
taken sufficiently into considerations. Besides the regulations imposed by the 
central bank, the operations of some lBs are also subject to religious supervisory 
committees to ensure the conformity of their operations with the principles of 
Islamic Law (Shari'ah). 
Low risk and quick return projects dominate the portfolio holdings of these institu- 
tions. This fact is very clear in terms of techniques etnployed(e. g. A/urabahah) 
and areas of investment (e. g. Trade and Construction sectors). This leads us to 
conclude that short-term operations dominate the business of IBs on the debit 
and credit sides. Alimad (1987) states "the available data suggest that most of 
Islamic Banks are providing either short-term finance of six months or less or 
medium-term finance of one year or less ... generally speaking, 
it could be said 
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that lBs do not provide long-term finance and confine themselves to short-term 
and medium-term finance". 
It appears so far that the investment avenues available to these institutions are 
still limited. This can be noticed from the relations with other institutions, 
especially commercial banks, which is merely limited to transaction accounts. 
This limitation can be reduced by the expansion of IBs domestically as well as 
internationally. In addition, thought needs be devoted to the development of 
short term securities and securities markets which do not violate the principles 
of Islamic Law (Sliari'ah), to absorb the excess or shortage of liquidity which 
some institutions face. 
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Appendix 7.1 Summary of the 
Results Obtained 
In this appendix the scores given by the management of the seven responding Islamic 
Banks are presented. These scores are then expressed in rank order manner so that 
the values of W can be computed and the problem of tied observations (this problem 
is treated in details in the next appendix) is taken into account. 
I. The scores given by the management of the seven responding banks. 
P1. Q2 Scores advocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB `1'IBS 
a - - 8 3 4 8 8 
b - 6 - 2 3 6 6 
c 8 8 4 4 1 7 6 
d 6 7 7 1 2 8 8 
P2. Q5 Scores advocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB TIBS 
a 8 6 3 1 1 - 5 
b 6 8 - 1 2 - 3 
c 4 1 - - 3 1 2 
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P4. Q8 Scores advocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB TIBS 
a 8 8 4 1 4 8 6 
b 7 7 :3 4 2 1 3 
c 5 5 4 2 3 8 8 
d 7 6 2 3 1 8 5 
e 6 1 2 5 5 8 6 
P4. Q9 Scores advocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB TIBS 
a 8 - 6 1 1 7 8 
b 7 - :3 3 2 7 3 
c 8 8 2 2 3 - 4 d :3 - 5 4 4 6 2 
P4. Q10 Scores advocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB 'I'IBS 
a 4 8 6 3 2 8 7 
b 6 1 :3 1 1 8 6 
c 8 7 4 2 3 1 7 
d - 7 6 4 4 - 8 
P4. Q13 Scores advocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB TIES 
a 3 8 - 
2 3 5 
- 
b 6 1 1 :3 5 5 6 
C 8 6 8 1 1 8 4 
d - 5 - - 4 - - 
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2. Rankings of the scores presented above. 
P1. Q2 Rank ad vocated by 
Objects IBB [BID HB UB QIB AIBB TIBS R.; 
a 3.5 4 1 :3 4 1.5 1.5 18.5 
b 3.5 3 4 2 3 4 3.5 23 
c 1 1 :3 4 1 3 3.5 16.5 
d 2 2 2 1 2 1.5 1.5 12 
R; - - - - - - - 70 
N=4, K=7, R= N' 0-=17.5,5=62.5, W=. 255 
P2. Q5 Rank ad vocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB `I'IBS R; 
a 1 2 1 2 1 2.5 1 10.5 
b 2 1 2.5 1 2 2.5 2 13 
c 3 3 2.5 3 3 1 3 18.5 
E Ri - - - - - - - 42 
N=3, K=7, W= 14 ,S= 33.5 ,W= . 56 
P4. Q8 Rank ad vocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB TIBS R; 
a 1 1 1.5 1 4 3.5 2.5 14.5 
b 2.5 2 3 4 2 4 5 22.5 
c 5 4 1.5 2 3 3.5 1 20 
d 2.5 3 4.5 3 1 3.5 it 21.5 
e 4 5 4.5 5 5 3.5 2.5 29.5 
E Ri - - - - - - - 108 
N=5, K=7, R=21.6, S= 116.2, W=. 237 
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P4. Q9 Rank ad vocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB UB QIB AIBB TIBS R; 
a 1.5 4.5 1 1 1 1.5 1 11.5 
b :3 4.5 :3 3 2 1.5 :3 20 
c 1.5 1 4 2 3 4 2 17.5 
(1 4 4.5 2 4 4 3 4 25.5 
R= - - - - - - - 74.5 
N=4, K=7,7=18.62,5=101.1887W= 
. 41 
P4. Q10 Rank ad vocated by 
Objects IBB IBID HB iJB QIB AIBB TIBS R; 
a :3 1 1.5 3 2 1.5 2.5 14.5 
b 2 4 4 1 1 1.5 4 17.5 
c 1 2.5 :3 2 :3 3 2.5 17 
cl 4 2.5 1.5 4 4 4 1 21 
ER; - - - - - - - 70 
N=4, K=7, k=17.5, S=21.5, W=. 087 
P4. Q13 Rank ad vocated by 
Objects IBB IBID I-IB UB QIB AIBB TIBS R; 
a 3 1 3.5 2 3 2.5 3.5 18.5 
b 2 4 2 1 1 2.5 1 13.5 
c 1 2 1 3 4 1 2 14 
d 4 3 : 3.5 4 2 4 3.5 24 
11 E Rt - - - - - - - 70 
N=4, K=7, R=17.5,571.5, V=. 29 
Exploratory notes of the abbreviations used in Appendix 7.1 
" Pi. QI = stands for the part (P) and question (Q) in the questionnaire with 
(I) representing the number of the part and the question e. g. P1. Q2 stand for 
part (1) question (2). 
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9 IBB = Islamic Bank of Bahrain 
" IBID = Islamic Bank International Denmark 
" I-IB = Habib Bank Limited 
" UB = United Bank Limited 
" QIB = Qatar Islamic Bank 
" AIBB = Albarakah Islamic Bank of Bahrain 
" TIBS = Tadainon Islamic Bank, Sudan 
" a, b, c, d, and e represent the items of the questions. 
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Appendix 7.2 The Kendall 
Coefficient of concordance W 
7.2.1 - Calculation and interpretation of W 
W is a technique designed to measure the degree of agreement among K ranks of 
N objects or individuals e. g. in our questionnaire Part (1) Question (2) we are 
interested in measuring the correlation (i. e. the degree of agreement) between 
the ranks given by the K=7 banks to the N=4 objects. The value of W is 
given by the following formula: 
S 
112 K2(N3 -N) 
where, S= sum of squares of the observed deviations from the mean of R; (I>') 
S=ß(R, _7)2 
R= 
N 
K= number of sets of rankings 
N= number of entities (objects or individuals) ranked. 
lei 
K2(N3 - N) = the maximum possible variation in sums of ranks if there was 
perfect agreement in the rankings. Example of how W is calculated for P1. Q2 
R; 
_70=17.5 N4 
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S=(18.5-17.5)2+(23-17.5)2+(16.5-17.5)2+(12-17.5)2=62.5 
12K2(N3 - 
N) = 
1(7)2(43 
-4) = 245 
Therefore, 
62.5 
W 
245 
0.255 
Interpretation of W, Kendall (1948a) suggests that the best estimate of the 
"true" ranking of the N objects is provided, when W is significant, by the 
order of the various sums of ranks(i. e. R., ). If one accepts the criterion which 
the various respondents have agreed upon (as evidence by the magnitude and 
significance of W) in ranking the N entities, then the best estimate of the "true" 
rankings of those entities according to that criterion is provided by the stuns of 
ranks. 
e. g. in our case of P2. Q5, where W stood at . 56, of the rank advocated by 
the management of the seven responding IBs, the listed objects are ranked as 
follows: 
-a object is number (1) with 10.5 (R; ) i. e. minimum cash holding. 
-b object is number (2) with 13 (Ri) i. e. general relationships among assets 
and liabilities. 
-c object is number (3) with 18.5 (R; ) i. e. minimum amount of capital. 
When the value of W is significant, the next logical step is to test the significance 
of W. In doing so two options are available depending on the size of the sample. 
If this size is small special Table has been worked out and certain critical values 
have been calculated; and if the sample size is large the distribution of NV is 
approximated to Chi-square test (X2). In the case of small size samples the 
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special Table is used when the range of N is from 3 to 7 and K ranges from 
3 to 20. This special Table is used to compare the observed value of W with 
the critical value of \V displayed in the Table. If an observed value of W is 
equal to or greater than that shown in the special Table for a particular level of 
significance then Ho may be rejected at that level of significance and vice versa. 
Example P2. Q5 of the rank order advocated by the seven responding IBs in our 
case: the observed W= . 
56 and; 
the critical value of W= . 329 at the 5% level of significance. 
Therefore, Ho the null hypothesis of this question; the listed factors do not 
affect the portfolio holdings of IBs is rejected. See Siegel ct al (lud ed) (1988) 
for more details. 
7.2.2 - The problem of tied observations 
Sometimes two or more observations will receive the same score on the same 
variable. The effect of these tied observations is to depress the value of W as 
found by the formula presented in Appendis 7.2.1. When tied scores occur, each 
of tlicin is assigned the average of the ranks that would have beeil assigned had 
no ties occur, this is the usual procedure for assigning ranks to tied observations. 
If the proportion of ties is small, that effect might be neglected, and Bence the 
the formula in Appendix 7.2.1 might still be used. On the other land if the 
proportion of ties is large, a correction factor might be introduced which will 
increase slightly the value of W over what it would have been if uncorrected. 
The correction factor is given by the following formula, Siegel(1956) : 
T- 
E(t3 - 1) 
12 
Where, t= the number of observations tied at a given rank. 
> directs one to sum over all groups of ties within any one of the K rankings. 
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The new corrected formula of W is given below : 
s We -- 1LLK2(N3-N)-/ TT 
Where, ET T directs one to sum the values of T for all the K rankings. 
Applying the above formula to the data presented in Appendix 7.1, the following 
results have been found : 
Question P1"Q2 P2-Q5 P4-Q8 P4-Q9 P4-Q10 P1"Q13 
Value of W, . 266 . 56 . 26 . 45 . 
09 . 30 
The above results shows the small proportion of ties in the obtained data. That 
is why the value of We has not changed so much from the value of NV. 
For further reading and details about W see S. Slegel (1956) and Siegel ct al) 
(2nd ed) (1988) "Nonpararnetric Statistics for the Behavioural Sciences". 
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Appendix 7-3 Questionnaire for 
rthe Mananeimsen1. of Is 1 . u. ic B armt . 
*Please tick the appropriate box (es)* 
Part One(1) 
1- Which of the following are the main objectives of the Bank ? 
(you can tick more than one box ) 
a- Maximizing profits 
b- Maximizing return to owners 
c- Minimizing the risk of losses 
d- Maximizing return to depositors 
e- Others- specify- 
1- ................... 
2- ................... 
2- Rank the following objectives according to their order of importance? 
(higher numbers indicate higher priority) 
a- Maximizing profits 
b- Maximizing return to owners 
c- Minimizing the risk of losses 
d- Maximizing return to depositors 
e- Others - specify- 
1- ............. 
12345678 
2. ............. 
Part Two(2) 
3)-Which of the following agencies controls the operations of your bank ? 
( you can tick more than one box ) 
a- The Central bank 
B 
b- Others - specify 
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4- Which of the following restrictions are being imposed on your bank ? 
( you can tick more than one box ) 
a- Minimum cash holding or other short term 
reserve assets ratios 
b- General relationships among assets, liabilities 
and equity ( e. g risk-asset to capital ratio) 
c- Minimum amount of capital 
d- Others - specify - 1- ................... 
2- ................... 
5- How strongly do the following affect your portfolio holdings ? 
12345678 
a- Minimum cash holding or other short 
term reserve assets ratio 
b- General relationships among assets 
liabilities and equity 
( e. g risk-asset to capital ratio ) 
c- Minimum amount of capital 
d- Others - specify- 1- ............ 
2. ........... 
Part Three(3) 
6- Which of the following measures are taken by your bank to minimize the 
risk of losses ?( you can tick more than one box ) 
a- Careful selection of partners (i. e partner's previous 
experience, reputation in the community, letters of reference) 
b- Asking for collaterals . 
c- Putting ceilings to certain risky 
investment operations(e. g direct investment) 
d- Others-specify- l- ............................. 
2- ............................. 
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7- Which of the following measures are taken by your bank to protect 
the interest of depositors ? (you can tick more than one box ) 
a- Assigning special reserves for risky operations 
b- Insuring deposits 
c- Investing in safe and quick return projects 
d- Others-specify- 1- ......................... 
2- ......................... 
Part Four (4) 
8- How strongly do the following affect your decision to undertake long 
rather than short term investment ? 
a- Volume of funds in long term 
investment account 
b- liquidity requirements 
c- Rate of return of the investment 
d- The investment risk 
e- Social need of the investment 
f-Others-specify- 
1- .............. 
z. .............. 
12345678 
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9- How strongly do the following affect your demand for cash holding ? 
a- Volume of funds in current accounts 
b- Volume of funds in saving accounts 
c- Liquidity requirements 
d- Banking services 
e- Others-specify- 
1- ............... 
2- ............... 
12345678 
10- How strongly do the following affect your decision to provide banking 
services ? 
a- Return from bank services 
b- Social need for these services 
c- Volume of funds in current 
and saving accounts 
d- Total funds 
e- Others-specify- 
i- ........... 
2. ........... 
12345678 
11- By which of the following methods do you provide working capital to 
entrepreneurs ? (you can tick more than one box) 
a- Mudarabah and Musharakah contracts(i. e profit and 
loss sharing principal) 
b- Beneficiary loans (i. e interest free loans) 
c- Others-specify- 
1- ........................... 
2- ........................... 
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12- By which of the following beans do you guarantee the necessary 
liquidity ?( you can tick more than one box) 
a- Cash holdings and accounts with other banks 
b- Rental contracts (i. e leasing(Ijara) contracts) 
c- Sales contracts (e. g Murabahah) 
d Others-specify- 
1- ............................. 
2- ............................. 
13- Rank the following methods according to their degree of usability ? 
(higher numbers indicate higher degree of usability ) 
a- Mudarabah (i. e. capital agency) 
b- Musharakah (i. e. partenership) 
c- Murabahah (i. e. mark-up-onsale) 
d- Ijara ( i. e. Leasing) 
e- Others - specify - 
1- ............. 
2. ............ 
12345678 
14- Have your bank developed a new method(s) for channelling funds ? 
( name please) 
1- 
................................................... 
2. ................................................... 
3. ................................................... 
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Part Five(5) 
15- With which of the following institutions do you have accounts or any 
other arrangements ? (you can tick more than one box) 
a- Islamic banks 
b- Commercial banks 
c- Others-specify- 
1- ........................... 
2- .......................... 
16- What type of accounts do you have with Islamic banks? 
( you can tick more than one box) 
a- Current accounts 
b- Investment accounts 
c- Others-specify- ................. 
17- what type of accounts do you have with commercial banks ? 
(you can tick more than one box) 
a- Transaction accounts 
b- Others-specify- 1- ....................... 
2- ....................... 
18- Do you have any thing to add ? (e. g suggestions, comments) 
( please write it down in the space given below ) 
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Chapter 8 
A Single Objective Optimization 
Model of the Asset and Liability 
Management Problem of an 
Islamic Bank 
8.1 Introduction 
The main concern of this chapter is to develop a one period certainty model for the as- 
set and liability management (ALM) problem of an Islamic Bank (IB). The technique 
used to derive this model is Linear programming (LP). The results of the developed 
model will be compared with the actual results of two practicing institutions. These 
are Kuwait Finance I-louse(KFH) and . Jordan Islamic 
Batik(JIB) for the planning pe- 
riods of 1988 - 1989 and 1987 - 1988 respectively. That 
is, given the conditions and 
the initial balance sheet of each bank at the end of 1988 and 1987 what will be the 
optimal balance sheet that will optimize the objective functions of the banks at the 
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end of 1989 and 1988 obtained by applying the LP technique? In order to achieve this, 
the sequence of the chapter goes as follows: assumptions to simplify the real world are 
stated first, the model is developed next, the results of developed model are compared 
with the actual results of the two selected institutions and finally concluding remarks 
are drawn. 
8.2 Assumptions to simplify the real world work- 
ing of lBs 
In order to develop the single objective optimization model (SOOM) the following 
assumptions are initially stated : 
1. The IB is assumed to be acting as a profit maximizing firm. There are certainly 
many other objectives that can be optimized e. g. maximizing the return to 
equity shareholders, but we selected the objective of profit maximizing in the 
belief that this objective will serve the interests of both equity shareholders as 
well as depositors. This is so, because the maximization of the profits assigned 
to each one depends upon the maximization of the results achieved by the bank's 
operations, especially investment ones. This is due to the participatory nature 
of the profit and loss-sharing (PLS) system. 
2. The bank is using financial instruments that bear little risk. In other words the 
bank is applying Murabahah (Mark-up on sale ) and Ijara (Leasing) techniques 
in employing its investments funds. 
3. The bank accepts two types of accounts: investment and non-investment ac- 
counts. The first category includes funds deposited for investment purposes 
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and saving funds whose owners authorize the bank to employ their funds in in- 
vestment projects. The funds in this category are entitled to share in profits as 
well as losses if this is the case. Thus investment funds are accepted on the PLS 
basis. The second category consists of demand deposits and non-investment 
saving accounts. This type of deposit does not generate income and it is not 
subject to any loss. Moreover, holders of these accounts can withdraw their 
funds on request. 
4. The planing horizon is assumed to be a single period of one year. 
5. Funds are utilized on the basis of short and long term maturities. Short term 
operations are those employed in projects that terminate at the end of the 
planning period. Long term operations, on the other Baud, are those projects 
accepted on yearly basis but they are renewable at the end of each planning 
period. 
6. The bank is exempted from paying taxes. 
7. Fixed assets are assumed to be constant over the planning period. 
8. Paid-up-capital is also assumed to be constant over the planning period. 
9. Rates of return generated from the employment of funds are fixed and known. 
8.3 The single objective optimization model 
In Chapter (5) the asset and liability management (ALM) problem faced by the se- 
nior executive of a bank has been summarized as follows: Given the initial balance 
sheet (B10) at the beginning of the planning period (to) the senior executive seeks to 
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determine the components of the balance sheet of the bank that will optimize (i. e. 
maximize in our case) the objective function at the end of the planning period (t1). 
But, in achieving this aim the decision process of our senior executive is subject to in- 
ternal and external conditions. Internal constraints, like the percentage of investment 
funds devoted to a particular sector of the economy, and external constraints like the 
reserve requirements asked from regulatory authorities. Therefore, the SOOM model 
consists of two essential elements. These are: the objective that will be optimized 
and the constraints which limit the optimization of this objective. In what follows 
we will develop an LP ' model for an interest-free Islamic Bank (IB). 
8.3.1 The Objective Function 
In Islamic Banking literature as well as in practice, the institution(i. e. IB) obtains 
funds from internal (i. e. paid up capital, reserves and retained earnings) and external 
(i. e. deposits) sources and uses these funds to finance investment and banking service 
operations. The bankers, however, should know exactly the percentage contribution 
of each source in the case of mixing both sources so as to determine the PLS ratio 
that will be applied to the actual results of the operations, especially in case of losses. 
Since we are assuming that the bank is seeking to maximize the total profits (TP) re- 
alized from banking and investment operations, spreading resources among profitable 
and low-risk projects will, therefore, be the main target of the management of the IB. 
Hence, the objective criterion can be stated symbolically as follows: 
Max (TP) = Rif IF + R, SF 
'See Appendix 8.1 for understanding the basic requirements of applying LP technique and other 
essential features. 
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Where, TP = the contribution value of total profits 
Rif = the rate of return realized from investment operations. 
R3 = the rate of return realized from banking service operations. 
IF = the amount of funds assigned for investment projects . 
SF = the amount of funds assigned for banking service operations. 
We should note that the bank is not utilizing the whole of its investment funds in 
one operation and is not applying one mode of finance for the use of these funds. 
Therefore the rate of return Rif is broken down into the rates achieved through each 
mode of finance (i. e. in our case the rates of return realized from Murabahah (R,,, ) 
and Ijara (R1) (Leasing) modes of finance). 
8.3.2 Constraints 
Generally speaking, constraints can be grouped into two main categories; namely iil- 
tratemporal and intertemporal relationships, (Cohen and Hammer (1967,1972)). The 
first category includes the relationships that must be met at each point in time of the 
planning horizon. The second represents those constraints that link variables of the 
model over the span of the whole planning horizon. Since we are interested in devel- 
oping a single period optimization model the intertemporal links are not discussed 
here. On the level of the intratemporal constraints the following relationships are 
considered : 
8.3.2.1 Balance sheet constraints 
These constraints simply ensure the equality between total assets on one hand and 
total liabilities plus shareholders's equity on the other. Since assets and liabilities of 
an Fl represent uses and sources of funds respectively, these constraints, ensure as 
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well that the uses of funds do not exceed the available resources. 
8.3.2.2 Legal constraints 
Monetary authorities, represented by central batiks, may oblige commercial batiks 
to hold certain minimum amounts of cash, or any other liquid assets, as statutory 
reserves. Minimum amount of cash to meet daily operations are also required. In 
addition to these some banks maintain all optional reserves called general reserve. 
Above all IBs are requested by the Islamic Law to take all necessary measures in 
order not to practice usurious transactions (e. g. borrowing on the basis of interest in 
case of liquidity problems or any other matter that arises. ) 
8.3.2.3 Policy constraints 
These are the most important ones, because they reflect management attitudes and 
raise the most difficult decisions in the construction of the ALM model in such a way as 
to take into consideration the trade-offs that exist between risk, return and liquidity. 
In this category of constraints no general rules can be applied to all banks. What can 
be said is that the management of any institution usually puts some upper or lower 
bounds upon the financing of the operations carried out by the bank, determine how 
much funds should be employed in each activity and so forth. Above all the planned 
activities must be taken in the light of the environmental and legal surroundings. 
8.3.2.4 Market constraints 
This type of constraint represents the limits imposed on the bank's freedom of action 
by other institutions carrying out the same work in the market place. One of the major 
restrictions facing lBs is the acceptance of investment deposits on the PLS principle. 
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Thus, in contrast to depositors of interest based batiks, investment accountholders 
in IBs are liable to negative returns when the batik incurs losses from its investment 
portfolio. Therefore, as these newly established institutions want to have a sustainable 
share in the deposit market they need to take this and other factors into consideration 
and try at all costs, except violating the principles of Islamic Law (Shari'ah), to avoid 
losses in their operations. 
In order to develop the single objective optimization model the following variables 
and constants are defined: 
" On the assets side: 
CLA = the amount of cash and other short term liquid assets kept with the 
bank or with other banks for liquidity and banking service purposes. 
MF = the amount of funds employed through Murabahah mode of finance. 
LF = the amount of funds employed through Ijara or Leasing mode of finance. 
IF = the total amount of funds employed in investment operations. (IF = MMF 
+ LF) 
OA = the amount of funds employed in other assets. 
FA = the amount of funds used in fixed assets. 
TA = the amount of total assets. (TA = CLA + IF + OA + FA) 
" On the liabilities side: 
CD = the total amount of money generated through current and call accounts. 
SD = the amount of money attracted through saving accounts. 
LID = the amount of money attracted through limited investment accounts (i. e. 
short term investment deposits). 
UID = the total amount of money attracted through unlimited investment ac- 
counts (i. e. long term investment deposits). 
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ID = the total amount of funds generated through investment deposit accounts. 
(ID=SD+ LID + UID) 
CID = total amount of funds in CD and ID (CID = CD + ID). 
DFI = the amount of funds generated from deposits of other Fis. 
D= the amount of total deposits. (D = CID + DFI) 
PUC = the amount of paid-up-capital. 
SR = the amount of funds field as statutory reserves. 
GR = the amount of funds field as general reserves. 
SR, = the amount of total statutory reserves at the beginning (to) of the plan- 
hing horizon. 
GR, = the amount of total general reserves held at the beginning (to) of the 
planning horizon. 
E= total amount of shareholders' equity. (E = PUC + SR + GR) 
OL = total amount of other liabilities. 
TL = the amount of total liabilities. (TL =D+E+ OL) 
" Other variables and constants: 
Rif = the rate of return realized from investment operations (IF). 
Rs = the rate of return achieved from the employment of funds in banking ser- 
vice operations (CLA). 
RL = rate of return obtained from the employment of funds through 111urabahah 
(MF) mode of finance. 
R1 = rate of return obtained from the employment of funds through Ijara or 
leasing (LF) mode of finance. 
TC = the amount of total costs. 
TP = the amount of total profits (TP). 
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NP = the amount of total net profits. 
SRIR = the amount of funds assigned as special reserve for investment risk. 
This amount is assigned in good times to cover the expected losses in bad ones 
and this policy is adopted by . IIB in our situation. 
SIA = total amount of funds generated through special investment deposit ac- 
counts and this method too is used by JIB. These funds are employed by the 
bank on behalf of depositors in specific projects recommended by them. 
FSP = total amount of funds assigned for the special projects determined by 
the depositors. 
SHP = total amount of shareholders part in the realized profits. 
DP = total amount of depositors part in the realized profits. 
Brp = the PLS ratio assigned to the bank from profits realized from mixing its 
funds with those of depositors. 
Drp = the PLS ratio assigned to the holders of investment accounts deposits 
from the sharing of their funds in the projects selected by the bank and financed 
by the mixing of both sources of funds (i. e. those of the bank with those of de- 
positors). 
s= the percentage ratio added to the statutory reserves from net profits (NP). 
r= the percentage ratio added to general reserves from net profits (NP). 
MGR = minimum amount of cash requirements. 
DER = debt to equity ratio, relates D to E. 
g= the value of the DER ratio. 
CR = capital ratio, relates E to TA. 
k= the value of the CR ratio. 
FUR = funds utilization ratio, relates IF to ID and E. 
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h= the value of the FUR ratio. 
LR = liquidity ratio, relates the most liquid assets (CLA) to total assets (TA). 
I= the value of the LR ratio. 
FCD = the amount of CD accounts forecasts. 
FID = the amount of ID account forecasts. 
FD = the amount of total deposits D forecasts. 
FIF = the amount of total IF forecasts. 
FTA = the amount of total TA forecasts. 
FCID = the amount of total CID forecasts. 
The last six variables (i. e. the forecasted ones) have been derived by fitting a 
simple regression line to the time series of the relevant data. In this analysis 
time or a coded variable is treated as the independent variable and the variable 
concerned (e. g. TA) is treated as the dependent variable. Various methods 
are utilized for forecasting purposes. These methods can be classified into four 
main categories; time series techniques, causal models, qualitative methods and 
marketing approaches, (Collier, Cooke and Glynn (1988)). The method we have 
selected lies in the area of the first category (i. e. time series models). This type 
of techniques assume that the future value of a variable is related to the past 
values of the variable arranged in time series. The application of these tech- 
niques is useful in the short run, the absence of disturbance to the enviroll iiieint 
and where there is a definite upward or downward trend in the time series data, 
(Collier at al (1988)). Two main reasons can be given to justify the use of this 
type of forecasting as far as this current study is concerned. First, is the fact 
that the available data is not suitable for the use of other techniques, especially 
causal models. Second, most of the data presented in Tables 8.11 and 8.12 have 
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sliowii an upward trend during the years under observation. 
I- The Objective function: The batik is seeking to maximize the amount 
of total profits (TP) generated from banking (CLA) and investment (IF) oper- 
ations. This function can be stated mathematically as follows: 
Max(TP) = R3CLA + RLMF + R1LF (8.1) 
It is worthy to note that Rs, RL and R, should represent the marginal profits 
realized after subtracting marginal operating costs associated with each opera- 
tion. Unfortunately, the available data is not detailed enough so that this step 
is carried out. Therefore, total costs (TC) are subtracted as a whole from total 
profits. 
However, the above maximization is subject to the following constraints: 
II - 1- Objective constraints(OBC): These constraints reflect the policy adopted 
by the bank with respect to the sharing of the realized profits from the oper- 
ations carried out by the bank and financed by its funds in conjunction with 
those of depositors. 
SHP = RSCLA + Brp[RLMF + R, LFJ (8.2) 
DP = Drp[RLMF + R1LF] (5.: 3) 
NP = SHP - TC (S., 1) 
The inclusion of the above three statements depends upon the policy adopted by 
the institution concerned. Some lBs share the whole realized profits with their 
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depositors (e. g. KFI-I), whereas others share only the outcome of investment 
operations (i. e. the outcome of the operations in which depositors'funds have 
been employed) (e. g. JIB). In the latter case these equations are included. On 
the former case only the following equation is included. 
NP=TP-TC (8.5) 
II - 2- Balance sheet constraints(BSC): These constraints are included simply 
to satisfy the accounting requirements that total assets (employment of funds) 
is equal to total liabilities plus shareholders equity (sources of funds). 
TA=CLA+IF+OA+FA (8.6) 
IF = MF+ LF (8.7) 
D=CD+DFI+ID (8.8) 
ID=SD+LID+UID (8.9) 
E= PUC + SR + GR (8.10) 
TL= D+E+OL (8.11) 
TA = TL (S. 12) 
II - 3- Legal constraints (LGC): These constraints reflect the restrictions inm- 
posed on the management of the institution by regulatory authorities, especially 
the central bank, and those regulations specified in the internal regulations that 
govern the operations of the bank. 
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CLA > MCR (8.13) 
SR = SR, +, s * NP (8.1,1) 
GR=GR0+r*NP (8.15) 
SR < PUC (8.16) 
II - 4- Policy constraints(POC): These constraints reflect the interrelationships 
between the variables of the balance sheet adopted by the management of the 
bank where such upper, lower or other relations are set out. 
D<g*E (8.17) 
E<K*TA (8.18) 
IF<h*(E+ID) (8.19) 
CLA < I* TA (8.20) 
We should note that there are other policy constraints which reflect the partic- 
ular situation of each bank. Therefore, the development of these constraints is 
left to the section when we compare the results of the developed model with 
those of the selected banks. 
II - 5- Market constraints (MRC) : These simply represent the upper/lower 
limits which certain variables cannot exceed. Examples of these are as follows: 
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CD <FCD (8.21) 
ID < FID (8.22) 
IF < FIF (8.23) 
D< FD (8.2'! ) 
TA < FTA (8.25) 
Having presented in some details the different components of the model, atten- 
tion is given to know precisely what the model is going to do. In other words 
what is the decision task to be determined by the model?. The decision to be 
reached by the model is to determine the structure of the balance sheet that will 
maximize the contribution to total profits at the end of the planning horizon. 
That is to determine how much money is going to be employed through CLA, 
MF, LF and consequently IF modes of finance and what proportion of funds 
is going to be attracted through CD, ID and E so as to maximize the total 
profits (TP) of the bank. Therefore, the variables just mentioned are treated as 
decision variables and the rest, such as OA, FA, OL and DFI, are considered as 
constants or balancing items whose inclusion is important to satisfy accounting 
requirements. 
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8.4 Comparing the results of the single objec- 
tive optimization model with the actual results 
of two practising IBs. 
In this section the above developed single objective optimization model (SOONI) 
is used to generate the components of the balance sheets of two practicing IBs. 
Thereafter, a comparison is made between the results obtained by the model 
and those actually achieved. Our main candidates for carrying out this task are 
Kuwait Finance House (KFH) and . Jordan Islamic Bank 
(JIB). Before we start 
examining the results of the model as compared with those actually achieved, it 
should be noted that the ideal way to conduct this comparison is to use the same 
data and date that the management use in their planning. Unfortunately, this 
was not possible. Nevertheless, the available data extracted from the annual 
reports of the selected banks and other material provide a benchmark on the 
nature of the results and managerial implications that these models can provide. 
8.4.1 Comparing the SOOM's results with actual ones 
for KFH 
In order to generate the `optimal' components of the balance sheet of KFI-I by 
implementing an LP model, the period of 1988 - 1989 has been chosen. That 
is, assuming that we are at the beginning of the planning period 1988 - 1989 
(i. e. the end of the financial year 1987 - 1988), what will be the structure 
of the balance sheet that will maximize the total profits (TP) of the House 
at the end of 1989 by utilizing the LP model? The main source of obtaining 
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the necessary data was annual reports of KFH from 1979 through 1989. It 
was hoped that the monthly (or at least quarterly) movements of sources and 
uses of funds as well as profit and loss statements would be available so that 
the structural coefficients and other inputs of the model could be derived from 
quite a large sample; unfortunately this could not be achieved. Therefore, it 
has been decided that the available data will be used for analytical purposes. 
Some of these data have been treated as inputs while others have been used for 
comparison purposes. The main data used as inputs are giveu2 in the Table 
below: 
Table 8.1 The data inputs of the SOOM model for KFH. 
item value of the variable or coefficient 
total cost(TC) 13 (mKD) 
fixed assets(FA) 1S (mKD) 
paid-up-capital(PUC) 26 (inKD) 
forecasted volume of deposits(FD) 1198 (mKD) 
volume of statutory reserves at to (SR0) 17.4(II]KD) 
volume of general reserves at to(GR0) 1.2 (inKD) 
forecasted IF (FIF) 953(mKD) 
forecasted CID (FCID) 1061(mKD) 
forecasted TA(FTA) 1297 (mKD) 
forecasted CD 155(mkD) 
minimum cash requirements(MCR) 25% * CD + 10%*ID 
reserve ratios(r and s) 10% 
debt to equity ratio(g) 20 
capital ratio (k) 8% 
liquidity ratio(]) 15% 
rate of return generated from (CLA)R, 3.5% 
rate of return generated from (MF)R, 6% 
rate of return generated from (LF)R1 5% 
amount of funds of OA 10(mKD) 
amount of funds of OL 50 (mKD) 
ZSee Appendix 8.2 for data used to generate the results of the SOOM model and how it has been 
compiled. 
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Note: niKD denotes for millions of Kuwaiti Dinars. 
Using the above data and the structure of the LP model given in Appendix S. 3, 
the LP6 package 3 was used to generate the optimal solution of the developed 
model. The obtained results are presented in the Tables below: 
Table 8.2 The Balance Sheet of KFH generated by the SOOM 
model at the end of 1989. 
Assets niKD % of TA Liabilities mKD % of TL 
CLA 176.27 15 CD 155 13.2 
IF 931.91 79.3 DFI 38.23 3.2 
CW : 38.96 3.3 ID 878.33 74.7 
OA 10 0.9 E 53.58 4.6 
FA 18 1.5 OL 50 4.3 
11 TA 1175.14 100 TL 1175.14 100 
The other results which might be helpful in the comparison task are given in 
the Table below: 
Table 8.3 Values of other variables obtained by the SOOM model 
for KFH. 
Litern TP NP NIF LF SD LID UID D SR GR 
mK D 57.9 44.9 512.5 419.4 535.8 74.7 267.7 1071.6 21.9 5.7 
To complete the picture for comparison reasons the actual results achieved by 
the management of KFH are presented in the Tables below: 
3LP6 is a small scale Linear Programming package that allows the user to input, solve and 
manipulate small linear programming models on a PC computer developed by D. SIIEARN lecturer 
at the Management School, Sheffield University. See Appendix 8.3 for the whole structure of the 
SOOM model utilized to generate the components of the balance sheet for KFII for the year 1989. 
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Table 8.4 The actual Balance Sheet of KFH at the end of 1989. 
Assets mKD % of TA Liabilities mKD % of TL 
CLA 162.2 14.3 CD 128.6 11.4 
IF 889.9 78.6 DFI 100.2 8.8 
CW 51.4 4.5 ID 804.5 71.1 
OA 10.4 1 E 51.1 4.5 
FA 18 1.6 OL 47.9 4.2 
TA 1131.9 100 TL 1131.9 100 
Note: values in this and the previous Tables are expressed in millions of 
Kuwaiti dinars (mKD). 
Table 8.5 Values of other variables generated actually 
item TP NP MF LF SD LID UID D SR GIS 
mKD 47.9 33.3 494.7 395.2 509 12.3 283.2 1033.4 18.6 1.6 
Note: values in this and the previous Tables are expressed in millions of 
Kuwaiti dinars (mKD). The above results have been compiled from the annual 
report of 1989. 
8.4.1.1 Discussion and some explanation of the obtained results. 
Having presented the results generated by the model in conjunction with those 
actually achieved, attention is given to the discussion of these results. This dis- 
Gussion, however, is to be carried out in two phases: Firstly, an evaluation of the 
models' results is dealt with by comparing them with those actually achieved; 
secondly, some important managerial aspects of the model are discussed in the 
light of the optimal results generated by the LP technique (i. e. some points such 
as shadow prices and sensitivity analysis of the optimal results of the model. ) 
1. The first phase: comparison between the two results. 011 the level 
of the first phase, the following general remarks are made, see Tables 8.2, 
8.3,8.4an d8.5: 
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The volume of total assets(total liabilities), in terms of millions of Kuwaiti 
Dinars (mKD), obtained by the model is greater, by almost 3.8 per 
cent, than that actually achieved. This is due to the fact that input 
data have been forecasted (i. e. relying on time trend of time series 
data as the sole independent variable), which has led to the overes- 
timation of the values of the forecast variables (e. g. forecasted total 
assets (FTA) = mKD 1297). This is so because in the real world the 
pattern and behaviour of these variables cannot be explained by time 
trend only. If we have relied on time series analysis alone the time 
trend would have been considered as only one component of the time- 
series data, because other components such as seasonal and cyclical 
variations are also important. Therefore, relying on time trend alone 
made us accept the upward trend of the variables forecasted. In ad- 
dition, the behaviour of these variables is certainly affected by other 
independent variables (e. g. the volume of funds generated from iuvest- 
ment deposits(ID) is more likely to be affected by the expected rate 
of return offered by the batik as one of the factors which affects the 
supply of funds to these accounts relative to that available from other 
IBs and non-113s, likewise the volume of funds assigned to investment 
operations (IF) is also more likely to be affected by the expected rate 
of return offered by entrepreneurs). However, this may explain only 
part of the story; referring to the annual report of KFII for the year 
1989 we discover that there is a decline in the volume of total assets in 
the year 1989 from that of 1988. And the fact is that this shrinkage is 
not caused by a decline in the value of investments or funding sources, 
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but due to a drop in the value of exchange deposits with other finan- 
cial institutions(FIs). This factor is, in fact, clear from the position 
of these items (i. e. deposits from and with other FIs). On the assets 
side (CLA item of 1988 stood at mKD 280.3 (counting for 23.9% of 
TA) and 20.7% was been kept as deposits with other Fis leaving the 
rest (3.2%) as cash and balances with banks; whereas in 1989 the CLA 
item stood at mKD162.2 only (see Table 8.4) representing 14.3% of 
TA with 10% of TA only kept as deposits with other FIs. The sane 
feature can be noticed on the liabilities side for the item of deposits 
from other Fis. This item stood at inKD163.6 (13.9% of TL) in 1988; 
however the same item accounted for mKD100.2 (8.8% of TL see Ta- 
ble 8.4) in 1988. Therefore taking the face value of total assets(total 
liabilities) for the year 1988, which stood at mKD1172.8, and compar- 
ing it with that generated by the model mKD1175.14 we might be led 
to conclude that the results obtained by the model are much better 
than those actually achieved. This should not be the case because the 
foregoing discussion emphasizes the importance of the quality of the 
input data and the impact of not capturing in the model some of the 
problems faced by decision makers in the real world. And the omission 
of these problems in the modelling process may be the result of their 
difficulty or the inability of the model builder to detect them at the 
stages of building up the model. 
The value of total profits (TP) generated by the model JP = m1057.9) 
is higher than the volume of profits actually achieved (TP = mKD47.0) 
(a difference of 20.8%). This divergence between the two values may 
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due to several factors. The obvious one is the fact that the values 
of the forecasted variables are too high as discussed in the previous 
point. Another factor may be that risk has not been taken into con- 
sideration. The most important factor, however, is that the analysis 
ignores completely changes in relevant economic variables external to 
the bank, such as interest rates, exchange rates and the rate of infla- 
tion. It is, therefore, expected that in all environment characterized 
by certainty the best and logical selection of the program is to choose 
the combination of assets and liabilities that gives the highest rate 
of return. However, this is not the case in the real world where the 
policy of the management is undertaken in the light of the trade offs 
that exist between risk and return. Hence at this stage we can state 
that the inclusion or treatment of risk is a very important part which 
the model did not take into account. The way we have calculated the 
rates of return Rs, fý,, and R1, may be a fourth factor that have at- 
tributed to this discrepancy between the profits realized by the model 
and those actually achieved. This is so because, first we have assumed 
that the House is utilizing two modes of finance for channeling invest- 
ment funds. Second, we have considered the CLA funds in whole as 
being utilized for banking services and in fact this is not the case. Be- 
cause as a part of the CLA there is the cash and balance with banks 
item included which generates zero rate of return. 
From the values presented in Tables 8.2 and 8.4 we can notice that there 
is almost a perfect matching between the sources and uses of funds. 
Short term funds have been used to finance short term operations (see 
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CLA on the assets side and CD and DFI on the liabilities side). The 
same thing can be noticed for investments operations (IF) and ID 
and E the source of financing these operations. Though, the values 
do have some discrepancies which may due to the aggregation nature 
of the presentation of financial reports of the House which does not 
define clearly the maturity class of each category in the balance sheet, 
but the general overview is that there is a tendency of conducting 
this policy. This presence of matching between sources and uses of 
funds may due to the fact that the options available for IBs to meet 
liquidity requirements are limited (i. e. no access to the money markets, 
interbank markets and the like). Therefore, it might be the case that 
in order to avoid the practice of Riba (usury) (e. g. borrowing on the 
basis of interest to meet liquidity requirements) this policy has been 
adopted in the case of IBs. Therefore, the volume of funds assigned 
for banking services constitues a part of the funds in the CLA item. 
After making the above general remarks it is important to turn now to 
such a more detailed comparison between the two results. In this case 
much emphasis is placed on the percentage presentation, (what is liter- 
ally known as common size presentation of the balance sheet of banks) in 
Tables 8.2 and 8.4. A quick reference to the percentage values in these Ta- 
bles indicates that the results obtained by the model are almost identical 
to those actually achieved. Having said that, however, the two blocks of 
the balance sheet did not have the same features. The assets side of both 
results are more similar than those of the liabilities. Since it is almost 
impossible to achieve perfect result by applying such models, discussion 
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is, therefore, limited to the most important variables (i. e. decision vari- 
ables). These are CLA and IF on the assets side and CD, ID and E on the 
liabilities side. Limiting the discussion to these variables can be justified 
by the fact that these variables have considerable impact on the policies 
adopted by the management of the bank and therefore the maximization 
of the profits generated from the operations carried out. Moreover, in the 
case of the model other variables have been treated either as balancing 
items (i. e. CW on the assets side and DFI on the liabilities side) or as con- 
stants (i. e. OA and FA on the assets side and OL on the liabilities side). 
Clearly, limiting the discussion to the variables mentioned earlier gives a 
good indication that the model has captured some elements which enables 
managers to choose a policy that reflects the way they assign funds to 
the available opportunities. In the case of the model this is very obvious 
for the two constraints of liquidity ratio(LR) and funds utilization ratio 
(FUR) (see Appendix 8.3 for the specification of these two constraints). 
The first one(i. e. LR) reflects the desired level of liquidity to be maintained 
and the second reflects the matching of sources and uses of funds policy 
adopted. Thus it can be confirmed that the most important constraints 
are the policy ones, because they represent the attitude and response of 
the management to the different forces that affect their decision process. 
However, discussion of the importance of these constraints and their man- 
agerial implications is deferred to the next section. 
We can say that in general the results generated by the model are similar 
to those actually achieved. But it is too early to draw definite conclusions 
and suggest that implementing such models will bring the desired results 
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that the management look for. 
8.4.1.2 The second phase: some useful implications of the post- 
optimal analysis of the optimal solution. 
As we stated at the beginning of this discussion, the evaluation or assess- 
meat of the results generated by the model is in two parts; the first has 
been dealt with fully in the previous section; the other is the main concern 
of this section. This second phase concentrates on the utilization of some 
important features of the post-optimal analysis of the LP technique. In 
this respect I ant going to take few examples to show how this analysis can 
be conducted, the interested reader can consult Beazer(1975) for the use 
of this analysis with respect to banks and Williams(1990) for the general 
use of this analysis to any LP application. The elements analyzed are the 
following: 
(a) The funds utilization ratio (FUR) constraint and its shadow price. As 
we stated in Appendix 8.1 that with each constraint in the optimal 
solution there is a shadow price associated with it. What are the 
managerial aspects of this information? The output for the optimal 
solution in our model produced a shadow price associated with this 
constraint (i. e. FUR) equal to 5.7%. That means any marginal (0) 
increase(or decrease) of the resources available for investment opera- 
tions (IF) will result in an increase (or decrease) to total contribution 
of profits (TP) by an amount equals to 0*5.7%. For example, lets 
assume that instead of utilizing full ID and E for financing IF we have 
reduced it by 5% (i. e. IF < . 95(ID + E)). We should note, however, 
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that this analysis deals with marginal variations (i. e. small changes) 
in the right hand side of the stipulated values of the model, but for 
illustration purposes we have set out the value of 0 at the level of 5%. 
This decrease is equal to mKD46.59 (i. e. it is equal to the value of 
IF in optimal solution (mKD931.9) times 5%). The total contribution 
of profits (TP) will be decreased by mKD2.65 (46.59 * 5.7%). There- 
fore the new value of TP, after this reduction and rearrengemeut of 
the optimal solution, will be equal to mKD55.2. In fact solving the 
LP program by LP6 package with the forementioned reduction (i. e. 
IF < 
. 
95(ID+E)) will produce the same volume of total contribution 
profits mKD55.2. What does this whole process and result tell the 
decision maker? It tells him simply that if he has available funds (i. e. 
ID + E) for financing investment projects (IF), and there is it cost (or 
rate of return) of this source, and he selects a policy greater than the 
stipulated value of IF in the market constraint he should be able to 
make extra rate of return that equals to 5.7% for each marginal in- 
crease in the use of the available funds. On the other hand, if he (i. e. 
the decision maker) does not make full use of the available resources 
then there will be an "opportunity" cost equals to the foregone prof- 
its (e. g. mKD2.65 in our case) if the funds had been used for that 
particular purpose. It should be emphasized that there is an upper 
(mKD953 + 0,, %953) and lower (mKD953 - At 
%953) limits within 
which these changes can take place. In most packages the values of 
these limits are produced with the optimal solution. However, LPG 
does not provide this piece of information. Hence we are unable to 
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derive the values of these limits. It is enough for the decision maker 
at this stage to realize that increasing (or decreasing) the amount of 
available resources cannot be carried out without limits (e. g. there are 
market constraints on the bank's ability for maneuvring these funds 
and so forth). Moreover, the type of analysis we have just conducted 
is very simple. In the sense that many factors have not been taken 
into consideration. The source of funds is one of these. In this analysis 
source of funds has been treated as exogenous (pre-determined) and as 
such bankers have no control over its volume. In the practices of bank- 
ing bankers can exercise some control over this factor. This feature 
is very clear in the case of interest-based banks where liability man- 
agement has emerged as a very important tool through which bankers 
have become very aggressive in obtaining funds from different sources 
(e. g. money markets, interbank markets, Eurocurrency markets, etc) 
other than the traditional (i. e. deposits) way of acquiring funds. III 
addition, the development of financial instruments such as negotiable 
certificates of deposits, soaring interest rates during the 1960's and 
1970's, high competition between FIs and deregulation movement of 
the 1970's and 1980's have played very important role in the emergence 
of liability management. In the case of IBs, however, this is not the 
case, because the development of markets and financial instruments 
are still under way. The main element that these banks use to obtain 
funds is to offer a competitive rate of return to investment accoun- 
tholders. This in turn requires investing funds in profitable projects. 
This may explain why our analysis has concentrated on the assets side 
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assets side (i. e. uses of funds) of the balance sheet. 
(b) The same analysis can be applied to the liquidity ratio (LR) constraint 
or any non-binding '. In our case, the LR, constraint has a shadow 
price associated with it in the optimal solution. The value of this price 
is equal to 3.6%. Since the CLA item has been assumed to be used in 
financing bank service operations, the shadow price therefore represent 
the rate of return by which an increase (or decrease) in the level of 
CLA with respect to TA will result in an increase (or decrease) in total 
profits by an amount equals to the value of the shadow price(3.6%) 
times the quantity by which the level of CLA is increased or decreased. 
Moreover, the shadow price, in this case, could be interpreted as the 
"cost of borrowing" to meet liquidity requirements or the foregone 
"opportunity cost" rate of return of having too much idle cash (i. e. 
liquidity excess. ) 
The above discussion illustrates how important and useful are the manage- 
rial implications that can be gained from the application of such models, 
and how the output of the optimal solution can be used to evaluate dif- 
ferent courses in the decision making process. Hence, the application of 
optimization techniques, such as LP, should not be presented as a me- 
chanical tool of obtaining the optimal solution, but it should be presented 
as a managerial tool that Helps the decision maker to evaluate different 
4A constraint is said to be non-binding if the left-hand side quantity in the optimal solution is 
less or greater than, depending on the inequality sign, the stipulated value of the right-hand side, 
and therefore it has a zero shadow price and it does not affect the optimal solution. It should he 
noted, however, that there might exist situations in which the constraint might be non-binding evert 
if it is equal to the stipulated right-hand side value. This situation occurs if the removal of this 
constraint does not affect the optimal solution, (Williams(1990)). 
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alternatives. 
8.4.2 Comparing the balance sheet obtained by the 
SOOM model with the actual balance sheet of JIB 
For generating the values of the `optimal' balance sheet for JIB by imple- 
menting the LP program, the planning period of 1987 - 1988 was chosen. 
It would have been much better if the same planning period was chosen 
for both institutions, but it was impossible to obtain necessary data for 
. JIB for the year 1989. Therefore, the main decision to be examined using 
the program is to determine the structure of the balance sheet of JIB at 
the end of the financial year of 1987 - 1988. In other words, assuming that 
we are at the beginning of the planning period of 1987 - 1988, i. e. the end 
of the financial year of 1986-1987, what structure of the balance sheet will 
maximize the profits of the JIB at the end of 1988 by implementing the LP 
program?. As it was the case of KFH the main sources of information are 
annual reports of Jordan Islamic Bank from 1979 through 1988. Now we 
turn to the main components of the LP program for JIB. The data used 
as inputs of the model is given in the Table below': 
Table 8.6 The data inputs of the SOOM program of JIB 
item FA TC PUG SR, GR, FSP SIA SRI R,, 
value(m. ID) 4.6 2.29 6 3.1 .6 15.3 15.9 
3.5 
5See Appendix 8.3 for the whole structure of the LI' program used to generate the variables of the 
balance sheet of . 1Iß for the year ended 1988 and Appendix 8.2 for how the data has been compiled 
and how the estimated inputs have been obtained. 
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Continued Table 8.6. 
item FCD FID FD FTA FIF 
value(tn. JD) 34.8 149 183.8 215.5 122.5 11 
Note: m. J D denotes for millions of Jordanian Dinars. 
In order to generate the structure of the balance sheet the data provided 
in the Table above have been used in conjunction with the structure of the 
LP program for JIB given in Appendix 8.3. The results obtained are given 
in the Table below: 
Table 8.7 The balance sheet of JIB generated by the SOOM 
model at the end of 1988 
Assets m. ID % of TA Liabilities m. JD % of TL 
CLA 72.5 33.6 CD 26 12 
IF 122.5 56.8 ID 141.9 65.8 
FSP 15.3 7.1 SIA 15.9 7.4 
OA 0.9 .4 SRIR 4.5 2.1 FA 4.6 2.1 E 10.2 4.7 
OL 17.3 S 
TA 215.8 100 TL 215.8 100 
The other data which might be Helpful for comparison reasons are pre- 
sented in the Table below: 
Table 8.8 The value of other variables determined by the 
SOOM model 
item SR GR It TC NP SHP DP D 
value(in. JD) 
.1 
3.3G 86 12 2.29 2.68 4.97 6 183.8 
Note: values of the variables in this and the previous Tables are denoted 
in terms of millions of . Jordanian dinars 
(niJD). 
Having presented the results generated by the model, the actual results 
achieved by the management of JIB are presented next. The value of the 
balance sheet actually achieved is given in the following Table: 
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Table 8.9 The actual Balance sheet of JIB at the end of 1988 
Assets r nJD % of TA Liabilities m. JD % of TL 
CLA 74.7 33.6 CD 38.7 17.4 
IF 124.1 55.8 ID 142.6 64.1 
FSP 15.9 7.1 SIA 17.1 7.7 
OA 2.8 1.3 SRIR 4.2 1.9 
FA 4.9 2.2 E 10 4.5 
OL 9.8 4.4 
TA 222.4 100 TL 222.4 100 
The value of other variables which might be helpful in comparing the actual 
with the calculated results of the model are presented in Table S. 10 below: 
Table 8.10 Values of other variables actually achieved 
item SR GR TP TC NP SHP DP D 
va1ue(m. JD) 3.2 . 75 10.4 2.7 1.15 3.1 5.6 177.8 
Note: values in this and the previous Tables are expressed in terms of 
millions of Jordanian dinars (mJD). 
8.4.2.1 Discussion and some implications of the obtained re- 
suits. 
As in the case of KFH, the same methodology is pursued in analysing 
and interpreting the results of Jordan Islamic Bank(JIB). That is, the 
analysis is carried out on two levels: the first is the comparison between 
the results generated by the model and those actually achieved; the second 
is a reflection on some managerial implications of the results of the model. 
(a) The first phase: comparison between the two results. 
Looking at the results presented in Tables 8.7,8.8,8.9 and 8.10 the 
following general remarks can be drawn : 
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- The volume of total assets(total liabilities), in terms of millions 
of Jordanian Dinars, generated by the model are close to those 
actually obtained (there is a difference of only m. JD6.6(3%)). This 
closeness can be explained by the fact that the assumed upward 
trend of the forecasted variables has been captured by the linear 
equation of time trend analysis. This is quite apparent in 'T'able 
8.12 in Appendix 8.2, where it can be noticed that the upward 
trend of these variables has grown steadily in the years under ob- 
servation. This, however, is not the case for KFH which was hit by 
the collapse of the real estate and construction markets in 1984. 
The other factor which might explain this closeness is the fact that 
. JIB is a small size bank therefore it may have followed a conserva- 
tive policy in its employment of funds. This in turn makes it easier 
for the model builder to capture and formulate these policies. For 
instance, take the funds utilization ratio(FUR), which relates IF 
on one hand and ID and E on the other, actually this ratio stood 
at 81.3% which is almost equal to that of the model (80.5%). The 
case of special reserve for investment risk (SRIR) is a testimony of 
the conservative policy of the management of the bank. 
- The value of profits in both cases is close as well. l'Iowever, tlie 
profits generated by the model are slightly higher than those ac- 
tually achieved (by 15%). This may due to the treatment of CLA 
item which has been used as a block invested in banking service 
operations. However, in reality part of this fund is kept as an idle 
cash or balances with banks and it, therefore, does not generate 
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any income. In addition, we can notice in Tables 8.8 and 8.10 that 
net profit(NP) of the model is much higher than that of the actual 
case. This may due to the omission of other expenses such as taxes 
and other allowances decided by the management of the batik and 
the unrealistic assumption of constant costs. 
- From Tables 8.7 and 8.9 it is apparent that the bank is playing 
the role of liquidity destruction rather than liquidity creation (see 
Chapter 4). This is clear from the comparison between the items 
of CLA on the assets side and CD on the liabilities side, where 
the former is higher than the latter by almost double in the actual 
case and more than double in the case of the model. This indi- 
cates the fact that most, if not all, IBs are ensuring their liquidity 
regiurements through cash and balances with other batiks (CLA) 
item. 
Once again the foregoing discussion illustrates the importance of hav- 
ing strong methods or techniques of estimating the required data of 
the model so that it can have the power to generate the course sought 
by the decision maker. 
We turn now to the common size comparison of the results presented 
above, where attention is directed towards the most important items 
of the balance sheet. These are; CLA and IF on the assets side and 
CD, ID and E on the liabilities side. If we take the assets side it is clear 
that the results in both situations are the same. In the case of CLA 
item it is a coincidence that the results are exactly the same, because 
we have calculated the expected ratio of this variable with respect to 
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total assets as the average of the actual ratios of the values over the 
years under observation. However, in the case of IF it seems that 
the FUR ratio, as explained in the previous point, has expressed the 
policy adopted by the tnanagetnent. On the liabilities side, however, 
the situation is not the same. Two items (i. e. ID and E) yield close 
results, whereas in the case of CD there was a divergence of more than 
5% between the two percentages. This may due, in the case of the 
model, to the relationships that link CD with other variables in the 
model especially TA and D. With respect to TA, CD is linked with it 
through the liquidity ratio (LR). And as we noticed in the first point 
of the general remarks the value of TA of the model is less titan that 
of the actual case. With regard to D, CD is related to it through the 
equality between total deposits (D) and the different types of other 
deposits, especially the case of SIA which has been assumed as con- 
start. Therefore, the equality prevents CD from exceeding an upper 
liIllit. 
We can conclude that in small size batiks the adopted policies of the 
management are not very sophisticated. And, therefore, the applica- 
tion of Irrodels such as LP technique can capture these policies. 
(b) The second phase: some implications of the values of the op- 
timal solution. 
In the previous section we have seen how important is the funds uti- 
lization ratio (FUR) relationship in deciding the optimal course of 
the balance sheet. Accordingly, the shadow price associated with this 
constraint is very important for the decision maker in evaluating the 
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different options available. In the optimal strategy arrived at the value 
of this shadow price is negligible as it is almost equal to zero. That 
means if we increase FUR, let say by 0= 5%, the value of total con- 
tribution (TP) remains the same and therefore the new solution is 
the same as that obtained when FUR was equal to 80.5%. Thus, this 
value of FUR represents an upper limit of the interval within which the 
shadow price could have a meaningful interpretation. MVloreover, the 
constraint (IF < 122.5) has a shadow price associated with it equals 
to 8.2% (rate of return of IF) which means that if we could seek other 
investment opportunities it is likely that any marginal increase of the 
available resources will offer us a rate of return equals to 8.2%. If we 
turn now to the other side of the coin and assumed that the manage- 
ment has selected an FUR course equals to 75% (instead of 80.5%). 
In this case the shadow price associated with FUR constraint is equal 
to 8.2%. This tells the management that it has a chance of increasing 
its total profits (TP) by an amount equals to 8.2% times the marginal 
increase of sources available to finance IF (0). For example, let z= 
5%, this will take us to our initial optimal course and the increased 
amount of profits is equal to 8.2% times mJD5.97 = mJD. 49. Adding 
this to the amount of current total profits will produce the tn. 1 D 12 
total profits of the initial balance sheet. However, we should be very 
cautious with this type of analysis in deriving any general conclusions 
since it does not take marginal costs into account. Hence, knowing 
whether or not an incraese in the available resources will be profitable 
requires taking into consideration all factors that affect profitahilty. 
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The above analysis is almost the same for the liquidity ratio (LR. ) 
constraint where the shadow price associated with this constraint is 
equal to 2.7%. However, there is only one addition to that is the fact 
that this shadow price can be interpreted as the "cost of borrowing"to 
meet liquidity requirements or the "opportunity cost" of having too 
much idle cash (liquidity excess. ) 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the importance of giving a lot of 
consideration to the investment portfolio to maximize profits and its 
trade-off with liquidity requirements. 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
In the light of the above results and from the discussion that followed 
the following general remarks can be made: 
The general performance of the model is quite encouraging, in the 
sense that the results generated by the SOOM program for both 
institutions are not very different from those actually achieved. 
This, in fact, illustrate the fact that this program has captured 
to some dedree the policies adopted by the management of these 
institutions (e. g. the FUR and liquidity requirements). Having 
said that, it should be noted that the results of the SOONI program 
for JIB are better, in their closeness, than those of KID II. This 
may due to the reasons (i. e. size of the bank and the conservative 
policies adopted by the management) stated in the first phase of 
the discussion of the results of JIB. 
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The managerial implications of the model (i. e. post-optimal analysis 
of the SOOM program) are as important as obtaining the optimal 
solution itself. We have seen how much important information can 
be obtained from this analysis. Although, our discussion was lim- 
ited to few aspects we can state that the application of LP or any 
Operational Research (OR) technique should not be presented to 
the decision maker as a mechanical tool for obtaining the optimal 
solution rather as a managerial tool that will help the decision 
maker to evaluate different alternatives. 
The importance of having robust methods or techniques of estimating 
the required data. Therefore, having good models or methods that 
can capture the factors affecting the behaviour of the variables 
concerned is a preliminary prerequisite of generating promising 
results from the implementation of optimization techniques. 
It is quite apparent how important are the policy constraints adopted 
by those responsible for handling the ALM problem in the bank. 
This is not a surprising finding, because these constraints repre- 
sent the attitude and response of the management to the different 
factors that affect their decision making process. 
The model did not take risk into considerations. From the discus- 
sion of the ALM problem it was clear that the treatment of risk is 
one of the crucial factors that affects the ALM problem. LP tech- 
pique can be used to handle this by assuming different economic 
scenarios and solving for each but it is a cumbersome and time 
consuming process. One way of taking risk into account is dealt 
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with in the next chapter where risk will be treated as an objective 
to be optimized in itself. 
The capital ratio constraint of these institutions did not have an effect 
on the optimal course arrived at. This may give an indication that 
the role of capital in Islamic Banks is not like that played by capital 
in conventional banks. If it (i. e. capital) has any such role, this 
might be limited to protecting funds deposited in current accounts 
and therefore the requirements are less than those in conventional 
banks. In most developed countries regulatory authorities requires 
a ratio of at least 8% of total capital with respect to total risk 
weighted assets. 
Although, iniuitnum cash requirement and other legal ratios are quite 
high they do not appear to have a great impact on the optimal so- 
lution of the model. This may due to the prudent policies adopted 
by the management in both institutions especially JIB. 
The matching of sources of funds policies are quite clear in the poli- 
ties pursued by the management of these batiks. However, the 
measures taken in each batik are not the same. Kuwait Finance 
House keeps a low ratio of cash and balances with other banks 
in relation to total assets, whereas . Jordan Islamic Bank keeps a 
high one. This difference in policy may reflect the different in size 
between the two intermediaries and the fact that KFII is working 
in a high income country with a well developed banking system 
and the government can be expected to intervene to rescue banks, 
as it did the crisis of 1982. 
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Appendix 8.1- Some essential 
features of the LP technique 
Linear programming (LP) can be defined as "the analysis of problems 
in which linear function of a number of variables is to be maximized (or 
minimized) when these variables are subject to a number of linear in- 
equalities[or qualities]", Beazer(1975). It appears from this definition 
that the essential features of an LP program are the optimization of a 
linear function subject to a set of mathematical relationships, such as 
equations, inequalities, logical dependencies, etc, which correspond to 
some more down-to-earth relationships in the real world. Therefore, 
the general form of an LP program can be stated in mathematical 
notations as follows, Beazer(1975): 
Maximize (Z) = Ej cjxj 
subject to 
F-; aijX; <_ bi, i=1........ ii, and xX >0 
or Minimize (Z) = C* X 
subject to AX <b, X>0 
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A is a matrix of structural coefficients and b is a vector of stipulation 
values for the amounts of resources available. C is a vector of criteria, 
either prices, costs or rates of return. A, b and C are parameters of 
the problem; only the vector of the activity level, X, can be varied to 
affect the solution of the problem. The decision maker is interested in 
choosing a program, an X vector, that optimizes his criterion function. 
From this discussion we can summarize the following essential features 
of an LP program, Williams(1990): 
i. There is a single linear expression (the objective function) to be 
optimized (maximized or minimized). 
ii. There is a series of constraints in the form of linear expressions 
(equalities or inequalities) which can take one of the forms < or 
> or =. 
iii. Non-negativity constraints (i. e. the vector of the activity level 
must be greater or equal to zero. ) 
In addition to the above basic features the story of LP technique, how- 
ever, do not stop here. Other very important aspects are noteworthy. 
The foremost, among others, is the post-optimal analysis which con- 
centrates on the economic interpretation of the obtained results. This 
includes the dual model, sensitivity analysis and sonne other features. 
However, we will describe briefly in what follows the first two factors 
(i. e. the dual model and sensitivity analysis) and their usefulness in 
deriving such implications of the optimal solution. 
i. The dual problem. Associated with any Linear program- 
ining(LP) problem is another problem known as its dual. With 
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each maximization original (or primal) problem is its ininimiza- 
tiou dual program and vice versa. Although the idea of duality 
is mathematical in nature, it has some very important economic 
interpretation. Having said that we are, in fact, not going to con- 
centrate on the analysis of duality in this study for two reasons. 
First and foremost, is the fact that duality requires the building 
up of another new LP model which is beyond the scope of this 
study, although this model can be derived from the primal one. 
Second, values of the variables obtained in the optimal outcome of 
the dual model are equal to quantities called shadow prices which 
we are going to discuss in the next paragraph. These values usu- 
ally appear naturally in most packages if the simplex method is 
applied. 
ii. Sensitivity analysis. The main theme of this analysis is to study 
the effects of changes in the data as used inputs on the optimal 
course arrived at. These changes cover the following: 
- Changes in the right Band side coefficients or changes on the 
restrictions imposed as constraints on the program being opti- 
inized (e. g. the amount of resources available). In LP prob- 
lems each constraint has associated with it a quantity known as 
shadow price which can be interpreted as the managerial effect 
of increases(or decreases) in the capacities, Williains(1900). 
- Changes in the coefficients of the criterion function. This could 
be a unit of profit contribution or cost. 
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- Changes in the input/output (or interior) coefficients associated 
with each activity or resource. 
It should be stated that all of the above changes can take place only 
within an interval. That is this changes can be carried out only within 
such upper and lower values; these values are called limited ranges of 
the variable or constraint concerned. 
Before we end this Appendix it is important to point out that two 
important steps as perceived by the author are very important in the 
modelling process. These are: firstly to recognize that such actual 
problem can be approximated to all LP or any other OR program. 
Thus defining the problem and formulating it is a very important and 
crucial step; secondly, interpreting the optimal solution and discussing 
the likely implications of such results. Certainly, there are some other 
steps which cannot be underestimated especially the step of obtaining 
the optimal solution. However, the existence of powerful microcom- 
Puters with efficient packages had made this step much more easier. 
Accordingly, such big practical problems are possible to be tackled. 
Nevertheless, understanding the way how the solution been obtained 
Helps decision maker to understand and analyse the results much bet- 
ter. 
Williams(1990) is a very useful reference of discussing the above and 
other related topics. Therefore, the interested reader can consult this 
reference. 
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Appendix 8.2 The data used 
to estimate the forecasted 
variables and some other 
input data of the model 
The data used as inputs of the model can be grouped into two cate- 
gories; the one that deals with Kuwait Finance House(KFH) and the 
other that deals with . Jordan Islamic Bank(JIB). 
i. The data used to estimate variables of the model for KFH. 
The Table below presents the values of the variables, to be forecast, 
over the last eine years: 
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Table 8.11 Past values of some variables over the last 
nine years for KFH. 
year CD TA D CID IF DER% LR% 
1980 29.2 168.4 148.6 148.6 133.9 286 22 
1981 55.2 351.1 294.1 294.1 272.5 162 19 
1982 70 568.7 473.1 473.1 303.7 133 21.04 
1983 79.6 799 697.8 697.8 633.3 198 15.06 
1984 69.1 845.7 731.6 710.9 676 204 13 
1985 123.3 803.9 734.1 724.3 619.4 202 10 
1986 133.4 861.8 793.9 758.7 689.9 199 10 
1987 107.8 1057.5 979.2 840.5 76: 3.2 197 19 
1988 143.3 1172.8 1082.6 918.9 805.5 195 24 
The above values have been compiled from annual reports of KFII 
from 1980 to 1988. And the mIKD denotes for millions of Kuwaiti 
dinars and variables are as defined in section 2 of this chapter. 
ii. The data used for estimating the forecast values for JIB. 
Table 8.12 Past values of the variables to be forecast 
year CD TA ID IF D LR% R; 1% DER 
1980 4.8 15.4 6.8 6.7 11.6 43 8.6 5.8 
1981 12.2 31.6 13.1 14.2 25.3 43 8.5 8.4 
1982 16.3 45.3 19.4 26.4 35.7 28 9.4 8.5 
198: 3 20.7 71.4 37.8 : 37.6 58.5 36 8 1: 3.2 
1984 22.3 102.1 60.5 63 82.8 27 7.: 3 17.9 
1985 23.7 126.7 79.1 71 102.8 31 7.6 21.4 
1986 26.4 161.6 99.9 95.4 126.3 28 6.7 1: 3.1 
1987 : 31.2 197.4 127.2 109 158.4 33 7.07 15.8 
1988 : 35 222.5 172.7 124.1 207.7 33.6 7.7 17.5 
The above values have been compiled from annual reports of the 
Bank from 1980 through 1988. 
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In order to arrive at the values of the forecasted variables the coded 
method ' of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) of the linear trend of time 
series analysis has been used. Therefore, the equation used for this 
purpose is assumed to take the following form: 
Yt=a-}-b*X 
Where, Yi = the actual values of the variable concerned(e. g. TA). 
X= represents time, or any satisfactory codes. 
a= the Y intercept of the trend line, or the trend value when X=O. 
b= the slope of the trend line, or change in Yt per unit of time. 
The formulas of calculating a and b are given below: 
(I = 
(Yý) 
b_ (X)(Y) 
(X2) 
We should note that the method of assigning codes differs from the 
case of even to odd data cases (i. e. the number of periods involved). 
Since our data involves odd number, the following example is given 
below to demonstrate how the values of a and b have been arrived at: 
In order to derive these values the following computation is needed. 
It is presented in the Table below: 
61n most practical applications analysts have used codes rather than the actual time periods as 
the independent variable. The main reason of this is to facilitate calculations, and as a matter of 
fact any convenient coding system is satisfactory; for most applications, the greatest efficiency is 
achieved if codes are assigned to time periods in such a way that the sum of the codes is zero (0), (Daniel and Terrell (1975)). 
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Table 8.13 The computation needed to estimate the 
coefficients of a and b. 
year Yi(CDKF1-I) year code(X) E XYt EX2 
1980 29.2 -4 -116.8 16 
1981 55.1 -3 -165.3 9 
1982 70 -2 -140 it 
1983 79.6 -1 -79.6 1 
1984 69 0 0 0 
1985 123.3 1 123.3 1 
1986 133.4 2 266.8 4 
1987 107.8 3 323.4 9 
1988 143.3 4 573.4 16 
E 810.7 0 785 60 
Note: CDKFH represent current deposits for KFII and are denoted 
in millions Kuwaiti dinars. 
From the above Table the values of a and b are computed as follows: 
a= 
(Ye) 
= '310.7 = 90.07 74 9 
b (X) (Y') _ Iss _ 13.08 (X2) - 60 
Substituting for the values of a and b in the equation above gives the 
following estimated equation for CDKFII: 
Y, -90.07+13.08*X 
For the year 1989 X=5, therefore the forecasted value of CDKFII for 
this year is: 
Y89 = 90.07 + 1: 3.08 *5= 155.47 
With the same procedure values of the other variables can be obtained. 
However, the Microfit 3.0 7 has been used to obtain tlne estiInit (I 
equations. The estimated equations and the forecasted values of the 
variables are presented in the Table below: 
7M icrifit 3.0 is an interactive econometric software package written especially for microcomputers, 
and specifically designed for the econometric modelling of time series. For more ile tails irr the usrr's 
manual guide published by Oxford university press 1991. 
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Table 8.14 the estimated equations and the forecasted 
values of the variables used as inputs in the LP models of 
KFH and JIB. 
The variable the estimated equation forecasted values 
CDKFH YT = 90.1 + 13.07 *X 
CD89 = 155.45(niKD) 
TAKFH Yj = 736.54 + 112.13 *X TA89 = 1297(mKD) 
IFKFH Yj = 544.15 + 81.95 *X IF89 = 953.9(inKD) 
DKFH Yi = 659.44 + 107.54 *X D89 = 1198.54(inKD) 
CIDKFH Yt = 618.52 + 88.64 *X CID89 = 1061.72(mKD) 
CD. JIB YL = 21.4 + 3.35 *X CD88 = 34.8(m. JD) 
ID. JIB Yt = 68.5 -}- 20.14 *X ID88 = 149(iiiJD) 
TAJIB Yj = 108.22 + 26.89 *X TA88 = 215.8(iiiJD) 
IF. JIB Yt = 60.82 + 15.42 *X IF88 = 122.5(in. JD) 
D"JIB Yc = 89.9 + 23.49 *X D88 = 183.8(m. JD) 
DERJIB Yt=13.5+1.44*X DER88=19.3 
FURJIB Yi=. 87-. 017*X FUR88 = 80.2% 
R; 1JIB Yi=6.35+. 46*X RiJ88=8.2% 
Note: in the case of KFH, X=5 and for JIB, X=4 and mKD and 
m. JD denote for millions of Kuwaiti dinars and Jordanian dinars 
respectively. 
The main criterion used to judge the outcome of the estimated equa- 
tions was R2, the coefficient of determination. That is why some other 
equations are not included. Examples of these are the rates of returns 
of the different operations of KFH (i. e. R3, R,,, and R! ). In this sit- 
cation the average of the actual values of the last three years have 
been taken as a projection for the year 1989. The R2 of the equations 
presented in Table 8.14 are given in the Table below: 
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Table 8.15 The values of Rl of the equations presented in 
Table 8.14 
The variable of the equation Rl value 
CDKFH 
. 85 
TA KF I-I 
. 91 IFKFH 
. 86 DKFH . 94 CIDKFH 
. 88 CDJIB 
. 96 IDJIB 
. 95 TA. J IB . 98 IFJIB 
. 99 DJIB . 96 
DERJIB . 58 FURJIB 
. 75 R, j. I IB . 54 
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Appendix 8.3 The structure 
of the LP programs used to 
generate the optimal 
balance sheets of Kuwait 
Finance House(KFH) and 
Jordan Islamic Bank(JIB). 
i. The structure of the model used for KFH. As we described at 
the beginning of the chapter (section 2) the LP program comprises 
of two main parts; constraints and objective function. 
Constraints of the model. 
There are five groups of constraints: 
1.1 - Objective constraints. 
TP=. O<35*CLA+. O6*MF-}-. 05*LF 
NP = TP - TC 
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1.2 - Balance sheet constraints: 
TA = CLA +IF+ OA + FA 
IF=Mr+LF 
CID=CD+ID 
ID=SD+ LID+UID 
D=CID+DFI 
E= PUC+SR+GR 
TL=D+E+OL 
TA = TL 
1.3 - Legal constraints: 
CLA>. 25*CD+. 10*ID 
SR = SR,, +. 10 NP 
GR=GRo+. 1ONP 
SR<PUC 
1.4 - Policy constraints. 
D<20*D 
E <. 08 TA 
If < 1D+E 
CLA<. 15*TA 
MF=. 5*IP 
LF=. 45*IF 
SD<. 50*D 
UID>. 25*D 
ID <. 85 * CID 
1.4 - Market constraints. 
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D<1197.19 
IF <953 
CD < 155.45 
CID<1061 
TA<1297.19 
The objective function. 
Max(TP) =. 0: 35 * CLA +. 06* Al F+. 05 * LF 
ii. The structure of the model for JIB. 
Constraints of the model. 
1.1 - Objective constraints. 
SHP=. 027*CLA+. 02416* IF 
DP=. 0492*IF 
NP=SIIP - TC 
1.2 - Balance sleet constraints. 
TA =CLA+IF +FSP+OA+FA 
D= ID+CD+SIA 
E= PUC+SR+GR 
TL= D+ E+SRIR+Ob 
TA = TL 
1.3 - Legal constraints. 
CLA>. 25*CD+. 10*ID 
SR = SR,, + . 10 * NP 
GR =GR0+ . 10 NP 
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SRI R= SRI R0 +. 0082 * IF 
1.4 - Policy constraints. 
D<19.3*E 
E<. 08*TA 
IF<. 80*ID+. 80*E 
CLA<. 336*TA 
1.5 - Market constraints. 
CD <34.8 
ID < 149 
TA < 215.8 
IF < 122.5 
D< 18: 3.8 
The objective function. Max(TB) =. 027 * CLA +. 082 * IF 
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Chapter 9 
A Multiobjective Optimization 
Model of the Asset and Liability 
Management Problem of an 
Islamic Bank 
9.1 Introduction 
The main concern of this chapter is to relax some of the assumptions made in devel- 
oping the single objective optimization model (SOOM). The foremost, among others, 
is the multiobjective nature of the ALM problem of an Iß. Hence the single objective 
approach taken in the previous chapter is replaced by an approach of optimizing a 
multiobjective function within which the interest of depositors is featured. The se- 
quence of the points covered in this chapter goes as follows: the multiobjective nature 
of the banking firm is dealt with in the second section. The MOOM model is de- 
veloped next and, then the results generated from its application are compared with 
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those results actually achieved by the management of KFH and JIB. Some manage- 
rial implications of the results of the MOOM model and a comparison of these results 
with those of the SOOM model are covered in the fifth section. Finally concluding 
remarks are drawn. 
9.2 The multiobjective nature of the banking firm 
Much of the literature of the firm has been dominated by the explicit assumption 
that firms are regarded as business entities that try to maximize a single objective 
function in the terminal wealth of the owners or any other appropriate single criterion 
function (e. g. maximizing the net present value). Although those writers who have 
pursued this line have noticed and acknowledged the multiple criteria nature of the 
firm, it was until the Second World War, as noted by Zeleny(1982), that such serious 
and "scientific" attempts started to appear in addressing this fact (i. e. the multiple 
criteria of the firm). The multicriteria nature of the firm are derived from the fact that 
firms are the product of the efforts of human beings; as such the ultimate objectives 
of these firms are determined and shaped by the objectives of the persons who have 
an interest in the existence of these firms. As a consequence, managers of firms try to 
satisfy the objectives of the interested groups who are involved in the affairs of these 
firms. Zeleny (1982) quoted the following statement of professor Leibeustein (1976) 
"only individual members of firms have motives, and the meaningfulness and nature 
of firm motives depend on the study of individual motives. In other words, whether 
or not it is proper, meaningful or useful to view firms as profit maximizers becomes a 
problem to be subjected to analysis and solution and is not something about which we 
simply make assumptions at the outset. It will all depend on the analysis of individual 
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behaviour, of the interaction of individuals within groups, and the behaviour of the 
groups that constitute the firm which will determine the answer". If this is the case 
the banking firm, therefore, is no exception. We have seen in chapter 5 that the 
ALM problem that the management of any batik tries to resolve centres around how 
to structure assets, liabilities and capital accounts in such a way as to satisfy the 
requirements of the interested groups (i. e. the owners, deficit and surplus economic 
units and monetary authorities). An elaboration is, therefore, needed to examine the 
objectives that each group is aiming to attain from the involvement in the affairs of 
the banking firm. Since the banking firm is regarded as a financial intermediary (FI) 
that stands between two parties, the interests of these parties is of vital importance 
to the management of these institutions in determining the objectives of the firm. In 
addition, the interest of the owners and monetary authorities are very important too; 
because the former are the main founders of these institutions and the latter keep a 
very close and an open eye on the operations of these intermediaries. In what follows 
we will examine briefly the requirements of each group. Table 9.1 is presented to 
summarize some of the motives and objectives of the groups that have interest in the 
business affairs of the banking firm. 
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Table 9.1 Summary of some of the requirements of the groups that have 
an interest in the affairs of the banking firm 
Groups Examples of some of their requirements 
Surplus economic liquidity, minimization of the risk 
units (SEU) of the lending process, safe place of keeping 
their funds, reasonable rate of return, etc 
Deficit economic low cost of borrowing, amount of 
units(DEU) funds available at particular time, 
keeping these funds as long as possible, etc 
Shareholders high rate of return which may require 
(owners) investing in long term risky projects, 
low risk, etc 
Monetary safety of depositors which may require high 
authorities reserves and considerable amount of capital 
kept as cushion for that purpose, etc 
The above Table demonstrates clearly the multiple criteria nature of the banking firm 
and Bence the real dilemma that the management of these institutions face. In ex- 
plaining this dilem na Zaloom ct al (1986) pointed out that "bank fund managers must 
respond to a number of interest groups each with different objectives. These interest 
groups include the stockholders, depositors, regulatory agencies and the creditors. 
The stockholders prefer to see the bank as a profit making institution. Depositors 
prefer the bank to be a safe place to keep their savings. Regulatory agencies whose 
main function is to minimize bank failures and to protect the depositors' interest, 
would like to see more capital so as to reduce the risk. The stockholders, on the 
other hand, would like to use more borrowed funds, the provision of which is cheaper 
than capital. They also are ready to accept more risk, provided that there is a higher 
rate of return... ". The foregoing discussion clearly illustrates the multiple criteria 
nature of the banking firm and the fact that the management of these institutions 
should take these multiple criteria into account in determining the target objectives 
to be optimized. Most writers who have discussed the ALM problem of banks, and 
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have tried to construct analytical models to solve it, have noticed the multiobjective 
nature of the banking firm. For example, Cohen and Thore (1970) recommended 
that bank managers should take the trade-offs between liquidity, profit and risk into 
consideration in structuring the bank assets and liabilities "... the nature and the 
magnitude of the trade-offs which exist between yield, liquidity and risk must be 
considered by bank managers". Kusy and Ziemba (1986) state that the ALM prob- 
lem of a batik centres around "... how to structure a bank's assets and liabilities to 
make optimal trade-offs among risk, return and liquidity". Despite this observation 
by these writers and others, most or the majority of them have constructed single 
objective optimization techniques. This may due to two main reasons: first, the late 
emergence of the algorithms that solve the family of techniques that incorporate the 
multiobjective nature of the firm; and, second, the complexity of these algorithms as 
such practical applications are difficult to handle. Nevertheless, since the late seven- 
ties the area of multiple criteria decision making has received considerable attention 
from analysts and management scientists. According to Evans (1984) the methods 
that deal with multiobjective decision criteria are classified into three groups accord- 
ing to the three pure approaches of articulation of the decision maker's preference 
structure: the first group contains techniques prior articulation of preferences (prior 
to the optimization process). Techniques which employ this type of prior articulation 
of preferences can involve the explicit use of a value function as in the direct assess- 
ment and the maximization of the decision maker's value function, or the implicit use 
of a value function as in goal programming, (Evans(1984)). The main disadvantage 
of such prior approaches is the difficulty which the decision maker has in specifying 
the required preference information, (Evans (1984)). However, recent surveys indi- 
cated that GP is one of the methods that is gaining considerable attention in the 
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implementation in the decision making process; see Baston(1989) for more details of 
such applications. This acceptance of decision makers of the application of goal pro- 
gramming may possibly due to its great flexibility in accepting numerous constraints 
and goal priorities, Bashir(1982). The second group is the class of methods that use 
progressive articulation of preferences (during, or in sequence with, the optimization 
process). These methods often involve an interactive decision maker/computer ap- 
proach. The techniques applied in this area are similar to those of the first group in 
the sense that they try to find one best-compromise solution. The algorithms devel- 
oped to solve this type of problem typically are initiated through the finding of all 
optimal solution to a single objective problem, related in some way to the original 
multiobjective problem. The decision maker is then required to provide some infor- 
mation concerning his preference structure over the multiple objectives, relative to 
the outcome arising from this solution. Using this preference information, the algo- 
rithin sets up a new single objective problem for next iteration. Iterations continue 
until the decision maker or the computer program, based on some externally delii»ed 
criterion, decides that the current solution is "close enough" to a best compromise 
solution, Evans(1984)). A typical example of this type of techniques is Polynominal 
Goal Programming. The third category includes methods that use the approach of 
a posteriori articulation of preferences (after the optimization process). , Methods in 
this category are concerned with finding all or most of the efficient solutions ' to 
the decision making problem. These solutions are presented to a decision maker(s) 
who chooses one solution as the best from this set of efficient solutions through some 
process set by the decision maker himself. The main advantage of this approach is 
that only the "more is better" assumption is required in order to generate all efficient 
'See Appendix 9.1 for a definition of an efficient solution used in multiobjective programs. 
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solutions. A specified value which represent a particular decision maker's preference 
structure of the objective function is not required prior to the optimization process. 
Multiobjective Linear Programming (MOLP) 2 is a typical example of this last type 
of technique. These techniques have three main disadvantages: first, the algorithms 
themselves are often very complex and hence difficult for decision makers to under- 
stand; and, second, many real problems are too large to solve using this approach; 
and, third, the number of efficient solutions generated is often too large and Bence 
imposes a considerable cognitive burden on the decision maker to analyse them effec- 
tively, (Evans(1984)). However, the cognitive burden of some of these problems has 
been reduced as explained in Appendix 9.1. 
9.3 The multiobjective optimization model of an 
interest-free IB 
One of the main features that characterizes the operations of IBs is the fact that 
investment accountliolders are treated the same way as equity shareholders. That is, 
getting their principal back and obtaining a positive rate of return on these funds 
depends entirely on the outcome of the projects financed by these funds (see chapters 
3 and 5). It is therefore apparent that the management of IBs should optimize a 
multiobjective function within which the interest of these depositors must feature. It 
would have been much more easier for the management to accomplish this task if the 
interest of these depositors did not contradict or at least did not conflict with those of 
equity shareholders. However, this is not the case as the discussion that follows will 
demonstrate. According to the method of profit distribution in IBs the maximization 
2See Appendix 9.1 for understanding some of the basic features of the AMOLP technique. 
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of profit objectives of equity shareholders and investment accountholders depend, 
among other factors, upon two elements. These are the rate of return achieved from 
investment projects and the profit sharing ratios assigned to each group. We may 
recall equations 8.2 and 8.3, from chapter 8 page 167, to elaborate on this point. 
These two equations were specified respectively as follows: 
SHP = R3CLA + Brp[RIMF + RILF] (9.1) 
DP = Drp[R. MF + R1LF] (9.2) 
Where, SHP = total share of equity shareholders in the profits realized by the bank. 
DP = total share of investment accountholders in the profits realized by the batik. 
Other variables as defined in chapter 8 page 163. 
This analysis assumes that investment accountholders share the outcome of invest- 
ment operations only. If we ignore for the time being the first part of the right-hand 
side of the first equation (i. e. R3CLA) and replace SHP and DP by their equivalent 
values. That is: 
SHP = R, E and DP = R, dID, where Re = the rate of return on equity shareholders 
funds (E), and; 
Rid = the rate of return on investment accountholders funds (ID), the following equa- 
tions are obtained: 
Re 
1= 
Bz, p[RLMF + R1LF] (9.3) 
Rid = IDDrp[R. MF + R1LF] (9.4) 
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If we add further that, R,,, MIF + R1LF = R; jIF, then the new equations will be 
stated as follows: 
Re = BrpRi fE 
(9.5) 
IF 
R; d = DrpRtf ID 
(9.6) 
It is clear from the above equations that: 
Re is a function of Brp, Rif and E. That is Re = f(Brp, Rif, 
E ); and Rid is a 
function of Drp, R; 1 and 
LE 
. 
That is Rid = f(Drp, R11, 
LE). The only factor, from 
the above equations, that has a positive impact simultaneously on both R. and Rid is 
Rif. That is the rate of return achieved from the outcome of investment operations 
(i. e. IF). However, even this factor does illustrate the conflict of interests of equity 
shareholders with those of investment accountholders. If the management tries to 
maximize the profits of both parties through this factor, i. e. Rif, this may require 
investing in long-term risky projects which may be acceptable to equity shareholders 
but it may not appeal to investment accountholders. This is simply because those 
latter ones may emphasize the safety of their funds. This safety may require invest- 
ing in low-risk short-term investment projects. Adding to that the fact that most of 
the funds of these accountholders are of short and medium term maturities this will 
increase the pressure on the management to consider the interest of these depositors 
in determining the target objectives. 
If we turn now to the other two factors (i. e. the profit sharing ratios (Brp and Drp) 
and the volume of funds assigned for investment operations (IF)), then the conflict 
of interest of the two parties is much clearer. We may recall that Brp + Drp = 1, 
then if management tries to maximize the share of profits to any group through the 
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utilization of the profit sharing ratio, this will be on the expense of the other. That 
is if the management tries to maximize Re through Brp this will reduce the share of 
investment accountholders (i. e decrease in the value of Drp) and vice versa. The same 
argument could be applied to the volume of funds assigned to finance investment op- 
erations. If the management wishes to maximize the profits of equity shareholders, 
through IF, that may require an increase in ID and decrease or at least a fixed amount 
of E (look at in equation 9.5) and the reverse is true for investment accounthold- 
ers (see equation 9.6). From this brief discussion we may be able to conclude that 
maximizing profits for both equity sharholders and investment accountholders should 
be of high priority to the management of IBs. However, achieving this aim of con- 
flicting interests may be a very difficult task to accomplish. Hence, an optimization 
technique is needed that can help in finding a solution to this conflict of interests 
using all available factors. 
On the other hand reconciling the above mentioned conflict of interest of both eq- 
uity shareholders and investment accounholders is not the only difficulty that the 
management of IBs face in determining the structure of assets, liabilities and capital 
accounts of their intermediaries; there is the risk element that must be taken into 
consideration. Taking this factor into account is derived from the fact that with each 
earning opportunity there is a probability of facing certain volume of risk associ- 
ated with this opportunity. Hence it becomes clear that in order to maximize profits 
for equity shareholders and investment accountholders, the management of IBs must 
take necessary measures to protect the position of the bank from the inherent risks 
in the banking field. From the discussion in chapter 5 of the special nature of the 
ALM problem of IBs two types of risk were found to be very important; these are 
investment (i. e. variations of rates of return) and liquidity risks. The first type (i. e. 
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investment risk) deals with the uncertainty that characterizes the outcome of invest- 
ment operations. It is therefore the responsibility of the management to study and 
analyze the probability distributions of rates of returns of the assets included in their 
portfolios in order to determine how much risk they are willing to take for achieving 
the desired rates of return. In finance theory this risk is usually measured by the vari- 
ance of the portfolio (a2) 3 or its square root (Q). The main element used by financial 
managers to reduce the size of this risk is diversification ', that is by spreading fi- 
nancial resources over different projects and sectors of the economy and even through 
geograghical diversification (i. e. investing in countries other than the domestic one). 
In short, reducing the size of this risk requires the adherence to the proverb "do not 
put all your eggs in one basket". Therefore, the investment risk that lBs face could be 
dealt with in the light of the guide-lines provided by portfolio theory. In this case the 
management of an IB will select the structure of assets, liabilities and capital accounts 
that maximizes the expected rate of return for a given volume of risk attached to it 
or vice versa. However, this type of risk (i. e. investment risk) could be dealt with 
from a different angle; that is it could be treated as an upper limit which cannot go 
above certain maximum accepted level. This level could be argued to be a zero rate 
of return from investment operations. This is because setting this maximum level 
to zero could at least virtually guarantee the safety of the principals of investment 
3There are other measures used by academics like mean absolute deviation and semi-absolute deviations, see Brodt(1976,1978) and Zeleny(1982). 4The gains in risk reduction from portfolio diversification depend inversely upon the extent to 
which the returns on securities in a portfolio are positively correlated. Ideally the securities should display negative correlation. This implies that if a pair of securities has a negative correlation of 
returns, then in circumstances where one of the securities is performing badly the other is likely to 
be doing well, and vice versa in reverse circumstances. Therefore the `average' return on holding 
the two securities is likely to be much `safer' then investing in one of them alone ... 
in normal 
circumstances 
... most securities will display a degree of positive correlation, as well are 
likely to be 
influenced by external trends in the economy. Nevertheless, there will still be some gains from risk 
diversification as long as the securities are not perfectly positively correlated, Allen(1983). 
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accountholders. In this study, however, it seems that risks of this type do not have a 
great effect on the total risk that the management has to face. This can be justified by 
the fact that the practices of IBs are still dominated on the assets side by low-risk and 
quickly realizable investment assets in real estate and trade sectors of the economy, 
as the empirical findings in chapter 7 indicate as well as the findings of Ahmad(1987). 
This, however, by no means should be considered as an underestimation of the size 
of this risk in the case of IBs, but it is only used as a justification of our certainty 
assumption about the rates of return on the operations of IBs in this analysis. We 
turn now to the second type of risk; that is liquidity risk. This type of risk could 
be defined as the possibility that the bank or any credit institution could run out of 
cash because of deposit withdrawals, requests of customers, especially those the bank 
has established relationships with, to meet borrowing needs, or any other ininiediate 
requests for cash. In order to quantify this type of risk it is important to spell out the 
sources that contribute. to the presence of this type of risk and the necessary measures 
taken to reduce its size. As far as the sources are concerned in IBs they do not differ 
from those we have just listed. However, we will pay particular attention to deposit 
withdrawals. IBs accept basically two type of deposits those that can be withdrawn 
on demand (e. g. demand deposits) and those that can be withdrawn at least after a 
short notice (e. g. ; 30,60 or 90 (lays). Hence since IBs accept the latter ones for specific 
and determined periods of time, it is left therefore that the main concern is demand 
deposits. So, how can IBs meet the withdrawal of this type of deposit? We have 
discussed this problem in chapter 5 where we found that IBs meet the requirements 
of liquidity requests through three main sources. These are the holding of vault cash 
and other short term assets, new deposits or injection into the existing ones and the 
maturing assets. It is the first factor which is our train concern in this discussion 
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because it is under the direct control of the management. Moreover, the management 
of IBs rely heavily on it to meet their liquidity requirements. It is therefore important 
to derive such a quantitative measure that links this factor (i. e. cash and other liquid 
assets) with the main source of deposit withdrawals (i. e. transaction deposits). In 
interest based banks in most developed countries the relationship between the two 
variables is usually specified by the monetary authorities as a minimum requirements 
that must be met (e. g. In the US for instance vault cash plus Federal reserve deposits 
(legal reserve) must be at least 12 percent of transaction account balances, Yeager 
and Seitz (1989)). In the case of lBs we can argue that the management of IBs should 
regard this minimum requirements as a goal to be attained, because of the limitation 
use of other ways (e. g. borrowing on the basis of interest rate) of meeting liquidity 
requirements. And we will argue further that vault cash and other short term liq- 
uid assets plus legal reserves should at least be kept as an amount that equals the 
amount of transaction deposits, because achieving this target could at least ensures 
the confidence of depositors that their bank is not in a position of bieng unable to 
meet its obligations of deposit withdrawals. Using the variables we have introduced 
in chapter 8, this goal could be stated as follows: 
CLA + SR > CD 
dividing both sides of the above equation by CD will produce the following equation: 
CLA+SR >1 
CD - 
From the above discussion we can conclude that in determining the structure of the 
assets, liabilities and capital accounts the management of IBs should optimize a utility 
function within which at least three main objectives are included. These are: 
1. Maximizing the share of profits of equity shareholders. 
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2. Maximizing the share of profits to investment accountholders. 
3. Minimizing the amount of risk involved. 
It becomes clear that conventional Linear Programming (LP) can no longer be ap- 
plied in this situation. A Multiobjective Linear Programming (MOLP) is therefore 
suggested to solve the nniltiobjective ALAI problem of IBs. Since the first two objec- 
tives (i. e. number 1 and 2) have been specified in the previous chapter and treated 
as constraints in that occasion, we are not going to repeat the process carried out 
there. I-fence, these two objectives are kept as specified in equations 9.1 and 9.2. 
However, for the third objective a quick reference is given below of how we are going 
to incorporate it in the ? %IOO, NI model. \Ve have stated this objective as a goal to 
be attained and as a matter of fact we know that Coal Programming deals with this 
type of specification . We have learnt from Zeleny (1982) 
5 that in the case of a single 
goal in it particular Goal Programming problem this can be converted easily to the 
optimization of the objective function itself instead of optimizing the deviations c (i. e 
5The following example is extracted from Zeleny (1982) to demonstrate how this can be done: Suppose that there is only one goal, to attain at least a minimum profit of 12 dollars. This single 
goal problem can be specified as follows: 
Minimize d- 
subject to 
4t x1 + 3.2x2 - d+ + d- = 12 and feasible set X. 
Our goal, then, is to minimize underachievement of the target profit, and we do not care if we 
overachieve; that is, d+ can be as large as possible. Minimizing d- amounts to minimizing 12 - (4x1 + 3.2x2), Which is the same as maximizing 4x1 + 3.2x2. 6The GP technique assumes that all goals or objectives can be quantified and ranked. It is 
possible with GI' to put weights on the goals or objectives which represent a hierarchical in which 
goals should be satisfied. Thus GP asks management to set some estimated targets for each of 
their goals and to put priorities on them, that is, to rank them in order of importance. When this information is supplied, GP tries to minimize the deviations from the targets that were set. It begins 
with the most important goal and keeps on until the achievement of a less important goal would 
cause management to fail to achieve a more important one, (Levin, Rubin and Stinson (1986)). In 
short, in the GP the manager sets levels which he would like his objectives to reach, and see if there 
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the under- and over-achievements) from the target goal. Thus in our case we have 
the following goal: 
CLA+SR-CD> 0 
In the case of Goal Programming this problem would be specified as follows: 
Minimize d-, subject to: 
CLA+SR-CD-d++d- =0 
Where, d- = the underachievement of the target objective; and 
d+ = the overachievement of the target objective. 
It should be noted that the value of d+ is not as important as d-, because in the case 
of d- we would like it to be as small as possible therefore we should minimize it. The 
above specification is equivalent to the following statement (see footnote 5): 
Max(Z) = CLA + SR - CD, subject to the specified constraints. 
It is clear from the above treatment of the multiple criteria nature of 
IBs that the 
MOOM model differs from the SOOM model in the inclusion of objectives other 
than the single maximization of profits assumed in the latter. Hence the constraints 
developed and spelled out in chapter 8 are still applicable in the case of the MOOM 
model. 
is a solution which attains all these goals, or if not, find one which is close to doing so, 
(French, 
Hartly, Thomas and White (1986)). 
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9.4 Comparing the results of the MOOM model 
with the actual results of KFH and JIB 
Having identified and specified the objectives to be included in the MOOM model, the 
next step is to generate the values of the items of the balance sheets of the institutions 
selected. After the completion of this task a critical assessment of the obtained 
results is carried out. To accomplish this latter task the results generated through 
the application of the MOOM model are compared with those actually achieved by 
the management of KFI-I and JIB. Hence the main theme of this section is to discuss 
these points in some details. In order to do that the same planning periods are chosen 
as those in the case of the SOOM model. That is the planning periods of the financial 
years for both institutions are 1988 - 1989 and 1987 - 1988 respectively. 
Moreover, 
the same data input and constraints developed in chapter 8 are used to generate the 
items of the balance sheets through the application of the MOOM model. Therefore, 
the same reservation made about this comparison task in the case of the SOOM 
model is still valid. That is the ideal way to compare the results of the MOOM model 
with those actually achieved would have beeil to utilize the internal data that the 
management have used for their planning and decision activities. 
9.4.1 Comparing the MOOM's results with the actual ones 
of KFH. 
For generating the optimal balance sheet of KFH for the year ended 1989 through the 
application of the MOOM model, the structure of the model displayed in Appendix 
8.3, plus the inclusion of the risk objective to be optimized were combined to produce 
the structure of the MOOM program for KFH. Thus in the case of KFll two objectives 
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were included only. These are profits and risk. The reason of including profit as a 
single entity was due to the policy adopted by the management of the House that 
investment accountholders share in all profits realized from the operations of the bank 
see chapter 8 pages 167 and 168 for more details). Hence, the two objectives to be 
optimized arc stated as follows: 
MaxTP = RSCLA + RMF + R1LF (9.7) 
MaxVLR = CLA + SR - CD (9.8) 
Where, TP = the amount of total profits realized from the operations of the House, 
and; 
VLR = the amount of the volume of liquid assets kept as cash or as legal reserves 
over the volume of funds attracted through current accounts (CD). 
The above described structure of the MOOM model has been input to ADBASE 
to calculate the values of the items of the balance sheet. The results of one of the 
efficient extreme points 8 obtained are summarized in the following Tables: 
Table 9.2 Values of the objective functions generated by MOOM model 
Item TP VLR 
Value(mKD) 52.7 55.3 11 
7ADBASE is a software package developed by Professor Steuer (1991) for solving multiple objec- 
tive linear programs for all efficient extreme points and all unbounded efficient edges. 
8ADBASE has generated 6 efficient extreme points and we have selected this extreme point on 
the basis that it might provide a reasonable strategy, in our point of view, of a combination between 
risk and return. The significance of other points and their usefulness are discussed in the next 
section. 
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Table 9.3 The Balance Sheet of KFH generated by the MOOM model at 
the end of 1989. 
Assets mKD % of TA Liabilities mKD % of TL 
CLA 173 15 CD 139.1 12.1 
IF 840.7 72.9 DFI 123.6 10.7 
CW 111.7 9.7 ID 788.2 68.3 
OA 10 0.9 E 52.5 4.6 
FA 18 1.5 OL 50 4.3 
TA 1153.4 100 TL 1153.4 100 
The other results which might be helpful in the discussion process are given in the 
Table below: 
Table 9.4 Values of other variables obtained by the MOOM model for 
KFH. 
item NP MF LF SD UID D SR CR 
mKD 49.7 462.4 : 378.3 525.4 262.7 1050.8 21.4 5.2 
The results actually achieved by the management of KFH are presented in the Tables 
below: 
Table 9.5 Values of the objective "functions" actually achieved 
Item TP VLR 
Value(mKD) 47.9 52.2 
We should note, however, that in this case VLR has been extracted from the annual 
report of the House for the year ended 1989 and therefore we cannot claim that this 
has been regarded as an objective to be optimized. Its inclusion in this manner, 
however, is to make comparison between the two results convenient and possible. 
Table 9.6 The actual Balance Sheet of KFH at the end of 1989. 
Assets niKD % of TA Liabilities mKD % of TL 
CLA 162.2 14.3 CD 128.6 11.4 
IF 889.9 78.6 DFI 100.2 8.8 
CW 51.4 4.5 ID 804.5 71.1 
OA 10.4 1 E 51.1 4.5 
FA 18 1.6 OL 47.9 4.2 
TA 1131.9 100 TL 1131.9 100 
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Note: values in this and the previous Tables are expressed in millions of Kuwaiti 
dinars (iiiKD). 
Table 9.7 Values of other variables generated 
item NP MF LF SD LID UID D SR GR 
ImKD : 33.3 494.7 395.2 509 12.3 283.2 1033.4 18.6 1.6 
Note: values in this and the previous Tables are expressed in millions of Kuwaiti 
dinars (mKD). The above results have been compiled from the annual report of I I-I 
for the year ended 1989. 
Discussion of the results obtained. 
In the light of the above results the following general remarks are made: 
The amount of total profits generated through the model is higher than that actually 
achieved by the management of the House by a difference of almost 10 per 
cent. The discrepancy between the two values may due to two main reasons: 
first, is the assumption we have made that the House is applying two modes of 
finance only to channel its funds. This assumption may have affected the results 
achieved by not including some other modes of finance (e. g construction work 
which may generate negative or at least very low rates of return. The second 
reason is the treatment of funds in the CLA item. The funds placed in this 
item have been considered as a single block that generates rates of returns from 
banking service operations; however, part of these funds are kept as cash and 
balances with other banks. This latter element does not generate any returns 
to lBs because interest is not practised' and the absence of short-term avenues 
based on the principles of Islamic Law (Shari'ah), through which these funds 
can be placed. Having said that, however, we should mote that the value of 
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total profits achieved by the MOOM model are much closer to the actual ones 
than those obtained through the application of the SOOM model. This may 
due to the incorporation of risk in the modelling process, as the next point will 
demonstrate. 
The values of the other objective function in the actual and MOOM model cases 
are almost equal. There is a difference of mKD 3.1 only (i. e. the value of VLR 
generated through the MOOM model is higher than the value of VLR achieved 
actually by 6 per cent). Moreover, if we calculate the values of the ratio 
CLCDSR 
in both cases we will find that these values are exactly the same. 
CLA+. R (in the case of MOOM) = 1.3975 -- 1.4 
CLA+Sa (in the actual case) = 1.4 C 
The closeness of the results in the two cases might due to the fact that 113s, its 
explained in the previous point, still meet their liquidity requirements mainly 
through these elements (i. e. CLA and reserves). That is why it may be the 
case that the management of these institutions, in determining the composition 
of the assets and liabilities of their intermediaries pay considerable attention to 
liquidity risk and how can it be met through the variables under their direct 
control. This policy might have been pursued by the management of KFl-i. 
Although we cannot claim that we have found such a clear indication to this 
policy in the available material, it is clear from the examination of the pattern 
of the growth of these variables (i. e. CLA and reserves) over the years under 
observation that they constitute important elements of the balance sheet. 
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The value of total assets(total liabilities), in terms of millions of Kuwaiti Dinars 
(mKD), generated by the model is greater than that actually achieved by the 
management of KFH at the end of 1989. The difference, however, is not that 
significant. It constitutes 2 per cent (mKD 21.5) only between the two items. 
This slight difference between the two values might be the result of two factors. 
First, the way we have forecast the values of TA(TL) in the case of the model. 
That is we have considered time trend as the sole independent variable. In 
the real world, however, TA(TL) as well as other variables might be better 
considered as variables that are affected by other factors, see chapter 8 page 175 
for more details of this point. The second factor is related to an element which 
the model (lid not take into account. This element is the reduction of the value of 
deposits kept in the House or funds deposited with other financial intermediaries 
as explained in the previous chapter, see pages 175 - 176. Nevertheless, these 
general remarks have given a good indication of how important is the treatment 
of risk and its incorporation in the MOOM model. 
After making these general observations we turn now to compare some other results 
obtained through the application of the MOOM model. In this case our discussion is 
mainly limited to the most important variables. These are CLA and IF on the assets 
side and CD, ID and E on the liabilities side. These variables, in the case of the model, 
have a great effect on the objectives to be optimized (i. e. profits and risk). Moreover, 
their contribution to the size of the balance sheet is quite considerable. Whether in 
the case of the model or in the actual case this contribution did not go below the 
level of 85 per cent of total assets (total liabilities). The general outlook of the results 
generated through the model are close to those actually achieved. However, the two 
blocks of the balance sheet with respect to these variables did not show the same 
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pattern. The results of the liabilities are more close than those of the assets ones 
(note we are talking about the percentage values of the balance sheets). If we looked 
now to the values of the whole variables we may be able to conclude that the MOOM 
model has captured the policies adopted by the management of the House. The main 
thing that the MOOM model has taken into account is the treatment of risk and its 
minimization. Although in this situation our discussion was limited to one type of 
risk, that is liquidity risk, it has in fact affected the course of the results achieved by 
the MOOM model and makes its results much closer to those actually achieved than 
under the SOOM model. 
9.4.2 Comparing the MOOM's results with the actual ones 
of JIB. 
In the case of JIB three objectives have been incorporated in the MOOM model. 
These are: maximizing share profits of both equity shareholders and investment ac- 
countliolders, and minimizing liquidity risk. The inclusion of these three objective 
functions due to the policy adopted by the management of the bank. According to 
this policy the share of investment accountholders in the profits realized by the batik 
is limited to the outcome of investment operations, see chapter 8 pages 168 - 169. In 
order to generate the values of the balance sheet items the structure of the MOOM 
model comprising of the constraints displayed in Appendix 8.3 and the objectives 
presented below has been submitted to ADBASE software package to calculate the 
values of the items of the balance sheet for JIB at the end of 1988. The objective 
functions are as follows: 
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MasSll P= RSCLA + Brp[RLMF + R1LF] (9.9) 
MaxDP = Drp[RLMF + R1LF] (9.10) 
MaxVLR = CLA + SR - CD (9.11) 
Where, SHP = total amount of shareholders share in the profits realized. 
DP = total amount of depositors share in the profits realized from investment oper- 
ations. 
VLR = The amount of liquidity requirements kept as cash and other short term assets 
or as reserves over the value of funds attracted through current deposits (CD). 
The results obtained through the application of the MOOM model ' are presented 
below: 
Table 9.8 Values of the objective functions. 
Item SHP DP VLR 
Value(m. JD) 4.9 5.8 45 
Table 9.9 The balance sheet of JIB generated by the MOOM model at 
the end of 1988 
Assets m. JD % of TA Liabilities mJD % of TL 
CLA 72.5 33.6 CD 30.9 14.3 
IF 118.5 54.9 ID 137 63.5 
FSP 15.3 7.1 SIA 15.9 7.4 
OA 4.9 2.3 SRIR. 4.5 2.1 
FA 4.6 2.1 E 10.2 4.7 
OL 17.3 S 
TA 215.8 100 TL 215.8 100 
The other data which might be helpful for comparison reasons are presented in the 
Table below: 
'Only one efficient extreme point has been generated. 
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Table 9.10 Values of other variables determined by the MOOM model 
item SR GR TC NP D 11 
I value(m. JD) : 3.36 . 86 2.29 2.58 183.8 
Note: values of the variables in this and the previous Tables are denoted in terms of 
millions of Jordanian dinars (mJD). 
The actual results generated by the management of JIB are presented in the following 
Tables: 
Table 9.11 Values of the objective functions actually realized 
Item SHP DP VLR 
Value(tn. ID) 3.1 5.6 39.2 
Table 9.12 The actual Balance sheet of JIB at the end of 1988 
Assets rn. lD % of TA Liabilities mJD % o) TL 
CLA 74.7 33.6 CD 38.7 17.4 
IF 124.1 55.8 ID 142.6 64.1 
FSP 15.9 7.1 SIA 17.1 7.7 
OA 2.8 1.3 SRIR 4.2 1.9 
FA 4.9 2.2 E 10 4.5 
OL 9.8 4.4 
TA 222.4 100 TL 222.4 100 
The values of other variables which might be helpful in comparing the actual with 
the calculated results of the model are presented in the Table below: 
Table 9.13 Values of other variables actually achieved 
item SR GR TP TC NP D 11 
value(ni. JD) : 3.2 . 75 10.4 2.7 1.15 177.8 
Note: values in this and the previous Tables are expressed in terms of millions of 
Jordanian dinars (mJD). 
Discussion of the obtained results. 
From reference to the results presented in the Tables above, the following general 
observations are made: 
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With respect to the values of the objective functions, the only values that are close 
to each other are those of DP. In this case the value of DP generated through 
the MOOM model is higher than that actually achieved by a difference of 3.8 
per cent only. However, the values of other objective functions did show a great 
divergence between the two results. The biggest difference is that between SHP 
of the model and SHP achieved actually (a difference of 58 per cent), whereas 
in the case of VLR there is a difference between the two results of 15 per cent. 
The discrepancy between the two results may due to the CLA factor and the 
assumption of constant costs in the case of SHP and the actual value of CD in 
the case of VLR. In the former case (i. e. SHP) funds placed in the CLA element 
has been treated as one block. That is these funds have been considered to be 
used in financing services which generate rates of return to the bank. In reality 
part of these funds are kept as vault cash and balances with other banks for 
liquidity purposes. Therefore this part of CLA does not generate any income. 
The effect of the assumption of constant costs is very plausible in making the 
profits of shareholders greater than the actual case (i. e. the assumed value of 
costs is equal to mJD 2.29 whereas the actual cost is mJD 2.7). In the latter 
case, i. e. the case of the VLR objective function, the difference between the 
two values may due to the value of CD actually realized, because it is higher 
than that generated through the model. For this reason as well the values of 
the ratio CLA+ tiR are not so close to each other. 
CLA+SR (the case of the MOOM model) = 2.45 
CLGDSR ( the actual case) = 2.00 
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The values of total assets (total liabilities) in both cases are not far from each other. 
This may due to the fact that the upward trend in the values of TA(TL) over 
the years under observation has been captured by the time trend equation used 
to forecast the value of TA(TL) for the year ended 1988 as well as other reasons 
as spelled out in chapter 8 pages 186 - 187. 
It can be noticed that the bank is meeting its liquidity requirements mainly through 
the CLA factor. In both cases (i. e. the actual as well as the case of the MOOM 
model) the value of CLA is much more higher than the values of CD. In the 
case of the model the ratio LA is more than double, whereas in the actual case 
this ratio is almost equal to double. 
Having made the above general remarks, attention is now focused on comparing the 
two results in more detail. In this case much emphasis is placed on the percentage 
presentation of the items of the balance sheets. Moreover, discussion will focus mainly 
on the variables that have a very important influence on the objectives assumed to be 
optimized in the case of the model. These variables are CLA and IF on the assets side 
and CD, ID and E on the liabilities side. If we look at the percentage contribution 
of these variables to the volume of total assets (total liabilities), see Tables 9.9 and 
9.12, we will notice how close the results are in both situations. The largest difference 
is that of between CDs and it is slightly above 3 per cent. In the actual case CD 
is equal to 17.4 per cent of total liabilities, while the percentage of CD with respect 
to total liabilities in the case of the model is equal to 13.4 per cent. This closeness 
of results might due to the fact that policy constraints and objectives formulated 
in the model might have been captured or at least are very close to those adopted 
by the management of the bank. The reason why this might be the case is the 
small size of the bank; therefore its management might have pursued a conservative 
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policy in structuring the assets and liabilities of the bank. In addition, in the process 
of determining the components of the balance sheet it might be the case that the 
management is paying considerable attention to meet its liquidity obligations and 
ensuring them through the variables under their direct control. Further management 
have allocated a certain percentage of profits realized from investment operations in 
good times in order to cover any losses in bad times (the element of the balance sheet 
used for this purpose is SRIR). From this brief discussion one might conclude that the 
general performance of the MOOM model is quite good in the sense that it was able 
to incorporate some of the policies that might have a great influence on the decision 
process of the decision maker(s) and the results of the MOOM model have dominated 
those actually achieved. 
9.5 Some Managerial Implications 
In section 2 of this chapter we have discussed the methods available of tackling nuil- 
tiple objective programs. In that discussion it was stated that MOLP falls in the 
category of methods that find all or most of the efficient solutions. However, most of 
the available packages locate efficient extreme points only, because the number of all 
efficient solutions might be countless. Nevertheless, our main concern is not this. Our 
main interest is what do these results mean or offer decision maker(s)? In calculating 
the items of the balance sheet of KFH ADBASE generated 6 efficient extreme points. 
One of these points has been analyzed in the previous section, the remaining are pre- 
sented in Appendix 9.2. This simple exercise tries to find the nondominatecl solutions 
and present them to the decision maker(s) to select the "best" overall solution which 
might fulfil the utility being optimized. The results presented to our decision I»akvr 
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in the case of KFII can be grouped under three main preferences 
1. The first is the one in which the overriding concern of our decision maker is prof- 
its. This preference could be met by selecting one of the set of the four solutions 
(i. e. extreme points 1,2,3 and 5). One of these solutions (i. e. extreme point 
5) has generated the same results as those of the single objective optimizing 
model (SOOM). Therefore, if the decision maker is trying to maximize profits 
whatever the level of risk then lie should select one of these solutions. 
2. The second is the one in which the decision maker is trying to maximize profit 
but on the same time is paying attention to the level of risk that is going to 
face. This policy might be the case of extreme point 6 which we have discussed 
in the previous section. 
3. The third is the one in which the overriding factor of our decision maker is 
the minimization of risk. This policy is presented in the efficient extreme point 
number 4. 
The above discussion shows how the results of the MOLP technique might provide 
decision makers with explicit trade-offs that are required between nondominated so- 
lutions. Based on these trade-offs and the decision maker preferences for the various 
objectives, a multiobjective maximizing solution can be selected. In this case the 
MOLP allows the introduction of the utility function into the decision making pro- 
cess without requiring its prior explicit introduction into the model. 
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9.6 Concluding Remarks 
From the above results and the discussion that followed the following remarks are 
made: 
The general performance of the model is quite encouraging in the sense that the 
results generated through the MOOM model have captured some of the policies 
that might be pursued by the management of the selected institutions. This 
might be applied to funds utilization ratio (FUR) and liquidity requirements 
(LR) constraints and the inclusion of the risk objective function. 
The incorporation of risk objective function in the MOOM model has affected the 
results and have made these results closer to those actually achieved. This 
might imply the fact that liquidity risk is given considerable attention by the 
management of these institutions. This is not a surprising finding since these in- 
stitutions are working in localities within which the established available means 
of meeting liquidity requirements cannot be used by them because of the pro- 
hibition of paying or receiving of interest. 
The development of the MOOM model does not require much change to the work 
carried out in the case of the single objective optimization model SOOMI lllollel. 
The managerial implications of the obtained results are quite useful. The decision 
maker is not required to set tip a prior target to his objectives. On the contrary, 
he will have the opportunity to use his preferences and skills to select the policy 
which he thinks is going to optimize his utility function. 
The main source of ensuring liquidity is CLA and reserves as it was found in the 
previous case of the SOOM model. This is not strange since short term interest 
2: 36 
instruments are excluded and the limitation of the avenues of exploiting these 
short term funds on the basis of Islamic Law (Shari'ah). 
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Appendix 9.1 Some essential 
features of Multiobjective Linear 
Programming Technique 
MOLP is a technique that uses the concept of nondominaut solution. 'I'lse INIOLP, 
therefore, attempts to optimize all objectives simultaneously subject to the specified 
constraints. The output of the procedure is a set of solutions which is said to he non- 
dominated. A nondominated solution is a solution for which no objective function 
can be improved without some impairment of other objectives, (Eattnau and Scaly 
(1979)). The uondominated solution concept, provided by the MOLD, is equivalent to 
an efficient solution in the theory of portfolio analysis. When the set of efficient solu- 
tions is obtained, managers use their subjective preferences, experience and judgment 
to choose the solution that is more preferable 
to them. 'I'lse utility function is thus 
introduced by the bank managers themselves and does not require explicit specifica- 
tion, (Eatman and Sealy (1979)). Therefore, the best "overall" solution chosen by the 
management depends on their utility function and their evaluation of the trade-offs 
that can be derived from the solutions, (Eatman and Sealy (1979)). In siuninary, in 
the MOLP the manager is trying to find all the efficient solutions, with the property 
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that there is no other solution which is better or as good as it in all the objectives, 
(French, Hartley, Thomas and White (1986)). Thus, the multiobjective mathematical 
program (MMP) can be stated as follows: the MMP is an algorithm which tries to 
assist a decision maker in the problem of selecting values for each n decision variables, 
x= (xl, x2, ... x,, 
) in order to optimize p(p > 2) objective functions f, (x), 12(x), ... 
fp(x), subject to various constraints on the decision variables. Mathematically the 
MMP program can be summarized as follows: 
Optimize F(X) = [fi(x), f2(x), ... fp(x)], subject to xEX. 
Algorithms that solve these types of programs utilize the concept of efficient solution 
to be obtained. Au efficient solution xE to the above problem is it feasible solu- 
tiou, XE E X, for which does not exist any other feasible solution, xEX, such that 
fi(xE) < f; (x) for all i=1,2, ... p, and 
f; (xE) < f; (x) for some i=1,2,3, ... 1), 
(Evans(1984)). The algorithms developed to solve multiobjective programs can be 
divided into two categories, Evans(1984): 
1. Those which concentrate on finding all efficient extreme points, examples of the 
work carried out in this category are to be found in Steuer(1971,1991). 
2. Those which concentrate on finding all efficient points, regardless whether these 
points are extreme or not, example of this work are Yu and Zeleny (1975) and 
Ecker(1980). 
Each of the above approaches has its merits and demerits. The first category of al- 
gorithms produces some of the efficient points (i. e. extreme ones) and Bence reduces 
the long list from which the decision maker is going to choose the "best" overall so- 
lution. However, in many problems the best-compromise solution is an efficient point 
that is not an extreme point of the constraints set, (Evans(19S"1)). Academics, who 
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have developed algorithms that lie in the area of the second category, have taken 
this argument to develop methods that generate all efficient solutions. Evans(1984) 
states that these algorithms are often unsatisfactory for the reasons stated in page 
217 and the fact that these algorithms usually produce all infinite number of elli- 
cient solutions. To overcome these problems Steuer (1976) developed a procedure for 
eliminating many of the efficient points prior to the optimization by assigning lower 
and upper bounds to weights attached to each of the objectives. Zeleny (1982), on 
the other hand, has developed the method of "disposal ideal" for reducing the set 
of efficient solutions generated from MMP. The method used to reduce the set of 
efficient solutions is by removing each solution which results in all outcome which is 
at a certain distance or further from the " disposal ideal". For more details on this 
staff see Evans (1984) and Zeleny (1982). The latter is extremely recommended for 
understanding the multicriterion simplex method which is usually used in packages 
to derive the set of efficient extreme points. 
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Appendix 9.2 The other Results 
generated by the MOOM model 
for KFH 
In this appendix the other five extreme efficient solutions derived by the MOOM 
model for KID II are displayed. 
1. The results of the efficient extreme point number 1. 
Table 9.14 Values of the objective functions 
Item TP VLR. 
Value(mKD) 57.9 X13.1 
11 
Table 9.15 The Balance Sheet of KFH generated by the NIOOM 
model at the end of 1989 extreme point 1. 
Assets mKD % of TA Liabilities mKD % of '1'L 
CLA 176.27 15 CD 155 1.3.2 
IF 931.91 79.3 DFI 38.23 3.2 
CW 38.96 3.3 ID 878.33 7.1.7 
OA 10 0.9 E 5: 3.58 4.6 
FA 18 1.5 OL 50 '1.3 
TA 1175.14 100 TL 1175.14 100 
The other results generated by the model are given in the Table below: 
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Table 9.16 Values of other variables obtained by the MOOM model 
for KFH. 
item NP MF LF UID DSR (W 
mKD 44.9 512.5 419.4 878.33 1071.6 21.9 5.7 
2. The results of the efficient extreme point number 2. 
Table 9.17 Values of the objective functions 
Item TP VLR 
Value(mKD) 57.9 43.1 11 
Table 9.18 The Balance Sheet of KFH generated by the MOOM 
model at the end of 1989 extreme point 2. 
Assets mKD % of TA Liabilities mKD % of 
CLA 176.27 15 CD 155 13.2 
IF 931.91 79.3 DFI 38.23 3.2 
CW 38.96 : 3.3 ID 878.33 74.7 
OA 10 0.9 E 5: 3.58 4.6 
FA 18 1.5 OL 50 4.3 
TA 1175.14 100 TI, 1175.14 100 
The other results generated in this point are given in the Table below: 
Table 9.19 Values of other variables obtained by the MOOM model 
for KFH. 
item NP MF LF SD UID D sit (. Il{ 
mKD 44.9 512.5 419.4 535.8 342.5 1071.6 21.9 5.7 
3. The results of the efficient extreme point number 3. 
Table 9.20 Values of the objective functions 
Item TP VLR 
value(mKD) 57.9 13.1 
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Table 9.21 The Balance Sheet of KFH generated by the MOOM 
model at the end of 1989 extreme point 3. 
Assets mKD % of TA Liabilities mKD % of TL 
CLA 176.27 15 CD 155 13.2 
IF 931.91 79.3 DFI 38.23 3.9 
CW 38.96 3.3 ID 878.33 74.7 
OA 10 0.9 E 53.58 4.6 
FA 18 1.5 OL 50 4.3 
TA 1175.14 100 TL 1175.14 100 
The other results generated through this point are given in the Table below: 
Table 9.22 Values of other variables obtained by the MOOM model 
for KFH. 
item NP MF LF LID UID D Sit (U 
ni KD 44.9 512.5 419.4 610.4 267.9 1071.6 21.9 5.7 
4. The results of the efficient extreme point number 4. 
Table 9.23 Values of the objective functions 
Item TP VLR 
Value(mKD) 20.7 130.3 
Table 9.24 The Balance Sheet of KFH generated by the MOOM 
model at the end of 1989 extreme point 4. 
Assets mKD % of TA Liabilities mKD %u of '1'lß 
CLA 152.8 15 CD X10.7 4.1 
IF 276.9 27.1 DFI 651.4 63.9 
CW 561.3 55.1 ID 230.7 22.6 
OA 10 1.0 E "I6.2 4.5 
FA 18 1.8 OL 50 -1.0 
TA 1019 100 TL 1019 100 
The other results generated through this point are given in the 'l'ýýlýlcr bolo : 
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Table 9.25 Values of other variables obtained by the MOOM model 
for KFH. 
item NP MF LF UID D SR GR 
mKD7.7 152.3 124.6 230.7 922.9 18.2 1.97 
5. The results of the efficient extreme point number 5. 
Table 9.26 Values of the objective functions 
Item TP VLR 
Value 57.9 43.1 
Table 9.27 The Balance Sheet of KFH generated by the MOOM 
model at the end of 1989 extreme point 5. 
Assets mKD % of TA Liabilities mKD % of TL 
CLA 176.27 15 CD 155 13.2 
IF 931.91 79.3 DFI 38.2 .3 . 3.2 
CW : 38.96 3.3 ID 878.33 74.7 
OA 10 0.9 E 53.58 4.6 
FA 18 1.5 OL 50 4.3 
TA 1175.14 100 TL 1175.14 100 
The other results generated through this point are given in the Table below: 
Table 9.28 Values of other variables obtained by the MOOM model 
for KFH. 
item NP MF LF SD LID UID D SR ("IZ 
niKD 44.9 512.5 419.4 535.8 74.7 267.7 1071.6 21.9 5.7 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions and Suggestions for 
Future Work 
In this research we have dealt with the asset and liability management (ALM) problem 
of all Interest-free Islamic Bank (IB) and then we constructed mathematical models 
of the linear versions of single-and multi-objective forms to solve this problem. This 
effort was preceded by a thorough and detailed discussion of the nature and magnitude 
of the operations carried out by all IB and the implications of these operations on the 
ALM problem of these intermediaries. The main findings of this study are summarized 
as follows: 
1. Financial intermediaries are very important vehicles for the process of pooling 
and transmitting funds as well as providing other services in modern economies. 
They carry out this function through the use of financial instruments. In this 
process two arrangements are provided; one for surplus economic units (i. e. 
secondary securities) and the other for deficit economic units (i. e. prinºary 
securities). Most of these arrangements are based upon interest rate mechanism; 
that is holders of these securities are promised at a future date the payment of 
their capital sums and a pre-determined positive rate of interest. 
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2. Interest-free lBs are those financial intermediaries that provide financial services 
to their customers on the basis of the principles laid down by Islamic Law 
(Shari'ah). Prohibition of Riba (interest is one form of it) in all transaction 
dealings is one important element of these principles that must be adhered 
to. This study has demonstrated that working within the framework of these 
principles has made some of the operations of I Bs different from those carried out 
by their interest-based (IBBs) counterparts. This difference has been noticed 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Although on the qualitative level hotly 
intermediaries (i. e. lBs and IBBs) are similar in purpose; that is the provision 
of financial services, they have major contrasts on the intermediation function. 
These contrasts are summarized in the following Table. 
Table 10.1 Major contrasts between IBs and IBBs 
Islamic Banks (IBs) Interest-based banks (l B fis) 
Accept investment funds on the Accept investment funds 
basis of PLS principle. Thus on the basis of interest 
investment account holders mechanism. Thus depositors 
are not guarantied at the very least are 
the nominal values of guarantied the values of 
their funds. Paying back these their capital sums. 
funds depends entirely upon These funds and any interest 
the outcome of the operations are paid regardless the outcome 
financed by the bank. of the operations of the bank. 
Funds are passed on the same basis. Funds are passed on to 
That is PLS mechanism and therefore borrowers on the same basis. 
the results of the bank depend on That is interest and the 
the success/failure borrowed funds are paid regardless 
of the financed projects. the outcome of the financed projects. 
In addition to the supervision of the The main regulatory body 
central bank the operations of most of is the central bank. 
these banks are inspected by religious 
supervisory committees to ensure the 
conformity of these operations to the 
principles of Islamic Law 
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On the quantitative level, it seeins that IBs tend not to add to the available 
liquidity created elsewhere, whereas their interest-based counterparts tenet to 
add to the liquidity of the rest of the economy. 
3. The ALM problem of IBs is of special nature. This special nature is derived from 
the instruments applied by these intermediaries to pool and transmit funds as 
well as the environment through which they operate. The instruments used by 
IBs are not pure financial assets as applied so far, and hence these instruments 
cannot be traded in organized financial markets. The environment through 
which IBs operate affects the ALM problem because of the dominant role of 
interest based dealings in many countries. As a result major opportunities 
cannot be exploited (e. g. trading in money and capital markets). 
4. Islam is a complete way of life as such the financial system constitutes orte (part 
only of this code of life. The major implication is that taking a single part in 
isolation from other parts may not produce. the desired results. For instance, 
the whole code of this system is based on the belief of Allah (i. e. God) and 
the (lay of judgement. If the people who are supposed to he Muslims are not 
aware that they will to account for what they have done, this may affect their 
financial practices by underreporting the results of their projects. Therefore, 
those who are involved in the `Islamization' process should Ise aware of this 
fact and lience they should provide a comprehensive educational program as an 
essential part of completing the task of 'lslaillizing' the financial system. This 
by no means should be interpreted as abandoning the proccess of (estalulisliinG 
financial institutions on the basis of Islam, but it should be taken in the context 
of emphasizing the comprehensiveness of Islamic way of life and the pitfalls or 
difficulties that might be faced if one part of this system is implemented in an 
environment that is not fully guided by the Islamic code. 
2 , 17 
5. As for the application of linear programs, it is difficult to draw any definite 
conclusions from the data we have presented. Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
specific models (i. e. SOOM and MOOM) do offer considerable insight into the 
way some policies are adopted by the management of IBs. This is apparent 
in the case of funds utilization and liquidity requirements ratios. However, the 
treatment of risk in the case of the MOOM model has affected the results by 
making them much closer to those actually achieved than under the case of the 
SOOM model. Therefore, with considerable caution we might say that linear 
optimization programs do offer some hope as means to help the management of 
IBs in determining the `optimal' structure of the balance sheet of their banks. 
6. It is evident that managerial implications of the results generated through these 
models offer very valuable information. Optimization techniques should be 
presented, therefore, as managerial tools rather than as mechanical approaches 
of deriving optimal solutions only. 
7. The major difficulty faced, in generating the 'optimal' solutions through the 
application of these linear optimization techniques, was obtaining the appropri- 
ate data. The data used in thsi study was extracted from annual reports alone. 
This is a serious limitation, but uuvoidable weakness of the present study. 'I'Ile 
ideal way of deriving conclusions from the use of these models requires at least 
virtual data to that used by the decision maker. 
8. Not much cost is expected to be incurred if the management of Iris eleci(le's to 
adopt optimization techniques of the sort of the models we have developed in 
this study in their planning and managerial activities. Basically three elenmvnts 
are essential in these process: the analyst (model builder or management scien- 
tist), the model itself and the decision maker. It might be possible that at early 
stages of adopting this process that much time needs to be spent in establish- 
ing a very effective communication system and bridging the gap between the 
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understanding of the analyst and that of the decision maker, and lieuce reor- 
ganization of the data bases that provide the model builder with the necessary 
and appropriate data. Once this essential and initial stage is completed on a 
sound ground I do not think that the years to come will require as much time as 
that spent at the initial stage. As for the likely benefits that might be achieved, 
these are listed as follows: 
" Reorganization of the information data in such a detailed and appropriate 
way that will be very useful for planning and decision making activities. 
" Implementation of these models allows decision makers to evaluate different 
courses and hence have all overview about the policy to be selected under 
specific circumstances. 
" Formulating real world activities may help us ill increasing our under- 
standing to these real phenomena, especially if we recognize the fact that 
mathematical optimization models consider simultaneously all aspects of 
the problem analysed. 
However, the above listed benefits should not be considered in isolation from the 
limitations that optimization techniques have. The greatest, among others, is 
the fact that these models are merely abstract approximation of the real world 
phenomena. As such the developed models must necessarily be incomplete or 
inaccurate in some aspects. This is so because the real world is too complex 
to manipulate or understand without the help of an intellectual simplifications 
that models present. Therefore, rather being seen as a rigid guide to action, the 
solution provided by these models should be viewed as strategic plan to whirls 
tactical modifications, based on nonquantifiable subjective factors; may he nec- 
essary. Thus the use of these models should not be considered as a replacement 
to management judgement, but should serve as a basis for communication, co- 
ordination, etc. In short, benefiting from implementing these models requires ; III 
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interaction between the model builder, the decision maker and the model itself 
through computer programs. Cohen (1969) states "when management-oriented 
scientists work jointly with senior executives to develop the economic substance 
and banking meaning of the management science models, the results are usually 
very relevant to the executives' problems". 
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Suggestions for Future Work 
The subject of Islamic banking is still a very fertile and new area as such many 
avenues yet to be explored. Here I point out a few avenues with respect to current 
research of the ALM problem and the area of Islamic banking in general. As far as 
the current research is concerned, there are several ways in which this study could be 
extended. One way is to consider the multiperiodicity of the ALM problem of l13s. 
Thus monthly or quarterly programs could be developed so as intertemporal links can 
be developed and more detailed constraints and variables can be included. Another 
venue is to enlarge the sample size by including other banks working under (lifferent 
economic conditions or just to cover as many banks as possible so that it would be 
possible to derive conclusions that can be generalized. Actual implementation of 
these models is a third possible way. Finally, managerial implications of these models 
could be extended to include more constraints, objective function parameters and 
structural coefficients in the case of the SOOM model and critical evaluation of the 
different non-dominated efficient solutions in the case of the MOOM model. 
In the area of Islamic banking the following general topics are briefly listed: 
" Firstly, the implications of establishing commercial banks on a pure equity basis 
for monetary policies as well as for the management of these institutions. III 
particular stability of this system, bank runs and failures, liquidity distribution 
and creation, etc. 
" Secondly, critical evaluation on macro-level of the `Islamization' process of the 
financial system in countries such as Sudan and Pakistan so as to determine 
the positive steps, and enforce them, and identify the weaknesses so as to avoid 
them, as well as such study will be fruitful for other experiments. 
" Thirdly, accounting and financial reporting heeds particular attention, so that 
standard accounting practices can be developed and implemented by operating 
Islamic banks. 
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